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Abstract 
 
This thesis develops and tests a new model which integrates the resource-based view (RBV) 
and institutional theory to explain MNEs, especially emerging economy MNEs’ (EMEs) 
outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) strategy and performance. Existing literature has 
highlighted the significance as well as limitations of the RBV and IT in an international 
business context. Recently scholars argue that the RBV and IT should be combined for better 
applicability in MNE study. However, so far, there has been no work that comprehensively 
addresses the following questions: What are the limitations of the RBV and IT in the 
international business context? What are their boundaries and overlaps for MNE study? In 
the international business context, why should the RBV and IT be integrated and how can 
they be integrated to better explain MNEs’ OFDI strategy and performance? 
 
In order to fill the above research gaps, this thesis firstly discusses the limitations, 
boundaries, and integration mechanisms of the RBV and IT in an international business 
context, based on which, a new model integrating the RBV and IT is developed to 
explain/predict MNEs, especially EMEs’ OFDI strategy and performance. Theoretical 
propositions are proposed in the theory-building chapter (chapter 2).  
 
To test the above new model, three specific empirical studies (chapters 3, 4 and 5) are 
conducted. As a baseline of the model, chapter 3 examines how MNEs’ resources, 
institutional conditions and OFDI strategies affect their performance directly and separately. 
Specially, controlling for EMEs’ self-selection into the global investment market, chapter 3 
investigates how EMEs’ resources, institutional conditions, and OFDI strategies affect their 
productivity gain from OFDI. The propensity-score matching and difference-in-difference 
(DID) approaches are combined to test the theoretical framework, utilizing unique data on 
Chinese manufacturing firms over the sample period 2002–2008. The results provide insights 
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into this topic by indicating that EMEs without state ownership but with stronger absorptive 
capability gain higher and sustainable productivity effects. Such gains are lagged if merger 
and acquisition (M&A) are employed as an entry strategy, and gains are higher for EMEs 
investing in developed than in less developed countries. Policy and managerial implications 
are discussed.  
 
Chapters 4 and 5 investigate the determinants and impact of MNE subsidiaries’ bribing 
strategy in corrupt contexts. An analytical framework is built based on an integration of 
institutional and resource-based constructs, and tested using firm-level data from 2210 
subsidiaries operating in Africa. Controlling for the subsidiaries’ self-selection to bribe, the 
findings, based on the Tobit, Heckman two-step, OLS and IV regression results, indicate that 
the heterogeneity of MNE subsidiaries’ resources and perceived corrupt pressures lead to 
differing bribery strategies in response to host country corruption, and these two variables 
then interactively moderate the impact of bribery on MNES performance. MNE subsidiaries’ 
perceived level of host country corruption produces a positive effect on their choice of 
bribery. But the subsidiaries’ home-country anti-corruption levels and their holding of 
internationally recognized quality certification (IQC) reduce MNE subsidiaries’ willingness 
to pay bribes. A more interesting finding is that, after controlling for MNE subsidiaries’ 
perceived pressures of corruption in host countries, MNE subsidiaries’ home-country anti-
corruption levels and MNE subsidiaries’ holding of IQC negatively moderate bribery’s 
effectiveness on performance. Theoretical and managerial implications of the findings are 
discussed.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Research Background and Thesis Structure 
 
In 2015, global flows of foreign direct investment (FDI) jumped by about 40 per cent to 
$1.76 trillion ($1,065 billion outward flows from developed economies and $378 billion 
outward flows from developing economies), the highest level since the global economic 
and financial crisis of 2008-2009 (UNCTAD, 2016). However, the dramatic growth of 
global outward FDI (OFDI) flows did not translate into an equivalent positive result on 
multinational enterprises (MNEs). While some MNEs gain monopolies in international 
markets, others suffer from inappropriate investment strategies and corresponding poor 
OFDI performance, which stimulates scholars to declare the importance of figuring out 
the factors which determine MNEs’, especially emerging market MNEs’ (EMEs) OFDI 
heterogeneity (Martin, 2014; Dunning and Lundan, 2008; Brouthers, Brouthers, & 
Werner, 2008b； Liu, Gao, Lu, & Lioliou, 2016). Comprehensive identification of the 
determinants of MNEs’ strategy and performance thus is essential, both theoretically and 
practically, as MNEs can learn lessons from others and a more sophisticated theoretical 
philosophy assists them a lot to formulate correct strategies that fit themselves 
maximally (Peng, Wang,  and Jiang, 2008). 
 
So what determine the heterogeneity of MNEs’ internationalization strategy and 
performance? This question has been fundamental to international business scholars. 
Since Hymer (1960) and Vernon (1966), many attempts have been made to articulate a 
satisfactory theory for predicting MNEs’ OFDI activities, but what all of these 
approaches have in common is that they are asset-based theories (Dunning and Lundan, 
2008). Inspired by Penrose (1959), the RBV places its main focus on the accumulation 
of technological assets and knowledge by firms across borders, and contributes to our 
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theoretical understanding of what determines the boundaries and performance of MNEs 
over time and space. Barney (1991) then suggests that the variation in MNEs’ 
internationalization is a function of inter-firm resource heterogeneity, and it is the 
resource-based advantages that enable MNEs to generate competitive advantages and 
thus determine their strategic choices and OFDI results (Barney, 1991; Wang et al., 
2012). Dunning’s OLI or eclectic paradigm (Dunning, 1980, 1988) also emphasizes that 
it is the exploitation of MNEs’ ownership advantages, which derives from MNEs’ 
valuable, unique, and hard to imitate resources, e.g., technological and marketing 
resources (Kotabe, Srinivasan, and Aulakh, 2002), R&D (Kafouros and Buckley, 2008), 
brand, international knowledge and experience, that determines MNEs’ OFDI strategies 
(Brouthers et al, 2008; Chen et al., 2009) and “distinguishes the winners from the losers 
and mere survivors in global competition” (Peng, 2001; Rugman and Verbeke, 2002). 
 
However, notwithstanding its valuable insights, the RBV has been argued a lot by 
international business scholars for its ignorance of institutions’ effect on MNEs’ resource 
accumulation and exploitation (Peng et al., 2008； Brother et al., 2008; Priem and 
Butler, 2002; Khanna and Yafeh, 2007; Li and Peng, 2008; Zacharakis, McMullen, and 
Shepherd, 2007; Makino, Isobe, and Chan, 2004; Wang et al. , 2012; Barney, 2002). It is 
suggested that the RBV has not looked beyond the properties of resource and imperfect 
resource markets to explain MNEs’ enduring heterogeneity. In fact, as MNEs are 
operating cross-border, their variations and heterogeneity in competitive advantages 
could also lie in their embedded home countries (Kostova, Roth, and Dacin, 2008; 
Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 2008; Porter, 1980, Wang, 2012; Martin, 2014). In addition, 
in an international business context, MNEs’ rare, valuable, and hard-to-imitate resources 
in one context could be plentiful, non-valuable, and easy to imitate in other contexts, 
which indicates that MNEs’ heterogeneity of strategy and performance could not be 
predicted by sore resource-based factors, but a combination of resource-based factors 
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and institutional factors (Oliver, 1997; Brouthers et al., 2008; Wang, 2012). Developed 
country MNEs’ initial internationalization was based on resource-based ownership 
advantages that had evolved in a rather interactive way within the development of their 
home country, taking forms needed to be competitive there, and their decisions to 
commit to international expansion were based on the firms’ own perception of 
opportunities in foreign locations that could be best exploited by the activation of their 
in-place resources. Different from the RBV’s prediction, EMEs’ initial 
internationalization has been occurring before such firms have plausibly had the firm 
specific resources that could facilitate entry into international competiveness in the 
traditional fashion, and before their domestic market positioning was provoking reasons 
for them to consider doing so. Since general resource-based theories of OFDI are 
developed based on experiences of MNEs from industrialized countries, their ability to 
account for OFDI from developing countries, especially emerging economies, has been 
the subject of recent debate (Collinson and Rugman, 2007; Dunning, 2006; Mathews, 
2006b; Narula, 2006; Aharoni, 2014; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2012; Dunning, Kim and Park, 
2008; Godley, 2014; Ramamurti, 2012; Rugman, 2010), and an alternative framework to 
explain later-comer EMEs’ OFDI activities has been asked for (Buckley, et al., 2008; 
Dunning and Lundan, 2008; Mathews, 2001; Moon and Roehl, 2001; Child and 
Rodrigues, 2005). Here the author asks what aspects of these EMEs actually defy logical 
priori expectations and how addressing these specific issues may point towards a holistic 
understanding of their nature and implications. Specifically, to what extent does 
achieving this require adjustments to traditional resource-based theories? Do we need a 
new theory to fully encompass a truly radical phenomenon? Or can we comprehend this 
new phenomenon in the world of international bus iness through reworking of the 
established resource-based models?  
 
Inspired by Dunning and Lundan (2008), given the limitations of the RBV’s 
explanations of the MNE, an institutional approach, which ties to bridge the macro and 
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micro levels of analysis and encompasses both formal and informal institutions, offers a 
promising way to advance our understating of MNEs’ heterogeneity. Despite their 
different assumptions and boundaries, the RBV and IT could be potentially integrated in  
international business literature as these two theories are complementary and 
interdependent (Wang et al., 2012). The integration of the RBV and IT could also be 
justified that despite the vulnerability of their firm specific resources, EMEs 
internationalize and remain competitive because they have special ownership advantages 
that derive from embedded home country institutions, and can access various types of 
support from their home countries. Those institutional advantages, on one hand, assist 
firms to exploit resources-based advantages more efficiently; on the other hand, work as 
a supplement to EMEs’ resources, affecting their OFDI strategy and performance. 
However, so far, in spite of the urgent requests and some preliminarily empirical 
attempts, a theoretical framework that comprehensively incorporates both resource-based 
and institutional factors to explain MNEs, especially EMEs’ OFDI trajectory is still 
underdeveloped (Oliver, 1997; Brouthers, 2008; Wang et al., 2012; Martin, 2014; 
Dunning and Lundan, 2008). Tremendous works have stressed the separate roles of 
resource-based and institutional factors in MNEs’ OFDI entry mode choice, investment 
location decision, and subsidiary performance  (Kafouros and Buckley, 2008; Kotabe, 
Srinivasan, and Aulakh, 2002; Chen, et al., 2009; Lu et al., 2010; Barkema, Bell, and 
Pennings, 1996; Chung and Beamish, 2005; Delios and Henisz, 2003; Meyer et al., 2013, 
Johanson and Vahlne, 1977; Ghemawat, 2001; Luo and  Shenkar, 2011; Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2006; Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 2008; Del Sol and Kogan, 2007; García‐Canal 
and Guillén, 2008; Govindarajan and  Ramamurti, 2011; Holburn and Zelner, 2010; 
Hoskisson et al. , 2013; Luo and Wang, 2012), but it is not clear what the boundaries and 
limitations of the RBV and IT are in an international business context. Can they be 
integrated? If so, how can they be integrated to explain/predict MNEs’, especially 
EMEs’ OFDI trajectories (Oliver, 1997; Brouthers, 2008; Wang et al., 2012; Martin, 
2014; Dunning and Lundan, 2008)? 
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Against this research background, the current PhD project aims to stress the above 
research gaps and extend existing theoretical and empirical literature (e.g., Peng, 2008 
and 2009; Dunning and Lundan, 2008; Oliver, 1997; Brouthers et al., 2008; Wang et al, 
2012) by answering the following research questions: 
 
1. What are the firm-level boundaries and limitations of the resource-based view and 
institutional theory in an international business context? What are the integration 
mechanisms of the RBV and IT, and why and how can they be integrated in explaining 
MNEs’ outward direct investment? 
 
2. What are the respective roles of resource-based and institutional factors, and MNEs’ 
strategy in EMEs’ productivity growth from OFDI? 
 
3, How do resource-based and institutional factors jointly determine MNE subsidiaries’ 
bribing strategy in host countries? 
 
4, How do resource-based and institutional factors integrate to moderate the 
effectiveness of MNE subsidiaries’ bribing strategy on financial performance?  
 
Specially, chapter 1 of this thesis introduces the research background, research questions, 
thesis structure and potential theoretical and empirical contributions. 
 
Chapter 2 will concentrate on theory building. In this chapter, the author aims to fill in 
the gaps by developing a new model in line with the integration of the RBV and IT to 
comprehensively explain MNEs’ OFDI strategy and performance. Following Yan and 
Grey’s (1994) analytical induction approach, the author firstly offers a model that 
synthesizes past literature on how the RBV and IT have been applied to MNEs’ OFDI 
research. The author then uncovers this model’s shortcomings and extends it toward a 
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new model that carefully incorporates both separate and integrative characters of the 
RBV and IT to predict international business affairs. Different from the previous 
literature which has attempted to stress the potential combination of resource-based and 
institutional factors (Martin, 2014; Dunning and Lundan, 2008; Oliver, 1997; Brouthers 
et al., Wang et al., 2012), this chapter goes further via identifying the mutual moderating 
effect of resource-based and institutional factors on MNEs’ OFDI (Brouthers, et al., 
2008; Martin, 2014) and elaborating the firm-level integration mechanisms of resource-
based and institutional constructs in an international business context (Oliver, 1997; 
Wang et al., 2012). Furthermore, the model the author proposes in this chapter will 
incorporate a new concept “institution-based resources”, capturing both institutions’ 
indirect enabling role and direct supplying role in MNEs’ formulation of specific 
resources. This concept helps explain why traditional international business theory 
cannot fully explain EMEs’ internationalization practices (Buckley et al., 2007; Buckley 
et al., 2008).  
 
Chapters 3 to 5 will be empirical studies aiming to test the model proposed in chapter 2 
using a step-by-step approach. As Andersson, Cuervo-Cazurra, and Nielsen (2014) have 
strongly recommended, in the case of explaining interactions within the same level of 
analysis, scholars need to firstly provide an explanation of the mechanisms that link the 
main independent variable to the dependent variable, and then explain how the 
interaction variable modifies these mechanisms. Thus, although this thesis mainly 
contributes by identifying the integrative role of resource-based and institutional factors 
in moderating each other’s effects on MNEs’ OFDI, chapter 3 will test the baselines of 
the new model, i.e. test the direct and separate roles of resource-based factors, 
institutional factors, and MNEs’ strategy in MNEs’ OFDI performance. Resource-based 
factors, institutional factors and OFDI strategies could influence MNEs’ performance 
(Kafouros and Buckley, 2008; Kotabe, Srinivasan, and Aulakh, 2002; Chen  et al., 2009; 
Lu et al., 2010; Barkema, Bell and Penning, 1996; Chung and Beamish, 2005; Delios 
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and Henisz, 2003; Meyer et al. , 2013),  but the testing results of their effects in previous 
literature are inconstant, probably because of a lack of careful consideration of MNEs’ 
heterogeneity in resource and institutional conditions (Herzer, 2011), or proper control 
of MNEs’ endogenous self-selection bias (De Locker, 2007; Inui, and Todo, 2007; 
Hijzen, Jean, and Mayer, 2011). Instead of a simple examination of the general effect of 
MNEs’ OFDI on MNE performance (Bitzer, and Kerekes, 2008; De La Potterie and 
Lichtenberg, 2001), chapter 3 tries to fill in the research gaps not only by 
comprehensively examining different effect of resource-based factors, institutional 
factors and strategy on MNEs’ performance, but also by a careful consideration of 
MNEs’ self-selection bias and employment of more sophisticated performance 
measurement. As productivity growth guarantees MNEs’ sustainable performance, the 
author chooses MNEs’ productivity gains from OFDI as the measure of performance 
(Wang et al., 2012), and thus narrows the sample set down to EMEs as EMEs are more 
sensitive to productivity change from OFDI and whether they can gain productivity 
premium via OFDI is still under debating (Barba Navaretti and Castellani, 2004; Bitzer 
and Kerekes, 2008; De La Potterie and Lichtenberg, 2001; Driffield and Chiang, 2009; 
Herzer, 2011; Hijzen, Inui, and Todo, 2007; Masso and Vahter, 2008). A methodology 
combining the propensity-score matching and difference-in-difference (DID) will be 
adopted in this chapter to control for EMEs’ self-selection to the global investment 
market, and unique data on Chinese manufacturing firms over the sample period 2002-
2008 are deployed to test theoretical framework with hypotheses.  
 
Chapter 4 examines the joint role of resource-based and institutional factors in MNEs’ 
OFDI strategy formation. Given the global pervasiveness of government corruption, it is 
inevitable that MNEs will encounter corrupt requirements in host countries, and bribing 
has been identified to be a possible informal strategy that MNEs will have to carefully 
consider in host counties (Galang, 2012; Birhaun, Gambardella, and Valentini, 2015). 
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However, existing literature on the determinants of MNEs’ bribing strategy is very 
limited (Galang, 2012). Thus, specially, this chapter attempts to investigate how 
institutional and resource-based factors jointly determine MNEs’ strategies via testing 
the joint role of MNEs’ home-of-origin, home country institutional pressures, and the 
holding of resources in determining an MNE subsidiary’s bribing strategy. The 
theoretical framework and hypotheses are tested using firm-level data from the World 
Bank enterprise surveys from 2006 to 2012, with a total of 2210 MNE subsidiaries in the 
final sample. Both the Tobit model and Heckman two-step approach are employed to 
carefully tackle MNE subsidiaries’ potential self-selection to bribe.  
 
Employing both OLS and instrumental variable regressions, chapter 5 will investigate 
how resource-based and institutional factors integrate to moderate the effectiveness of 
MNE subsidiary’s strategy on financial performance, based on firm-level data from the 
World Bank enterprise surveys. Brouthers et al. (2008) argue that MNEs’ entry strategy 
that incorporates both resource-based and institutional factors can produce better 
subsidiary performance. While they recognize the institutions’ moderating effect on 
MNEs’ resource exploitation, they seem to ignore resources’ reverse moderating effect 
on MNEs’ confronted institutional pressures. This chapter will fill in the gaps by 
integrating the RBV and IT to generate an integrative model, and illustrating how 
resource-based and institutional factors integrate to moderate strategy’s effectiveness on 
MNE subsidiaries’ performance. To the author’s best knowledge, this is the first study 
that employs integrative theoretical framework, firm-level data, and appropriate 
estimation methods to investigate who exactly benefits from bribing (Birhanu et al., 
2015; Spencer, and Gomez, 2011).  
 
Chapter 6 summarizes the key findings and stresses theoretical contributions of the thesis. 
Managerial implications of the findings and main limitations of the thesis and possible 
areas for future research are discussed.  
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1.2 Potential Contributions 
 
This thesis aims to develop a new model integrating the RBV and IT to explain MNEs, 
especially EMEs’ OFDI strategy and performance, and then test the model, employing 
fine data sets and sophisticated estimation techniques.  
 
A few studies have attempted to stress the possible relationships between resource-based 
and institutional constructs, e.g., Oliver (1997), Dunning and Lundan (2008), 
Broutherset al., (2008), and Wang et al., (2012). However, although institutions’ role in 
affecting firms’ competitive advantages has been recognized (Oliver, 1997; Martin; 
2014), whether and how we should integrate the RBV and IT in MNE research remains 
to be research gaps (Oliver, 1997; Dunning and Lundun, 2008; Brouthers et al., 2008; 
Martin, 2014). Oliver (2008) emphasises that institutional capital and resource-based 
capital jointly formulate firms’ sustainable advantages. However, his research focuses on 
firms operating in one single institution, and hence needs to be extended to study MNEs. 
Dunning and Lundan (2008) emphasize the crucial role of institutional factors in 
international business theory, and try to incorporate institutional factors into the OLI 
model, but as their arguments are trying to distinguish the ownership advantages MNEs 
developed from resources or institutions, the interdependence and integration of 
resource-based advantages and institutional advantages have been neglected. How EMEs 
gain special competitive advantages from the integration of home institution and their 
own specific resources has not been referred to. Martin (2014) points to the interaction of 
institutional factors in formulating MNEs’ competitive advantage, but again, his attempt 
has not successfully provided answers to EMEs’ sources of competitiveness. Brouthers 
et al’s (2008) empirical results suggest that taking institutional factors into consideration 
when MNEs’ making OFDI strategies as institutions can moderate resources’ role on 
performance. But the above studies ignore the possible reverse moderating effect of 
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resource on institutions. Wang et al., (2012) refer to the integration of the RBV and IT, 
and examine how government affiliation levels integrate with EMEs’ resources to 
determine their OFDI. But traditionally, the RBV and IT has contradictory assumptions, 
so why and how can they be and should they be integrated? What are the mechanisms of 
their integration for predicting MNEs’ international activities? These have not been 
clearly explained. The author contributes to the literature by answering these questions. 
In chapter 2, the author synthesizes past literature on applications of the RBV and IT in 
international business study, and then goes further to identify the limitations of the RBV 
and IT, and investigates the boundaries, overlaps and integration mechanisms of them. 
At the same time, the author develops the concept “institution-based resources”, which 
sheds lights on explaining why traditional resource-based theories cannot explain 
MNEs’, especially EMEs, internationalization activities. After that, based on the 
analyses of the integration of the RBV and IT, the author develops a new model, 
combining the roles of resource-based and institutional factors to predict MNEs’ OFDI 
trajectories in a more comprehensive way.  
 
The empirical studies from chapters 3 to 5 also provide new insights into the underlying 
mechanisms of the MNEs’ heterogeneity in OFDI strategies and performance. These 
three empirical studies not only assist in testing the model in chapter 2, but also 
contribute significantly in their specific areas. Via investigating how EMEs’ state 
ownership status, absorptive capability, entry mode, and entry destination influence 
EMEs’ productivity gain from OFDI, the author tests the baseline of the model in 
chapter 2, i.e. the impact of resource-based factors, institutional factors, and entry 
strategy on MNEs’ OFDI performance. Existing literature has stressed OFDI’s impact on 
developed countries’ exports, investments and employment, and special features of 
OFDI from emerging economies  (Bitzer and Kerekes, 2008; Chen and Yang, 2013; 
Chuang and Lin, 1999; De La Potterie and Lichtenberg, 2001; Herzer, 2008, 2010, 2011; 
Kogut and Chang, 1991; Pradhan and Singh, 2008; Buckley, et al., 2007; Buckley, Tan, 
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and Xin, 2008; Herzer, 2011; Luo and Tung, 2007). However, the results on OFDI’s 
impacts on EMEs’ firm-level productivity growth is inconclusive (Herzer, 2011; Zhao, 
Liu, and Zhao, 2010). The author argues that this inconsistency derives from a lack of 
consideration of EMEs’ resource-based and institutional heterogeneity, absent of careful 
control of EMEs’ endogenous self-selection bias and suitable measurement methods of 
firm-level productivity (De Loecker, 2007; Hijzen et al., 2007; Hijzen, Jean and Mayer, 
2011). Thus, to remedy the above problems, this chapter shed lights not only by 
examining the general impact of OFDI on EMEs’ productivity, but also by investigating 
how resource-based factors and institutional factors affect the productivity premium 
EMEs can gain from OFDI. Carefully capturing EMEs’ heterogeneity in resource and 
institutional conditions helps explain the inconsistency of previous testing results. In 
addition, the author captures the ‘real’ impact of OFDI by carefully controlling for 
EMEs’ endogeneity of productivity change, employing a method that combines the 
propensity score matching and difference-in-difference (DID) approaches (Arnold and 
Javorcik, 2005). Furthermore, when measuring EMEs’ productivity change, the author 
augments the traditional Olley and  Pakes 's (1992) semi-parametric approach to measure 
EMEs’ TFP. The author introduces an OFDI dummy and export dummy in the 
production function, which allows for different production estimation functions for 
EMEs with various export and OFDI status. The augmentation of Olley and Pakes's 
(1992) semi-parametric approach will help us not only efficiently control for the possible 
simultaneity and selection biases (Olley and Pakes, 1992), but also successfully remove 
the potential productivity estimation bias from omitting influential variables in the 
production function estimation (De Loecker, 2011; De Loecker, Goldberg, Khandelwal, 
and Pavcnik, 2012). 
 
Chapters 4 and 5 provide new insights into international business literature by testing the 
joint role of resource-based factors and institutional factors in determining MNEs’ 
strategy, and then the integrative role of resource-based and institutional factors in 
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moderating the effectiveness of MNEs’ strategy on performance using the World Bank 
enterprise surveys data. Although there are studies referring to inf luential factors of 
bribery (Martin et al, 2007; Collins et al, 2009; Spencer and Gomez, 2011; Jeong and 
Weiner, 2012), so far, little is known about the role of MNEs’ bribery on their 
performance. Given the pervasiveness of government corruption, it is urgent and 
important to know who actually are paying bribes, and who benefit from bribing 
(Spencer and Gomez; 2011). To the author’s best knowledge, these two chapters 
represent the first attempt that combines the RBV and IT to analyse the determinants and 
impacts of MNE subsidiaries’ bribing strategy. The author identifies that MNE 
subsidiary’s resources and confronted pressures of corruption in host countries are 
mutually affected. Thus the determinants and impacts of MNE subsidiaries’ bribing 
strategy should be evaluated under careful considerations of the integration of resource-
based and institutional factors. These two chapters will make great theoretical and 
managerial contributions via opening the black box of MNEs’ bribery in host countries, 
and generating valuable managerial implications for MNEs by advising them how to 
deal with bribery requests based on their holding of resources and confronted 
institutional pressures and gain sustainable success. Except for this, the author uses firm, 
rather than country- level data, which provides us with an opportunity to investigate the 
micro mechanisms by which MNEs’ heterogeneity matters (Birhaun, et al. 2015). In 
addition, the measure of MNE subsidiaries’ bribery in this work is valuable, as it is the 
actual statistic provided by the respondents when they answered by the question set by 
the World Bank enterprise surveys that “What percentage of your annual sales has been 
paid to government officials as informal payments?”  Finally, the author contributes by 
deploying the Heckman-two step model to tackle MNE subsidiaries’ self-selection to 
bribe and utilizing instrumental variable regression based on fitted extent of MNE 
subsidiaries’ bribery to investigate bribing’s real effectiveness on MNE subsidiaries’ 
performance (Birhanu, Gambardella and Valentini, 2015). 
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Chapter 2: Integration of the Resource-based View and Institutional Theory to 
Explain MNEs’ OFDI Strategy and Performance: A Theory 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The RBV suggests that MNEs’ internationalization strategy and performance differ 
according to the heterogeneity of MNEs’ holding of resources, such as marketing and 
technological resources (Kafouros and Buckley, 2008; Wang, Hong, Kafouros, and Wright, 
2012). In the international business context, firm resources have been designated as MNEs’ 
ownership advantage (O) in Dunning’s eclectic framework (Dunning, 1988; Dunning and 
Lundan, 2008a) and as firm-specific advantages in the firm-specific advantages/country-
specific advantages matrix (Rugman, 1981; Rugman and Verbeke, 2001a, 2001b). However, 
rather than treating the variation in resource positions as the only explanatory variable, 
recently scholars argue that differences in MNEs’ internationalization trajectories can lie in 
their embedded institutional conditions, including both home and host country institutional 
environments (Buckley et al., 2007; Mike, Sunny, Brian, and Hao, 2009; Wang et al., 2012). 
This is especially for EMEs, whose OFDI strategy and performance are significantly affected 
by institutional factors such as low institutional development in home countries (Hoskisson, 
Wright, Filatotchev, and Peng, 2013), special home country institutional embeddedness 
advantages (Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 2008), strong government influences (Luo, Xue, and 
Han, 2010; Peng, Wang, and Jiang, 2008), and capital market inefficiencies (Buckley, Tan, 
and Xin, 2008).  
 
So far, some studies have recognized the joint role of institutional and resource-based factors 
on firms’ competitive advantages and performance (Oliver, 1997; Wang et al., 2012). Oliver 
(1997) proposes a process model combining the insights of the RBV and IT to explain firm-
level heterogeneity. This model argues that a firm’s sustainable advantage depends on its 
ability to manage a specific institutional context of resource decisions. But this framework is 
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built based on firms’ operation in one single institutional context. Therefore its explanation 
power for MNEs, who are operating across national boundaries, is limited. Dunning and 
Lundan (2008a) emphasize the importance of institutional factors in international business 
research and demonstrates how institutional analysis can be incorporated in to the OLI 
model. In their model they distinguish between the institutional ownership advantages (Oi) 
and asset-based ownership advantages (Oa). But Dunning and Lundun (2008a), on one hand, 
have not captured the effect of EMEs’ special institutional Oi on their internationalization; 
on the other hand, ignore the integration of Oi and Oa. Brouthers et al. (2008b) confirm that 
adding the moderating effect of national institutional environment to a resource-based 
perspective better explains the effectiveness of strategic decisions in an international 
business context, than does a mere resource-based approach. But they only emphasize 
institutions’ one-way moderating effect, and have not mentioned that firm resources could 
also reversely moderate the role of institutions in the strategy-performance nexus. Similarly, 
Martin (2014) neglects the mutual moderating effect of institutions and resources on MNEs’ 
specific advantages. Martin (2014) develops a concept of institutional competitive 
advantages, emphasizing an MNE’s interaction with institutions over its life cycle. However, 
the integration of institutional factors and resource-based factors has not been referred to, let 
alone how this combination works better to predict EMEs’ strategy and performance. Wang 
et al., (2012) examine how the integration of MNEs’ resources and government affiliation 
level affects OFDI investment, but they have not theoretically discussed why the RBV and 
IT should be integrated and how they could be integrated. Although institutional and 
resource-based constructs are argued to be complementary and interdependent when 
explaining MNEs (Wang, et al., 2012; Martin, 2014), so far, the literature about their 
integrative mechanism is very limited. This integrative approach based on the RBV and IT is 
especially meaningful for research on EMEs, as EMEs’ dramatic amount of OFDI started 
long before they have accumulated enough firm specific resources (Oa), or have been 
endowed with enough Oi from well-developed home country institutional infrastructure (Luo 
and Tung, 2007). Why do EMEs invest abroad? How do they compete with developed 
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market MNEs (DMNEs) in global markets? Do we need a new international business theory 
to explain EMEs’ internationalization trajectories? To address these related questions the 
author provides a new theoretical framework integrating the RBV and IT, to fill in the 
research gaps in successfully explaining both DMNEs and EMEs’ OFDI activities.  
 
 Aiming to extend the RBV and IT in an international business context, this chapter discusses 
the firm-level boundaries, limitations and the integrative mechanisms of the RBV and IT in 
international business literature, to better explain/predict MNEs’ OFDI strategy and 
performance. Propositions are thus developed in line with the integration of the RBV and IT 
to explain (a) what the firm-level boundaries and limitations of the RBV and IT are and how 
they could be integrated in international business research; (b) how the integrated framework 
explains MNEs’ internationalization strategy and performance.  
Following an analytical induction approach (Yan and Gray, 1994), the author will firstly 
offer a model that synthesizes past research on the role of the RBV and IT’s in MNEs’ OFDI. 
Employing this model as a benchmark, the author uncovers its limitations and then extends it 
via a discussion of the integration of both theories, to explain why and how an integrative 
approach of the RBV and IT is better applicable to answering research questions about 
MNEs, especially EMEs’ internationalization.  
The author argues that, the RBV and IT perspectives not only complement, but also interact 
with each other. MNEs select, accumulate and formulate firm-specific resources in home 
country institutional environments, and in IB, variations of MNEs’ embedded home country 
institutional environments contribute to the heterogeneity of their specific resources. 
Incorporating both institutions’ indirect enabling role and direct supplying role of firms’ 
formulation of resources, we propose a new concept “ institution-based resources”, which 
helps explain why traditional international business theory cannot fully interpret EMEs’ 
internationalization practices (Buckley et al., 2008). In addition, the author argues that value 
and applicability of MNEs’ resources vary upon institutions. Institutional and resource-based 
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factors moderate each other’s effect on MNEs’ internationalization strategy and performance.  
Following the integration of the RBV and IT, the author develops an extended model for 
MNEs’ OFDI strategy and performance. The author firstly confirms previous literature that 
institutional and resources-based factors have separate effects on MNE OFDI’s strategy and 
performance. Nevertheless, the author further argues that they jointly determine MNE 
OFDI’s strategy and interactively moderate the impact of EMEs’ OFDI strategy on 
performance.  
 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The next two parts will review the RBV and 
IT, and their applications in international business research. After that, the boundaries and 
limitations of the RBV and IT in an international business context are discussed, in response 
to the call for an integrative approach based on these two theories. A diagram will be 
presented here which synthesizes previous arguments on the role of the RBV and IT in 
MNEs’ OFDI strategy formation and performance. Fifthly, the author will analyze the 
integrative mechanism of the RBV and IT, based on which a new model is proposed for 
better predicting EMEs’ OFDI activities. Finally, section six offers discussion and 
conclusion.   
 
2.2 The RBV and its applications in international business research 
 
Traditionally, the RBV assumes that a firm’s competitive advantage is a function of a bundle 
of firm-specific resources that are rare, valuable, and hard to imitate. Resource endowments 
are usually not easy to transfer and are distributed unevenly, so that the firm’s competitive 
advantages derive from its possessing and using of these varying resource combinations 
(Barney, 1991). The basic argument of the RBV thus is that, specialized, rare, inimitable 
resources and resource market imperfections lead to the inter-firm heterogeneity, and 
successful firms are those that are adept at exploiting current resource-based advantages and 
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exploring new resource-accumulating opportunities (Gupta, Smith, and Shalley, 2006; Tsang, 
2000).  
 
2.2.1 Applications of The RBV in international business research 
Since in the early of 1990s, the RBV has gained tremendous influence in international 
business literature (Peng, 2001). For the application of the RBV in international business, 
most scholars hold the opinion that the variation in MNEs’ internationalization strategy and 
performance is a function of interfirm resource heterogeneity. R&D, for example, enables 
MNEs to develop innovative technologies and thus differentiate themselves from global 
rivals (Kafouros and Buckley, 2008). Marketing resources, on the other hand, enable MNEs 
to differentiate their products and create barriers to entry (Kotabe, Srinivasan, and Aulakh, 
2002). MNEs’ resources, which are difficult to imitate, involve higher levels of specificity 
(Dierickx and Cool, 1989) and contribute a lot to MNEs’ International competition. A key 
assumption of the RBV in international business research thus is that although MNEs’ OFDI 
decisions are constrained by causal ambiguity and information asymmetry, they are driven 
by exploitations of firm specific resources and competitiveness (Insead and Chatain, 2008). 
A popular research direction in an international business context is applying the RBV to 
analyze MNEs’ operation in emerging economies. For instance, Brouthers, Brouthers, and 
Werner (2008a) examines How do resource advantages or needs  influence MNEs’ OFDI 
strategies. Chen, Park, and Newburry (2009) investigates how variations of resource 
contribution by parent firms influence the control mechanism they choose in international 
joint ventures.  
But research on EMEs has significantly broadened and deepened RBV while raising new 
puzzles (Meyer, 2004; Wright, Filatotchev, Hoskisson, and Peng, 2005). The RBV provides a 
basis to explore how resource demands propel EMEs to internationalize. One question is 
what EMEs may be able to exploit abroad when they typically are technologically less 
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advanced. A second question concerns how EMEs acquire complementary resources abroad 
to overcome their competitive disadvantages (Zhou, Bruton, and Li, 2010; Luo and Tung, 
2007). For the first question, Mesquita and Lazzarini (2008) suggest that collective 
efficiencies help EMEs to get access to global markets. At the same time, Gubbi, Aulakh, 
Ray, Sarkar, and Chittoor (2010) analyze how international merge and acquisitions enable 
EMEs to acquire hard-to-trade resources, which are often embedded in target firms from 
developed economies. However, some scholars try to answer the above questions by 
proposing arguments that EMEs’ OFDI are initially motivated by asset augmentation. To 
improve international competitiveness, EMEs are likely to enter developed economies to 
explore new resources and capabilities (Wright et al. , 2005). Learning theory associated with 
the RBV has also been applied to explain EMEs’ OFDI to developed countries (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990). EMEs are likely to be at a disadvantage in global markets relative to 
DMNEs. Thus, to quickly obtain globally competitive knowledge-based resources, EMEs 
might be forced to enter developed countries to acquire cutting-edge technological 
capabilities. Cantwell (1994) and Dawar  and Frost (1998) suggest that Samsung, a large 
Korean business group, located its R&D facilities in Silicon Valley, seeking to gain advanced 
technology in memory chips. Once acquiring the expertise, Samsung transferred that 
capability back to Korea quickly. Such international exploration via knowledge acquisition 
and absorption allows EMEs to accumulate firm-specific resources quickly and thus enhance 
their long-term performance (Frost, 2001). Accordingly, EMEs often use international 
exploration not to achieve better near term performance but to develop potential absorptive 
capacity (Shaker, Zahra and George, 2002). However, as the real effect of resource 
absorption and accumulation via resource-seeking OFDI could be lagged, how EMEs 
without abundant resources formulate competitive advantages, and guarantee their near term 
performance? The RBV alone cannot answer this question.  
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2.3 IT and its applications in international business research 
IT suggests that firms are operating within the social frameworks of norms, values, and 
taken-for-granted assumptions about what constitutes acceptable and appropriate economic 
behavior (Scott, 1987). Firms’ strategic choices thus are constrained not only by the 
informational, technological, and income limits that neoclassical models have emphasized 
but by socially constructed limits like customs, norms, and habits. Under the guide of certain 
social conventions, individuals and firms are supposed to be approval seeking, susceptible to 
social influences and intractable habit and tradition (Scott, 1995a; Zucker, 1987). At the 
individual level, managers' habits, norms, and unconscious conformity to traditions explain 
firms’ activities (Berger, Luckmann, and Zifonun, 2002). At the firm level, shared value 
systems, corporate culture, and political processes support firms’ ways of institutionalized 
structures and behaviors. At the inter-firm level, isomorphic pressures that stems from 
industry, government, and societal expectations (e.g., the rules, norms, and standards on 
occupational safety, product quality, or environmental management) define socially 
acceptable firm activities, and those social pressures applied to all firms in the same 
institution cause firms to exhibit similarly ( DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
Following IT, conformity to social expectations contributes to firms’ survival and success 
(Baum and Oliver, 1991; Carroll and Hannan, 1989;  DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Oliver, 
1991). Different from economic frameworks, which investigate the extent to which firm 
behavior is economically justified and rational, theorists following IT emphasize the extent 
to which firm behavior is habitual, compliant, unreflective, and socially defined (Oliver, 
1997). Thus the basic assumption of IT is that firms' tendencies toward conformity with take-
for-granted and predominant traditions, norms, and social influences in their internal and 
external institutional environments lead to inter-firm homogeneity in structures and 
behaviors, and that successful firms are those that gain legitimacy and support by 
conforming to social isomorphic pressures.  
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2.3.1 Applications of IT in international business research 
While the rise of new institutionalism has been found throughout the social sciences since 
the 1970s, IT’s ascendance as a leading perspective in international strategy is a more recent 
phenomenon (Wan and Hoskisson, 2003). In international business literature, IT suggests 
that MNEs’ activities are guided by institutional factors, which have been defined as 
regulative, normative, and cognitive structures (Scott, 1995a). Three types of institutional 
isomorphism - coercive, normative, and mimetic isomorphism shape firm behavior 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Hence, while the RBV suggests that MNEs’ 
internationalization decisions are economically justified, and depend on idiosyncratic 
resources, IT argues that such decisions are outcomes of institutional influences, including 
political influences and internal and external isomorphic pressures. The determinants of 
MNEs’ OFDI extend beyond economic optimization and strategic justification to forces 
shaped by legal, and social rules, and by the broader political background surrounding the 
decision to internationalize (Oliver, 1997; Peng et al., 2008). 
Traditional adoption of IT in international business research lies in the analyses of MNEs’ 
operation in emerging economies. A characteristic of emerging economy is institutional 
transitions defined as ‘fundamental and comprehensive changes introduced to the formal and 
informal rules of the game that affect organizations as players’ (Peng, 2003:275). Not 
surprisingly, research on emerging economies has propelled IT to be a leading edge research 
perspective (Meyer and Peng, 2004; Peng, 2000). Representatives of IT-based studies, 
sometimes in combination with the RBV and TCT, include Delios and Henisz (2000) and 
Meyer (2001) on capabilities and experiences in unfamiliar environments in emerging 
economies, Brouthers and Brouthers (2001) on roles of institutional and cultural distances 
affecting MNEs’ entry decisions, Fey and  Björkman (2001) on international human resource 
management practices in host countries, and Meyer (2004) on MNE inward FDI’s spill-over 
effects in emerging economies.  
Another question that has usually been explained by IT is how host country institutional 
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environments, and the differences between home and host institutions, impact location or 
mode choices of the MNE (Meyer, 2001; Xu and Shenkar, 2002). Theoretical arguments and 
empirical evidence, however, are inconsistent. On the one hand, it is said that more efficient 
institutions and less corruption reduce the need for local networks and knowledge, which 
stimulates foreign investors to choose wholly owned subsidiaries over joint ventures (Meyer, 
Estrin, Bhaumik, and Peng, 2009). On the other hand, better institutions reduce the costs of 
legal enforcement, and hence the costs of resolving conflicts between joint venture partners, 
thus making joint ventures more viable (Dikova and Van Witteloostuijn, 2007). Empirical 
and theoretical inconsistencies imply that other theories need to be integrated with IT to 
jointly explain this phenomenon.  
 
A new trend of IT in international business research is applying IT to EMEs’ OFDI. Scholars 
argue that home country institutions and institutional changes shape the behavior of EMEs 
and confer an advantage/disadvantage for them in international competition. For instance, 
Del Sol and Kogan (2007) find that Chilean companies operating in Latin America are more 
profitable than local firms because of their exploitation of knowhow accumulated during 
pioneering home country economic reforms. This case also suggests that EMEs may attain 
competitive advantages in least developed countries where they face competitors from 
developed economies with sophisticated technologies but less experience with poor 
institutions (Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 2008), as internationalization performance is 
supposed to differ according to the extent that MNEs’ resources are transferable to a given 
host country institutional situation (Luo and Peng, 1999). Similarly, Lee and Beamish (1995) 
suggest that Korean firms face lower knowledge gaps in emerging economies as these 
countries present institutional and economic contexts that are similar to their own home 
country background. Pananond and Zeithaml (1998) find that Charoen Pokphand Group, 
which is Thailand’s largest multinational business group, is easy to exploit its resources 
successfully in other emerging economies like Hong Kong, Indonesia, Singapore, and 
mainland China. It is possible to successfully achieve economies of scale in these above 
34 
 
emerging economies than seek to compete in developed markets. Charoen Pokphand Group 
has competitive advantages in emerging economies as competitors from developed countries 
may find it hard to change their business models when operating in emerging markets 
(Prahalad and Lieberthal, 1998). As such, EMEs competing in emerging economies may 
cause the DMNEs to compromise their global identity (Dawar and Frost, 1998). 
 
2.4 A summary: limitations and boundaries of the RBV and IT in international 
business context – the call for and possibility of an interactive approach 
2.4.1 Limitations of the RBV in international business research 
The RBV of strategic management argues that firms’ resources and capabilities enable them 
to generate competitive advantages and above-normal rents of return. Firm-level 
heterogeneity in exploiting imperfect markets and acquiring strategic resources accounts for 
the variations of the firms’ gain of extra economic rents (Barney, 1986; Dierickx and Cool, 
1989; Mahoney and Pandian, 1992; Wernerfelt, 1984; Amit and Schoemaker, 1993; Barney, 
1991). However, notwithstanding its valuable insights, the RBV has not looked beyond the 
properties of resources and imperfect resource markets to explain enduring firm 
heterogeneity (Oliver, 1991; Peng et al., 2008). In particular, the RBV has not investigated 
the institutional context (e.g., firm histories, network ties, traditions, and embedded macro 
institutional environment) within which resource selection decisions are made and how the 
institutional contexts affect firms’ sustainable differences (Ginsberg, 1994). Nor has the RBV 
addressed firms’ resource selection processes, that is, how firms make, and fail to make, 
rational resource choices in pursuit of economic rents under certain institutional context. 
Accordingly,  Barney (2001) himself recognizes the important limit to the RBV’s 
applicability as it only holds as long as the 'rules of the game' in an industry remain relatively 
fixed. Thus in IB where each research unit is multi-boundaries, we need to go beyond the 
RBV to explain their competitive advantages and their corresponding internationalization 
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activities.  
Secondly, resources determine firms’ strategy and performance, but value of resources differs 
across institutions. Being utilized in explaining international business affairs, the RBV has 
been criticized for its “little effort to establish appropriate contexts” (Priem and Butler, 
2001). Rare, valuable, and hard-to-imitate resources and capabilities in one context might be 
plentiful, non-valuable, and easy to imitate in other contexts (Oliver, 1997; Brouthers et al., 
2008b). For instance, Dell’s intangible resources in “flexible manufacturing” of PCs add 
value when competition is moderately dynamic. But under the new context of high-speed 
dynamic competition, Dell’s capabilities of “flexible manufacturing” turns out to be not 
flexible enough (Scheck, 2008). The profound differences between emerging economies and 
developed countries force scholars to pay more attention to look beyond the RBV 
(Zacharakis, McMullen, and Shepherd, 2007). Recent research on the determinants of MNE 
subsidiary performance has documented that as firm specific resources are more critical in 
explaining MNE subsidiaries’ performance in developed markets, in emerging economies, 
institutional differences turn to be more salient explaining variables (Makino, Isobe, and 
Chan, 2004).  Barney (2001) himself acknowledges the validity of this criticism of the RBV, 
noting that, “the value of a firm’s resources must be understood in the specific market 
context within which a firm is operating”. As many authors simply assume away this 
problem, they have been failed in developing a more complete theory of international 
business.  
2.4.2 Limitations of IT in international business research 
IT (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; North, 1990; Scott, 1995a) argues that firms’ strategic 
justifications go beyond pure economic maximization, and firms need to conform to the 
institutional environment to gain legitimacy and survive. Thus MNEs should invest in host 
countries that are similar to their home country contexts. However, dramatic EMEs now 
invest into developed countries to seek strategic assets. Such an EME OFDI phenomenon 
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could not be fully explained by IT, and other theories need to be incorporated to help address 
the issue.  
 Secondly, resource-intensive MNEs do not fully comply with host country institutional 
environments, but could affect and co-evolve with host country institutions. Following IT, it 
is the institutional factors that determine firms’ strategy and performance, and firms in one 
institutional context turn to be similar upon isomorphic pressures. However, MNCs’ 
relationships with their institutional environments are dynamic, discretionary, symbolic, and 
proactive (Cantwell, Dunning, and Lundan, 2010). In contrast to the deterministic IT 
arguments, MNCs have an important agency role reflected not only in their varying degrees 
of compliance to host country institutional pressures (Oliver, 1991), but also in that they 
must make sense of, manipulate, negotiate, co-evolve and partially construct the host country 
institutional environments  (Kostova et al., 2008; Cantwell, Dunning, and Lundan, 2010). 
Thirdly, an MNE itself as a context challenges IT. Opposite to traditional theory, the author 
argues that IT can be used to explain why MNEs that originate from different institutional 
contexts turn to be heterogeneous, but not similar upon isomorphic pressures.  The author 
looks beyond traditional IT and asserts that in an international business context, as host 
country institutional pressures force MNEs to be similar, it is the different home -country 
institutions that contributes to the heterogeneity in their internationalization strategy and 
performance. An MNE, which originates from fragmentized contexts, is also itself a context 
challenging the IT (Kostova et al., 2008). MNEs formulate their take-for-granted operation 
and management styles in their home countries. As their home-of-origin differs, MNEs from 
different countries in one host country differ (Peng et al., 2008). Kostova, Roth, and Dacin 
(2009) argue that the internal and environmental diversity and complexity of MNEs are such 
that the concept of organizational field ill fits them, so that MNEs exhibit limited 
isomorphism with the various environments they face.  
 Fourthly, beginning with Porter (1980), scholars hold the opinion that firms’ competitive 
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advantages are accumulated in and affected by institutions. Recent work in international 
business has also recognized this by identifying that MNEs are endowed with specific 
competitive advantages by home country institutions, e.g., DMNEs are abundant of cutting -
edge technology while EMEs are less resource-sophisticated but have advantages when 
operating countries with similar “difficult” government conditions (Cuervo-Cazurra and 
Genc, 2008). This kind of institutions’ enabling role of MNEs’ formulation of specific 
resources/advantages has been confirmed (Martin, 2014), which infers traditional IT’s 
limitations in recognizing institutions’ role in the development of MNEs’ resources and 
capabilities. However, the author criticizes that IT ignores not only institutions’ enabling 
role, but also institutions’ directly supplying role in firm resource formulation. 
Reorganization of this makes significant sense as it helps explain why and how EMEs 
compete in global markets. Institutions’ enabling role and supplying role in firms’ 
formulation of resources will be analyzed in the next section. 
2.4.3 Boundaries of the RBV and IT in international business context and the potential 
for their integration 
The forgoing literature review indicates that previous applications of the RBV and IT make 
different assumptions and thus suggest different arguments about firm strategy and behavior. 
The RBV assumes firms are motivated to optimize available economic choices, whereas IT 
assumes that firms are motivated to comply with external social pressures to gain legitimacy 
and success. The RBV suggests that factor market imperfections (e.g., factors that inhibit the 
imitation of resources) increase variation in firms' resources and resource strategies; whereas 
the IT suggests that external social pressures (e.g., government regulations, public interest 
groups) reduce variation in firms' structures and strategies.  
However, in the international business context, the RBV and IT each have limitations in 
explaining the research questions. The above analysis contends that the RBV ignores the 
context within which MNEs select and accumulate resources. Furthermore, value of MNEs’ 
38 
 
resources differs across institutional contexts, which infers that MNEs’ resource alone cannot 
fully explain MNEs’ internationalization. On the other hand, IT could also be utilized to 
explain MNEs’ heterogeneity (Kostova et al., 2008). As MNEs select and accumulate 
resources in home country institutional environments, differences of home-of-origin lead to 
MNEs’ differences in holding of resources. Additionally, institutions not only indirectly 
affect MNEs’ formulation of resources, but also directly offer certain MNEs resources. This 
phenomenon is especially common for EMEs who have close relations with home 
institutions, and at the same time, whose home countries are in fast economic developing 
processes thus are urgent to invest abroad.  
The author thus concludes that, in the international business research background, either of 
the RBV and IT has limitations, and both of them have implications for each other. An 
integration of the RBV and IT can be much more powerful and applicable to tracking MNEs’ 
OFDI activities. Given that the RBV and IT each have their own boundaries, can these two 
theories be integrated?  Is there any overlap of these two theories? More importantly, what 
are the integrative mechanisms of these two theories?  
According to Dubin (1978), a complete theory must contain four essential elements, and one 
of those is a theory’s boundary. A boundary of a theory means that to whom, where and when 
does the relationship between the variables or constructs in this theory hold (Whetten, 1989). 
Temporal and contextual factors set the boundaries of generalization, and as such constitute 
the range of a theory. Theoretically, applications of the RBV and IT have no time limitations. 
But in international business research, the author argues that the RBV and IT both have 
contextual boundaries. As what they explain is firms’ behavior, they overlap with “who”, i.e. 
MNEs in international business research. Furthermore, different from previous researchers 
who assert that the RBV explains firms’ heterogeneity whilst IT interprets firms’ 
homogeneity, the author now can confirm that in international business research both 
theories can be employed to explain MNEs’ heterogeneity. Following the RBV, MNEs differ 
because of their holding of rare, specialized, inimitable resources, but according to IT, MNEs 
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vary upon their embedded institutional environments, especially home country institutional 
environments (Barney, 1991; Kostova et al., 2008). Additionally, as firms accumulate 
resources in certain institutional environments, institutions’ enabling role of firms’ 
formulation of firm-specific resources thus cannot be neglected, which is a tie of the 
institution-resource nexus. For EMEs from fast-developing home countries, home 
institutions even directly supply EMEs with resources, such as capital and information 
(Buckley et al., 2008). The author names the above resources MNEs gain from institutions’ 
enabling and supplying role as institution-based resources, and the boundaries and overlaps 
of the RBV and IT in the international business area will be illustrated in the following 
diagram (Figure 1). A discussion of the boundaries and overlaps of the RBV and IT lays a 
foundation for the further arguments. 
 
 
Figure 1: Boundaries and overlaps of the RBV and IT in an international business context 
 
As the boundaries of the RBV and IT overlap with each other and they are actually 
complementary and interdependent in the international business context (Wang et al., 2012), 
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the author believes that an integrative approach based on the RBV and IT fits better in 
international business and is an extension of  existing international business theory. 
However, although the respective roles of the RBV and IT in MNEs’ internationalization 
strategy and performance have long been discussed, the integrative mechanism of the RBV 
and IT in international business research is still unclear. Literature reviews referring to this 
have confirmed that rather than treating variation in resource positions and embeddedness in 
institutional conditions as the separate explanatory variables, differences in MNEs’ 
internationalization can lie in both of them (Peng et al., 2009; Wang et al., 2012; Brouthers et 
al., 2008b; Dunning and Lundan, 2008a). Peng et al. (2009) confirm that the RBV and 
industry-based views lack attention to contexts, and they identify the emergence of the 
institution-based views as a third leading perspective in strategic management, but they have 
not referred to the integration of resource-based and institutional factors. Brouthers et al., 
(2008) argue that entry mode strategy based on a model incorporating both resource-based 
and institutional factors produce better subsidiary performance. But they emphasize 
institutions’ moderating role in the effect of resources, a reverse moderating effect from 
resources to institutional conditions has been neglected. Dunning and Lundan (2008) have 
also tried to tie institutional analysis into the OLI paradigm. Although they recognize the 
existence of Oi (institutional ownership advantages), they have not successfully 
distinguished between Oa (asset-based ownership advantages) and Oi, let alone the 
integration of Oa and Oi. Wang et al. (2012) refer to an integrative approach of the RBV and 
IT, but the mechanisms about why and how they are integrated are missing. Recently, Martin 
(2014) proposes a concept of institutional advantage, emphasizing firms’ interaction with 
institutions. He recognizes institutions’ enabling role in firms’ formulation of resources 
which can be developed as firms’ competitive advantages. But Martin ignores that 
institutions can not only enable firms to accumulate resources, but also supply them with 
resources directly. This might be uncommon in developed countries, but is an evident 
phenomenon for EMEs, accompanied by the fast economic development of their home 
countries.  Key readings about the limitations of RBV and IT and the need of the integration 
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between them have been summarized in the following Table 1. 
Based on the literature review, the author concludes that so far, an agreement has been 
reached that resource-based and institutional factors have their respective effect on MNEs’ 
OFDI strategy and performance. Apart from that, resources’ role in MNEs’ OFDI can be 
moderated by institutional contexts (Brouthers et al., 2008). Furthermore, as firms select and 
accumulate firm-specific resources in institutions, MNEs are endowed with institutional 
advantages derived from their embeddedness in institutional environments (Martin, 2014). 
However, a framework that comprehensively explains how the RBV and IT separately and 
interactively predict MNEs’ internationalization strategy and performance is still under 
developed. The author illustrates the past research results about the separate and joint role of 
RBV and IT on MNEs’ internationalization in Figure 2. Then, in line with Yan and Grey’s 
(1994) analytical induction approach, the author extends this model to a more applicable 
theory, via the following discussion of the integrative mechanism of resource-based and 
institutional constructs, with the propositions followed. 
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Table 1: Limitations of RBV and IT in IB research and the need for an integrative approach: A summary of key readings   
Authors  Topic 
Primary 
theoretical 
approaches  
Data and context 
Analytical 
techniques  
Main findings  
Kostova, 
Roth and 
Dacin (2008) 
Institutional theory 
in the study of 
multinational 
corporations: A 
critique and new 
directions 
Institutional 
theory 
NA NA 
The MNE as a challenge to neoinstitutional theory. There is limited institutional 
isomorphism in MNEs. MNEs engage in actor-specific manipulation and 
negotiation of their status aimed at social construction of their acceptance and 
approval in both home and host countries. Achieving legitimacy in this context 
makes MNEs less, not more, similar.  
Saka-
Helmhout, 
Deeg and 
Greenwood 
(2016) 
The MNE as a 
challenge to 
institutional theory: 
Key concepts, 
recent 
developments and 
empirical evidence 
Institutional 
theory 
NA NA 
MNEs are experiencing dilemmas as they face multiple and contradictory 
institutional demands. Foreign subsidiaries confront the need to maintain 
legitimacy within both the host country and the MNE. But the connection between 
multiple, and often contradicting institutional pressures, and organizational 
responses that capture actor's ability to maintain or change institutional 
arrangements, has not received systemic attention. On the other hand, institutions 
can also have an enabling role that can lead to enhances in an MNE's 
competences. Multiple institutional embeddedness present MNEs with both 
opportunities and challenges. MNEs can tap into resources and capabilities from 
multiple local contexts and integrate them to create competitive advantages.   
Peng, Sun, 
Pinkham and 
Chen (2009) 
The institution-
based view as a 
third leg for a 
strategy tripod 
Resource-
based views; 
Industry-based 
views; 
Institution-
based views 
NA NA 
Resource-based views have limitations in IB research for its little effort to 
establish appropriate contexts. An Institution-based view could be used as the 
third leg of a strategy tripod, which overcomes the long-standing criticisms of the 
industry based and resource-based views' lack of attention to contexts, and 
contributes significant new insight. 
Dunning and 
Lundan 
(2008) 
Institutions and the 
OLI paradigm of 
the multinational 
enterprise 
Resource-
based view; 
Institutional 
theory; OLI 
model 
NA NA 
Institutions' role should be incorporated into the OLI paradigm to explain MNEs' 
formulation of ownership advantages. The content and structure of the O-specific 
advantages of a particular firm, including those which are country specific, may 
critically affect how particular resources and competences are created, accessed or 
deployed. Three are three different kinds of Ownership advantages, including 
institutional ownership advantages (Oi) that incorporates the firm-specific norms 
and values guiding decision-making, as well as an imprint of the institutional 
environment (L attributes) of the home country. Such institutional advantages can 
be transferred (intentionally or unintentionally) alongside other ownership 
advantages to host countries.   
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Martin 
(2014) 
Institutional 
advantage 
Institutional 
theory 
NA NA 
The concept ' institutional competitive advantage' is developed. A firm is argued 
to have an institutional competitive advantage when it is implementing a strategy, 
featuring distinctive resources, and activities enabled by its interactions with the 
institutional environment, which generates economic value in excess of its 
competitors. Resource-shaping interaction between firm and institutions is found 
and institutions' enabling role in firms' resource formulation is emphasized.   
Oliver 
(1997) 
Sustainable 
competitive 
advantage: 
combing 
institutional and 
resource-based 
views 
Resource-
based views; 
Institutional 
theory 
NA NA 
A firm's sustainable advantage depends on its ability to manage the institutional 
context of its resource decisions.  A process model of firm heterogeneity is 
proposed that combines the insights of a resource-based view with the institutional 
perspective. 
Brouthers, 
Brouthers 
and Werner 
(2008) 
Resoure-based 
advantages in an 
international 
context 
Resource-
based view; 
Institutional 
theory 
Data collected 
from survey 
samples of Dutch, 
Greek, German, 
and U.S. firms 
entering the 
emerging 
economies of 
Central and 
Eastern Europe 
(CEE).  
Hierarchical 
logistic 
regression 
analysis 
Differences in nations’ institutional environments influence the applicability of 
resource-based advantages.  For this reason, the effectiveness of such advantages 
may vary cross-nationally. Adding the moderating influence of national 
institutional environment to a resource-based perspective better explains strategic 
decisions (entry mode choice) in an international context than does a mere 
resource-based approach and decisions predicted by a model incorporating both 
perspectives yield better subsidiary performance.  
Wright, 
Filatotchev, 
Hoskisson, 
and Peng 
(2012) 
Strategy research in 
emerging 
economies: 
Challenging the 
conventional 
wisdom 
Transaction 
cost theory; 
Agency 
theory; 
Resource-
based theory; 
Institutional 
theory 
NA NA 
Among transaction cost theory, agency theory, resource-based theory and 
institutional theory, institutional theory is the most dominant one in explaining 
emerging economy related IB questions. But there is a need to examine the 
interaction between institutional theory and other theories.  
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Peng, Wang 
and Jiang 
(2008) 
An institution-
based view of 
international 
strategy: a fouc on 
emerging 
economies 
Resource-
based views; 
Industry-based 
views; 
Institution-
based views 
NA NA 
An institution-based view of IB strategy, in combination 
 with industry- and resource-based views, will not only help sustain a strategy 
tripod, but also shed significant light on the most fundamental questions 
confronting IB, such as "What drives firm strategy and performance". 
Cuervo-
Cazurra and 
Genc (2008) 
Transforming 
disadvantages into 
advantages: 
developing-country 
MNEs in the least 
developed countries 
Institutional 
theory 
Database of the 
largest affiliates 
of foreign firms in 
49 least 
developed 
countries 
collected by 
UNCTAD for the 
year1999 and 
 2001 
Tobit model 
Developing-country MNEs tend to be less competitive than their developed 
country counterparts, partly because they suffer the disadvantage of operating in 
home countries with underdeveloped institutions. But this disadvantage can 
become an advantage when both types of MNE operate in 
 countries with "difficult" governance conditions, because developing-country 
MNEs are used to operating in such less developed institutional conditions.  
Buckley, 
Clegg, 
Cross, Liu, 
Voss and 
Zheng 
(2007) 
The determinants 
of Chinese outward 
foreing direct 
investment 
The general 
theory of FDI 
Chinese State 
Administration 
for Foreign 
Exchange (SAFE) 
Pool 
ordinary 
least squares 
(POLS) and 
the random 
effects (RE) 
generalised 
least squares 
method 
A special theory is needed to explain the behaviour of Chinese MNEs. Three 
explanations (capital market imperfections, special ownership advantages and 
institutional factors) need to be nested within the general theory of the 
multinational firm.  
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Figure 2:  Review of past research: the role of the RBV and IT in explaining MNEs’ OFDI 
strategy and performance 
 
2.5 Toward a new model: integrating the RBV and IT to explain- MNEs’ OFDI strategy 
and performance  
 
In the following sub-section, the author’s analysis will focus on “how” the RBV and IT can 
be integrated to explain MNEs’ heterogeneity. The author will then propose an extended 
model integrating the RBV and IT.  
 
2.5.1 Integrative mechanisms of the RBV and IT 
2.5.1.1 From country-specific advantages to firm-specific advantages: MNEs select, 
accumulate and formulate firm specific resources in institutions  
Firms’ resource selection and accumulation are a function of both within-firm decision-
making and external institutional factors (Oliver, 1997). Within-firm managerial choices 
follow economic rationalities and are motived by effectiveness, efficiency and profitability 
(Conner, 1991), whereas external influences are institutional factors that affect firms’ 
decisions, including the level of competition intensity, power of buyers and suppliers, 
product market and industry structure. These factors influence what resources firms select, 
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as well as how resources are selected and exploited (Oliver, 1991).  
Resources and capabilities that are valued by firms for their potential contributions to 
competitive advantages are acquired in imperfect factor markets or built up via cumulative 
firm experiences and 'learning by doing' in certain institutional environment (Barney, 1986; 
Dierickx and Cool, 1989). Instances of valuable firm specific resources and capabilities 
include technological capabilities, R&D expertise, firms’ reputation, and relationships with 
buyers and suppliers (Barney, 1991; Mahoney and Pandian, 1992; Amit and Schoemaker, 
1993). Factor market imperfections in certain institutions, defined as barriers to imitation, 
acquisition and substitution of key inputs or resources, determine whether resources firms 
have selected and deployed can generate enduring variations in competitive advantages 
(Barney, 1991;  Barney, 1986; Penrose, 1959; Amit and Schoemaker, 1993).  
When factor markets in institutions are imperfect or incomplete, they create barriers to 
resource mobility, which lead to unequal distributions of resources across competing firms 
(Barney, 1986; Dierickx and Cool, 1989). These barriers restrain competing firms' 
opportunities to obtain or duplicate critical resources and thus produce the long -run 
differences among firms in their capabilities to generate rents. Resource market 
characteristics, on the other hand, also shape resources’ values and characteristics, 
determining whether resources are unique, scarce, durable, inimitable, idiosyncratic, non -
tradeable, non-substitutable and intangible (Rumelt and Lamb, 1984; Rumelt, 1984; Barney, 
1991; Amit and Schoemaker, 1993; Mahoney and Pandian, 1992; Peteraf, 1993). In addition, 
rent-generating resources can be accumulated or developed not only from factor market 
imperfections but also from unique historical circumstances (e.g., specific physical 
locations) and the accumulation of specialized capabilities embedded in institutional 
environment (Barney, 1991). A possible assumption thus exists that MNEs’ selection and 
accumulation of resources are affected by external institutional environment , including 
factor markets and transaction costs.   
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Differences among firms in the resources they select and accumulate generate firm 
heterogeneity (Barney, 1991). As MNEs formulate resources and gain competitive 
advantages in certain institutions, firms across institutions accumulate different resources in 
different ways, and thus institutions turn out to be a reason for MNEs’ heterogeneity. Oliver 
(1997) has also developed the concept of “institutional isolating mechanisms”, identifying 
how institutional factors explain the heterogeneity of firm resources. Wan and Hoskisson 
(2003) suggest that MNEs originate from resource environments that are more or less 
munificent regarding their institutional context, and thus arguing for the integration of IT to 
the RBV.  
These arguments suggest the following proposition:  
Proposition 1: Since MNEs select, accumulate and formulate firm-specific resources in 
certain institutional environments, the specific resources MNEs hold vary upon home 
institutions. In IB, variations of MNEs’ embedded home country institutional environments 
contribute to the heterogeneity of MNEs’ specific resources. 
 
2.5.1.2 Institution-based resources: Institutions’ enabling and supplying role in MNEs’ 
formulation of resources 
Scott (2008:220) notes that ‘by stressing the role of institutions as curbing and constraining 
choice and action, we ignore the ways in which institutions also empower actors and enable 
actions.’ This kind of institutions’ enabling role in governing the value -added processes and 
decision-making within firms has been recognized by previous literature(Martin. 2014; 
Dunning and Lundan, 2008a, 2008b; Scott, 2008) , which accounts for the institution-enabled 
sourcing of firm-specific resources (Cantwell et al., 2010; Martin, 2014). However, in 
addition to that, the author further argues that institutions not only indirectly enable firms to 
formulate resources, but also directly supply firms with resources, and this is especially true 
for EMEs who are embedded in the dynamics of the home country economic development 
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and institutional formulation. Examples of resources that MNEs gain from institutions’ 
direct supplying role include privileged access to raw material and inputs, low -cost capital, 
financial subsidies and support, foreign exchange, policy resources, foreign market 
information, and development programs, etc (Buckley etc., 2007). Incorporating both 
institutions’ enabling role and supplying role in MNEs’ formulation of resources, this work 
integrates institutional construct with resource-based construct and proposes the concept of 
‘Institution-based resources’.   
Institutions’ enabling role implies that firms are enabled to formulate resources via 
institutional embeddedness (Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 2008). Cantwell et al., (2010) 
identify the institutional ownership advantage (Oi) that incorporates firm-specific norms and 
values guiding decision-making, as well as an imprint of institutional environment (L), 
which confirms the enabling role of home country institutions. Firms formulate firm specific 
capabilities in home countries (Porter, 1980). According to this opinion, EMEs suffer as a 
result of operating in a home country characterized by a difficult institutional environment 
and inefficient or missing market mechanisms (Khanna and Palepu, 1997; Ghemawat and 
Khanna, 1998). Compared with MNEs from developed institutions, EMEs that originate 
from underdeveloped institutions tend to be of smaller size (Wells, 1983) and possess 
technologies that are less cutting-edge (Lall and Chen, 1983; Wells, 1983), and thus are less 
sophisticated in resources (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 2000; Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 2008; 
Dawar and Frost, 1998). However, EMEs can also benefit from their embeddedness of 
underdevelopment of institutions. Their ability to manage in difficult institutional conditions, 
a capability they were required to foster in their home countries to survive and be successful 
there, may be useful in other developing countries that also have difficult conditions and 
therefore present similar problems. In those environments, they would have fewer 
disadvantages, and in some cases may even have an edge over their developed-country 
counterparts. Thus, while DMNEs are more capital- and technology- intensive because of 
their well-developed home country institutions, emerging MNEs have specific institution-
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based resources for dealing with institutional deficiencies, deriving from their poor home 
country governance and capital markets (Cui and Jiang, 2012; Wang and You, 2012). 
In contrast with institutions’ enabling role in resource formulation, institutions’ supplying 
role of resources formulation is more evident in emerging economies with rapid economic 
development. For EMEs that originate from fast developing home countries like China, 
home country developmental processes motivate them and support their internationalization 
by providing supporting resources directly (Buckley etc., 2007). This distinct resource 
formulation type challenges traditional IB theory, and could be applied to solve the dilemma 
that how and why EMEs, as later comers, are capable to compete in international markets.  
 
Traditional international business theory suggests that MNEs’ resources (O advantage/FSA) 
should have been generated entirely in their home -country operations, and their initial 
extension of operations into foreign markets should logically stem from activities in home 
countries (Dunning, 1977, 1988; Vernon, 1966). They formulate the decisively strong 
resources of international competiveness over quite a long period of time during which their 
own evolution have been embedded in the processes of their own home country’s 
technological deepening and industrialization, and then start to address their specific 
resources by leveraging their knowledge and creative heterogeneity of different locations 
(Papanastassiou and Pearce, 2009). But EMEs’ internationalization has been occurring 
before such firms have plausibly had the opportunity to generate strong resources that 
facilitate their entries into international markets in the traditional fashion, and before their 
domestic market positioning has provoked reasons for them to need to consider doing so. 
Thus there comes the question that how it is possible for EMEs to address the challenge of 
internalization and why they do so. 
 The author argues that EMEs are able to expand internationally, despite their absence of 
enough firm resources and capabilities, because they can access various types of resource 
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and support from their home countries, and this direct institution-based resources from home 
institutions is a reflection of institutions’ supplying role of resources. But the extent to which 
EMEs can gain this kind of institution-based resources depends on the development requests 
of their home institutions and their relationships with home institutions. EMEs’ relationships 
with home institutions affect the types and degrees of resources that institutions would offer 
them (Cui and Jiang, 2012). Home institutions may define opportunities and provide 
resources for EMEs that have close relations with them to underpin their 
internationalization. For example, state owned EMEs are endowed with monopolistic 
resources, like political support, capital from state-owned banks, extra business chances 
provided by national corporations, human capital (Amighini, Rabellotti, and Sanfilippo, 
2013), access to networks, and privileged access to information about particular host 
countries that help reduce the liability of foreignness  (Cui and Jiang, 2009;  Luo, Xue, and 
Han, 2010).  
Thus, in conclusion, this current research moves forward by proposing the concept of 
‘institution-based resources’, incorporating a comprehensive consideration of both 
institutions’ enabling and supplying role in MNEs’ formulation of resources. Recognition of 
this concept is crucial in international business research as it combines the RBV and IT to 
explain MNEs, especially EMEs’ internationalization trajectories. Therefore, the author 
proposes that: 
Proposition 2: In line with the integration of macro institutions and micro MNEs’ specific 
resources, the concept institution-based resources refer to MNEs’ formulation of resources 
from both institutions’ indirect enabling role and direct supplying role. On one hand, MNEs 
formulate resources indirectly via home country institutional embeddedness; on the other 
hand, home institutions directly provide MNEs with resources according to the degree of 
MNE-institution relationships and home institutions’ development processes.  
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2.5.1.3 Effects of MNEs’ resources on internationalization strategy and performance 
moderated by institutions 
Limitations of the RBV’s applicability in an international business context have been 
highlighted recently for its little effort to establish appropriate institutional contexts (Priem 
and Butler, 2001). Institutional factors, on one hand, affect resources’ value as valuable, rare, 
and hard-to-imitate resources and capabilities in one context could be non-valuable, 
plentiful, and easy to imitate in other contexts (Brouthers et al., 2008b; Oliver, 1997). On the 
other hand, MNEs’ valuable resources have different levels of applicability in different 
institutional contexts, which requires firms to take institutional differences into consideration 
when formulating internationalization strategies.   
Institutional boundaries create limitations on resource factors’ global mobility, which 
influence the value of resources and thus MNEs’ resource-based advantages (Henisz, 2003; 
Wan, 2005). As resources’ value varies upon institutions, MNEs that lack institutional 
contextual knowledge might experience the erosion of resource-based value in host countries 
for several reasons. Firstly, MNEs need context-specific knowledge to know how to make 
the maximum exploitation of existing resources in new institutional settings (Dyer and 
Singh, 1998). Differences in legal, regulative, and normative environments require firms’ 
resource-based advantages to be supplemented by location specific knowledge and exploited 
in appropriate ways. For instance, DMNEs entering emerging markets like China need to 
learn specific knowledge to deal with Chinese values, customs, guanxi networks, and have 
to build up relationships with Chinese government (Xin and Pearce, 1996). Without a proper 
understanding of institutional context-specific issues, value of resources might be reduced, 
possibly through the lack of access to needed suppliers or channels, government barriers, or 
illegal copying, etc. Besides, institutional barriers will add costs and create potential delays 
in foreign entry, which also leads to the resource-based value erosion. Secondly, when 
operating in host counties, institutional differences between home and host countries might 
create a “liability of foreignness” for MNEs, even for those MNEs with resource-based 
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advantages (Zaheer, 1995). MNEs incur additional costs and time to understand and deal 
with individuals, organizations and governments in new institutional environments, and the 
lack of context-specific knowledge might result in greater costs for information acquisition 
and absorption. Compared with competitors who are familiar with the location and location-
specific institutional characteristics, MNEs need longer time to integrate their resource-
based advantages with new knowledge (Madhok, 2002; Peng et al., 2003). Thus in 
conclusion, “liabilities of foreignness” derived from institutional context differences might 
result in resource-based value erosion, through loss of time, increased financial costs, 
misunderstandings and ways in resource exploitation. 
Thus the author proposes that, 
Proposition 3: The value and applicability of MNEs’ resources vary upon institutions. 
Institutional factors moderate the effect of resources on MNEs’ internationalization strategy 
and performance.  
 
2.5.1.4 Effects of institutions on MNEs’ internationalization strategy and performance 
moderated by MNEs’ resources 
International business scholars have recently focused on how institutional factors, especially 
the distance between the home and host country institutions, impact foreign entry strategy 
and subsidiary performance (Brouthers et al., 2008b; Dikova and Van Witteloostuijn, 2007; 
Xia, Boal, a d Delios, 2009; Meyer et al., 2009; Brouthers, 2002; Siegel, 2009; Uhlenbruck, 
Rodriguez, Doh, and Eden, 2006). Theoretical arguments and empirical evidence, however, 
are inconsistent, which challenges IT’s power in explaining MNEs’ internationalization and 
suggests the need to examine the interaction between IT and other theories (Wright et al., 
2005; Xu and Meyer, 2013). 
IT suggests that firms’ conformity based on institutional pressures legitimates them 
( DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) by contributing to their acceptance and endorsement by 
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relevant actors in the institutional environment, and the resulting legitimacy can be critical to 
the firm’s survival and performance (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). But international business 
scholars have recognized the dilemma experienced by MNEs facing multiple and 
contradictory institutional demands (Kostova and Roth, 2002). Foreign subsidiaries confront 
the need to maintain legitimacy under both external and internal isomorphic pressures. 
While external pressures force MNEs to adapt to host country institutional environments, 
internal isomorphic pressures request them to obey internal rules and make strategies 
according to MNEs’ holding of ownership advantages and specific resources. MNEs’ 
resources and capabilities on one hand, moderate the institutional pressures they confronted 
with in host institutions, and thus affect MNEs’ reactions to host country isomorphic 
pressures. On the other hand, MNEs’ resources and capabilities enable them to exploit 
institutional advantages more effectively in international markets (Wang et al., 2012). 
Marano and Kostova (2016) show that MNEs’ relational ties with host country institutions 
shape the degree of institutional complexity MNEs will experience. Svensson (2003) also 
suggests that MNEs face the same set of regulations and institutional pressures for 
corruption in specific host countries, but their “refusal power”, measured by resources and 
alternative return, can explain a large part of the variation in their corresponding bribing 
strategy. Galang (2012) highlights that MNE’ strategy in response to institutionalized 
corruption in host countries is dependent on their political resources, and corruption’s 
consequences on MNEs’ performance are also potentially asymmetric upon their 
characteristics. Additionally, MNEs’ home country institutional embeddedness, which is 
identified as institution-based resources, could significantly moderate the degree of MNEs’ 
perceived institutional pressures in host countries. EMEs face lower pressures in similar 
institutional environments, and thus contain superior institutional advantages (Cuervo-
Cazurra and Genc, 2008). 
 
54 
 
 
Based on the above analysis, the author proposes that, 
Proposition 4: MNEs’ resources moderate institutions’ effect on their internationalization 
strategy and performance. 
 
2.5.2 Toward a new model: integrating resource-based and institutional constructs to 
explain MNEs’ OFDI strategy and performance  
The above analysis confirms the need for and possibilities of integrating the RBV and IT in 
international business research, which leaves us a foundation for proposing a new theoretical 
framework using an integrative approach. The underlying assumptions of the RBV and IT 
are different, but in international business research both theories can be used to explain the 
heterogeneity of MNEs’ internationalization (Kostova and Roth, 2002; Martin, 2014). MNEs 
select, accumulate, and formulate their firm-specific resources, including institution-based 
resources in institutions, and the value and applicability of MNEs’ resources vary 
dramatically across institutions. The role of Institutions and resources in MNEs’ OFDI 
strategy formation and performance are mutually moderated by each other, calling for an 
interactive approach incorporating both institutional and resource-based factors to explain 
the phenomena.  
More importantly, the RBV and IT each have limitations in explaining MNEs’ OFDI strategy 
and results, but these two lenses are complementary and interdependent. Institutional factors 
enrich MNEs’ assets and international capabilities and superior resources assist in reducing 
institutional pressures and exploiting institutional advantages more effectively.  Thus there is 
a need for an integration of these two approaches (Wang et al., 2012). The RBV and IT each 
in their way contribute to the development of international business theory (Meyer, Wright, 
and Pruthi, 2009), but either provides only a partial account of firms’ international 
55 
 
expansion. As EMEs are actually not resource-intensive enough and their 
internationalization is highly affected by home country institutional factors, e.g., home 
country institutional underdevelopment and highly government intervention (Buckley et al., 
2008), an integrative approach of the RBV and IT is particularly suitable and highly needed 
for explaining EMEs’ different internationalization trajectories.  
Following this, the author develops a new theoretical framework that integrates resource-
based and institutional constructs to explain MNEs’ OFDI strategy and performance. 
Particularly, the author extends the existing theory (e.g. Cantwell et al., 2010; Peng et al., 
2009; Spencer and Gomez, 2011; Martin, 2014) by arguing that a) MNEs are endowed with 
institution-based resources, which influence their OFDI strategy and performance; b) 
Institutional and resource-based factors have their respective effect on MNEs’ OFDI strategy 
and performance, and c) Institutional and resource-based factors also interactively moderate 
the effectiveness of MNEs’ OFDI strategy on performance.  
The model proposed by the author firstly suggests that the RBV and IT both have a separate 
effect on MNEs’ OFDI strategy and performance. MNEs’ holding of resources, their 
embedded home country institutional conditions, confronted institutional pressures, and 
OFDI strategies including entry mode and investment destination could all affect their 
internalization results (Brouthers etc., 2008b). This proposition is not new, and has been 
confirmed by the past literature. However, it will also be incorporated in the model as it is 
the foundation of the  interactive effects in the following steps (Andersson, Cuervo-Cazurra, 
and Nielsen, 2014). 
 Secondly, different from past research which has only captured institutions’ enabling role in 
firms’ resource development, the model proposes a new concept –institution-based 
resources, based on the integration of the RBV and IT, recognizing both institutions’ 
enabling and supplying role. Dunning and Lundan (2008a) try to incorporate institutional 
analysis into the OLI model to explain MNEs’ ownership advantages. Their work shows that 
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MNEs have formulated institutional ownership advantages from well-developed institutional 
infrastructure in their home countries. This view is similarly to Porter’s (1980) theory that 
firms formulate competitive advantages from their embedded industries. But Dunning and 
Lundun’s (2008a) proposition of institutional ownership advantage cannot explain why 
EMEs from undeveloped institutions with poor institutional infrastructure are now entering 
developed markets. EMEs might have comparative institutional advantages in similar 
emerging markets and undeveloped markets (Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 2008), but why do 
they go beyond these to developed markets, and more essentially, how can they compete in 
developed markets with resource-intensive DMNEs and local firms?  Here the author 
believes the concept institution-based resources provide some clues to solve this dilemma. 
EMEs are benefiting from home country institutions, and what home country institutions 
provide them are not only capabilities in dealing with institutional hazards, but also direct 
resources, e.g., capital, privileges in domestic markets, and information, which helps them to 
overcome the foreignness of liability in developed markets. The institution-based resources 
are originally from emerging economies’ quick economic development and rapid growth of 
foreign exchange reserves. But not all EMEs benefit from the institution-based resources as 
the amounts of institution-based resources they can obtain depend upon their relationships 
with governments.  The tighter this relationship, the heavier the EMEs’ resource-dependence 
on governments (Cui and Jiang, 2012). Institution-based resources thus on one hand, assist 
EMEs in dealing with liability of foreignness in international markets, but on the other hand, 
tie EMEs to home country governments, which turns them to be political entities, but not 
pure profits pursuing organizations. This special situation will significantly affect EMEs’ 
OFDI motivations, strategies, and final financial performance.  
Thirdly, integrative mechanisms of the RBV and IT indicate that resource-based and 
institutional factors moderate each other’s role in MNEs’ internationalization strategy 
formation and performance. When making OFDI decisions, MNEs’ need to exploit their 
resource-based advantages, but also take host country institutional environments into 
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account. MNEs’ holding of resources supplement and moderate the level of institutional 
pressures they are confronted. At the same time, institutional differences moderate the value 
of MNEs’ resources, and institution-based resources supplement this absence of asset-based 
ownership advantages. Thus, the author argues that EMEs’ resource-based advantages and 
institutional conditions jointly determine their OFDI strategy. In addition, as it is resources 
that guarantee the effectiveness of strategy, and institutional contexts affect whether strategy 
works in the right way, the author further argues that resource-based and institutional factors 
interactively moderate the effectiveness of MNEs’ OFDI strategy.  
According to the above analysis, the author develops a new model (Figure 3), and the main 
propositions are as follows: 
Proposition 5a): Resource-based factors, institutional factors and MNEs’ OFDI strategies 
have respective effect on MNEs’ OFDI performance. 
Proposition 5b): Resource-based construct and institutional construct need to be 
integrated in MNE study as a) they moderate each other’s role on MNE activities; b) they 
integrate to generate MNEs’ institution-based resources, and thus,  
Proposition 5c): Institutional and resource-based factors jointly determine MNEs’ OFDI 
strategy.  
Proposition 5d): Institutional and resource-based factors integrate to moderate the effect 
of MNEs’ OFDI strategy on performance. 
 
Following the above theoretical framework and propositions, the next three chapters 
will be empirical studies for theory testing. The blue line in figure 3 demonstrates the 
proposition 5a), and will be tested in the next chapter (Chapter 3) by examining that 
what are the respective roles of resource-based, institutional factors, and MNEs’ 
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strategy on EMEs’ productivity growth from OFDI.  
 
Proposition 5b) emphasizes the integrative role of resource-based factors and 
institutional factors. This proposition will not be tested as a separate empirical study. 
But following this proposition, resource-based construct and institutional construct 
will be treated as one integrative unit in chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 4 (the green line in 
Figure 3), in line with the proposition 5c), aims to test that how do resource-based 
and institutional factors jointly determine MNE subsidiaries’ bring strategy in host 
countries. The last empirical study in chapter 5 (the red line in Figure 3) is utilized to 
test the proposition 5d), i.e. how do resource-based and institutional factors integrate 
to moderate the effectiveness of MNE subsidiaries’ bribing strategy on financial 
performance. 
Figure 3: Theoretical framework: separate and integrative roles of the RBV and IT in 
explaining MNEs’ OFDI strategy and performance 
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2.6 Discussion and conclusion   
Based on a discussion of the boundaries and limitations of the RBV and IT, the author has 
analyzed the mechanisms of their firm-level integration for a better application in 
international business research, and then extended existing theory and proposed a new model 
integrating the RBV and IT, to explain MNEs’ OFDI strategy and performance.  
Respective roles of the RBV and IT in international business research have widely been 
discussed (Brouthers et al., 2008b; Chen et al., 2009; Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 2008; 
Meyer, 2001; Meyer et al., 2009; Xu and Meyer, 2013), but recently scholar have recognized 
that either of the theories can explain only partial of MNEs’ internationalization trajectories, 
and their complementary and interdependent position indicates that an integration of both 
theories  helps explain international business issues better (Wang et al., 2012; Brouthers et 
al., 2008b; Hoskisson et al., 2013; Wright et al., 2005). Even through the RBV and IT have 
different assumptions, these two theories can be integrated in international business area and 
their integration mechanisms are identified as (a): MNEs select, accumulate and formulate 
firm-specific resources in certain institutional environment, and in international business, 
variations of MNEs’ embedded institutional environments contribute to the heterogeneity of 
their specific resources; (b): Incorporating both institutions’ indirect enabling role and direct 
supplying role in MNEs’ formulation of resources, institution-based resources assist 
dramatically in explaining MNEs’, especially EMEs’ distinct internationalization 
trajectories; (C): The value and applicability of MNEs’ resources vary upon institutions. 
Institutional factors moderate the effect of resources on MNEs’ internationalization strategy 
and performance; (d): MNEs’ specific resources moderate the effect of institutions on their 
internationalization strategy and performance. 
Contradictory to the predictions from traditional international business theory, EMEs are 
now emerging long before the level of development sophistication of their home countries 
should have allowed them to obtain the types of unique firms specific resources to the 
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successful pioneering traditional MNEs (Buckley et al., 2007; Buckley et al., 2008). Thus 
there is a huge research gap about “why” EMEs go global and “how” they compete in global 
markets. The model presented in the chapter is based on an integration of the RBV and IT 
and extends traditional international business theory.  To answer the above questions the 
author argues that a): MNEs accumulate institution-based resources from home country 
institutions’ enabling role and supplying role of firm resources. MNEs’ holding of 
institution-based resources affects their OFDI strategy and performance; (b): Institutional 
and resource-based factors have separate effect on MNEs’ OFDI strategy and performance, 
but they then jointly determine MNEs’ OFDI strategy and interactively moderate the 
effectiveness of MNEs’ OFDI strategy on performance. 
The author firstly contributes to the literature by identifying an integrative approach based 
on the RBV and IT to explain MNEs’ OFDI strategy and results. Some scholars have 
emphasized a theoretical integration of IT with other perspectives to provide a more fine-
grained insight into the roles played by institutional variations (Hoskisson et al., 2013). 
Others criticized the applicability of the RBV in international business research as it ignores 
institutions’ influence. Brouthers et al. (2008b) and Peng et al. (2008) argue for an 
integration of the RBV and IT, but so far, no research has demonstrated in details the 
mechanisms with which the RBV and IT are integrated to predict international business 
issues. Hence, rather than merely asking “Is IT/RBV enough to explain MNEs, especially 
EMEs’ OFDI” or “Shall we integrate the RBV and IT？”, the author discerns “why” the 
RBV and IT should be integrated, and “how” they can be integrated.  
Secondly, the author proposes a concept of “institution-based resources”, identifying home 
countries’ enabling role and supplying role in MNEs’ formulation of firm specific resources. 
It is a concept that developed based on the integration of the RBV and IT, recognizing the 
macro institutions’ role in the development of micro firm-specific resources. Institutions’ 
enabling role in resource development has been recognized as Martin’s (2014) argument of 
institutional advantage and Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc's (2008) opinion that EMEs are 
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endowed with special competitive advantages from the embeddedness of undeveloped home 
country institutions. But they are far from enough to explain the questions “why” EMEs’ go 
global and “how” they can compete in global markets? Buckley et al. (2007) propose that 
EMEs’ OFDI is indeed distinctive with traditional international business theory because of 
their home country capital imperfections, special ownership advantages, and institutional 
factors. But they have not comprehensively identified and theorized how these institutional 
factors matter. The author has developed the concept of institution-based resources which on 
one hand, supports the enabling role of institutions; on the other hand, further argues that 
MNEs, especially EMEs are endowed with specific resources from home country 
institutions directly, and the amounts MEMs can obtain depend on the degree of firm-
institution relationships and institutions’ development processes. The recognition of this 
concept helps explain why and how EMEs conduct OFDI, and thus should be nested in 
traditional international business theory.  
Despite its significant power in explaining MNEs’ OFDI trajectories, IT is not enough in 
fully predicting MNEs’ OFDI strategies and results. Thus, thirdly, the author contributes to 
the literature by identifying the interactive role of institutional and resource-based factors in 
international business research. The author develops a new theoretical framework that 
integrates resource-based and institutional constructs to explain MNEs’ OFDI strategy and 
performance. The author agrees with previous arguments about the RBV and IT’s separate 
roles in OFDI strategy formation and performance (Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 2008; Xu and 
Meyer, 2013; Brouthers et al., 2008b; Chen et al. , 2009; Meyer, 2001; Meyer, Saul Estrin, et 
al., 2009). But the author further contributes by recognizing the joint role of institutional and 
resource-based factors in determining MNEs’ OFDI strategy, and their interactive role in 
moderating the effectiveness of MNEs’ OFDI strategy on international performance. As 
Brouthers et al. (2008) has demonstrated, international decisions predicted by a model 
incorporating both the role of context and firm resources could yield better subsidiary 
performance. The new model presented in this chapter is based on the integration of these 
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two perspectives, producing better applicability in predicting EMEs’ OFDI strategy and 
behavior.  
In the following chapter 3, 4 & 5, fine data sets and estimation techniques will be utilized to 
test this new model the author has developed in this chapter, following a step-by-step 
approach. Chapter 3 will test the baseline of the model, i.e., the respective impact of 
resource-based factors, institutional factors and OFDI strategies on MNEs’ OFDI 
performance. Chapter 4 will focus on investigating the joint role of resource-based and 
institutional factors in determining MNEs’ ODI strategy, and the last chapter 5 will test the 
integrative role of resource-based and institutional factors in moderating the effectiveness of 
MNEs’ OFDI strategy on performance. 
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Chapter 3: Separate Roles of Resource-based and Institutional Factors and 
OFDI Strategies in EMEs’ Productivity Gain from OFDI – An Empirical Test 
 
3.1 Introduction 
There is a sizable literature about the impact of outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) on 
employment, exports, investment, and productivity in developed economies (Bitzer and 
Kerekes, 2008; Branstetter, 2006; Chen and Yang, 2013; Chen, 2011; Chuang and Lin, 1999; 
De La Potterie and Lichtenberg, 2001; Herzer, 2008, 2010, 2011; Kogut and Chang, 1991; 
Pradhan and Singh, 2008). Recently, emerging economies’ role as an important source of 
OFDI has been recognized (Buckley et al., 2007; Buckley et al., 2008; Herzer, 2011; Luo 
and Tung, 2007), but studies on the crucial OFDI-productivity link in emerging economy 
multinational enterprises (EMEs) are very limited (Herzer, 2011; Zhao et al., 2010). Even 
though some studies have referred to this linkage, their results are inconsistent, probably 
because of the lack of careful consideration of the moderating effects of firm-level 
heterogeneity (Herzer, 2011), proper control of the endogenous self-selection bias and 
suitable productivity measurement techniques (De Loecker, 2007; Hijzen et al., 2007; Hijzen 
et al., 2011). 
 
This chapter aims to address the above-mentioned problems and tests proposition 1 of the 
theoretical model presented in chapter 2, i.e. resource-based factors, institutional factors and 
OFDI strategies have respective effect on MNEs’ OFDI performance. This chapter will 
contribute to the existing literature in three ways. Firstly, given EMEs’ lack of capabilities 
and strong resource-dependence on home country governments (Buckley et al., 2007; 
Buckley et al., 2008; Deng, 2007; Ramasamy, Yeung, and Laforet, 2012; Wang et al., 2012), 
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the author develops a novel theoretical framework for the OFDI-productivity1 nexus that 
incorporates both the RBV and IT. Specifically, this framework explains how firm 
heterogeneity in terms of absorptive capacity, state ownership and internationalization 
strategy affects OFDI’s productivity effects on EMEs. To the author’s best knowledge, this is 
the very first study that looks at EMEs’ productivity gains from OFDI with careful 
considerations of EMEs’ firm level heterogeneity in resource-based and institutional 
conditions  and entry strategies, using one integrated firm-level dataset. Secondly, the author 
examines the ‘real’ OFDI-led productivity change for EMEs via careful control for the 
possible endogeneity of productivity change, using a method combing the propensity-score 
matching and difference-in-difference (DID) approaches (Arnold and Javorcik, 2005). 
Thirdly, the author augments Olley and Pakes's (1992) semi-parametric approach to measure 
TFP, via introducing the OFDI dummy and export dummy in the production function, 
allowing for various production estimation functions for EMEs with different OFDI and 
export status. This enables us to not only efficiently control for the possible simultaneity and 
selection biases (Olley and Pakes, 1992), but also successfully remove the potential 
productivity estimation bias from omitting influential variables in the production function 
estimation (De Loecker, 2011; De Loecker et al., 2012). 
 
China’s drastic changes in OFDI orientation and rapid growth in OFDI flows since 2002 
provide us with a natural setting for analyzing the relationship between OFDI participation 
and firm productivity variations. Based on an integrated dataset from 1516 Chinese firms 
with 2033 foreign subsidiaries from China’s National Bureau of Statistics, Ministry of 
Commerce, local government reports and firm-level official websites for the period 2002-
2008, the author examines the instantaneous and future productivity gains upon OFDI entry 
controlling for the self-selection process. The author finds positive productivity premiums 
                                                 
1 Firm productivity is a component of a country’s production efficiency, which plays an essential role in shaping 
a country’s GDP growth. Therefore, the author chooses firm productivity as the dependent variable, to some 
extent, to shed light on a country’s growth. 
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for EMEs with OFDI, but this productivity effect varies significantly according to EMEs’ 
heterogeneity in state ownership, absorptive capacity, and internationalization entry mode 
and investment destination. The estimation results indicate that EMEs without state 
ownership gain positive productivity effect via OFDI, while this effect is insignificant for 
those with state ownership. The author also finds that EMEs with stronger absorptive 
capability gain higher and more sustainable productivity effect and that this effect will be 
lagged if merge and acquisition (M&A) is employed as an entry strategy. Furthermore, 
productivity gains are higher for EMEs investing in developed than in less developed 
countries. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the theoretical 
framework and hypotheses, based on a critical review of the RBV and IT. In Section 3, the 
author describes the dataset. Section 4 explains the measurement of the main variables used 
in the study, illustrates the preliminary analysis and justifies the estimation strategy adopted, 
including the choice of appropriate comparison groups with the propensity-score matching 
technique. The estimation results will be presented in Section 5. Section 6 presents the 
robustness check via different TFP and investment destination measures and one-step 
system-GMM estimation. Finally, Section 7 offers discussions and conclusions.  
 
3.2 Theory and Hypotheses 
Recent progress in the RBV has focused on understanding where resources derive from and 
how they are assembled (Barney, Ketchen, and Wright, 2011; Sirmon, Hitt, Ireland, and 
Gilbert, 2011), and transferred across national boundaries (Meyer, Wright, and Pruthi, 2009). 
This process recognizes the dual possibility for firms to utilize resources, as well as 
accumulate and leverage them to generate competitive advantage and productivity growth. 
Cantwell (1989), Dunning (1988, 1994), Frost (2001), Shan and Song (1997), and Teece 
(1992) endorse this by asserting that a firm’s specific advantage and productivity change can 
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arise not only from the ownership of proprietary assets, but also from the ability to secure, or 
efficiently coordinate, the complementary assets possessed by other fir ms in host countries 
via OFDI. As later comers, EMEs, in contrast to developed country MNEs, are more likely 
to pursue productivity effect via OFDI as they are based in less innovative developing 
regions, possess a relatively narrow range and intensity of knowledge competencies, and 
hence more urgently engage in asset-seeking FDI in order to address their competitive 
disadvantages and improve their global competitiveness (Buckley et al., 2007).  
 
However, existing literature generates inconsistent estimation results of OFDI’s productivity 
effects on EMEs, challenging the direct OFDI-productivity linkage based on the RBV 
(Barba Navaretti and Castellani, 2004; Bitzer and Kerekes, 2008; De La Potterie and 
Lichtenberg, 2001; Driffield and Chiang, 2009; Herzer, 2011; Hijzen et al., 2007; Masso and 
Vahter, 2008). Why are the testing results of the OFDI-led productivity growth hypothesis 
based on similar datasets and estimation techniques so mixed? In line with the RBV, 
Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004) suggest that firm level resource heterogeneity makes 
firms’ investment performance diversity possible (Grossman, Helpman, and Szeidl, 2006). 
Technology diffusion and productivity premium are by no means automatic (Kokko and 
Kravtsova, 2008). Higher productivity gains should be expected for EMEs which have 
higher R&D and absorptive capability and invest in relatively developed regions (Almeida 
and Kogut, 1997; Audretsch and Feldman, 2004; Cantwell and Janne, 1999; Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1989, 1990; Dosi, 1988; L. Kim, 1997; Lall, 1992). EMEs are regarded as lacking 
ownerhip advantages but at the same time having close relations with home country 
governments (Child and Rodrigues, 2005; Luo and Tung, 2007; Yiu, Lau, and Bruton, 2007). 
They are strongly influenced and supported by home country governments and other 
institutions (Cui and Jiang, 2009) and hence the RBV alone is argued to be far from enough 
for explaining EMEs’ internationalization strategy and performance (Peng et al., 2008). This 
chapter tries to fill in the research gap in productivity effects of EMEs by developing and 
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testing a new theoretical framework which incorporates both the RBV and IT for predicting 
how an EME’s heterogeneity in prerequisite resources, institutional background, and 
corresponding internationalization strategy moderates OFDI’s productivity effect on the 
EME. This framework is one part of the model the author has developed in chapter 2.  
 
The RBV posits that firm-specific resources differentiate successful EMEs from failing ones, 
but it is criticized for its “little effort to establish appropriate contexts” ( Priem and Butler, 
2001) and overlook of how important institutional force - the home country government – 
interferes with the use of firm specific resources and affects EMEs’ internationalization 
behavior (Wang et al., 2012). Institutional theory proposes that firms are affected by 
institutions – defined as regulative, normative, and cognitive structures (Scott, 1995b). 
EMEs are shaped by political, legal and social rules, and by the broader political context 
surrounding the decision to internationalize (Oliver, 1991; Peng et al., 2008). As such, their 
determinants and performance of  OFDI activities extend beyond economic optimization. 
“Institutions directly determine what arrows firms have in its quiver as it struggles to 
formulate and implement strategy and to create competitive advantage” (Ingram and 
Silverman, 2002). EMEs, especially EMEs with state ownership, enjoy a high level of home 
country government support, which endows them with a specific institutional ownership 
advantages to ameliorate certain ownership and location disadvantages (Buckley et al., 2007; 
Lecraw, 1993). The author introduces a concept called ‘institution-based resources’ to 
integrate the RBV and IT. EMEs formulate specific resources based on underdeveloped 
home country instutions and strong home country government support. EMEs use such 
specific resources to compete with host country firms. These institution-based resources on 
one hand, offer EMEs with privileged resources, but on the other hand, increase EMEs’ 
resource-dependency on home country institutions (Cui and Jiang, 2012), which 
significantly moderates EMEs’ internationalization strategy and outcomes.  
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To the best of the author’s knowledge, this has been the first attempt which combines the 
RBV and IT to explain how firm resources, home country institutions, and the corresponding 
internationalization strategies moderate EMEs’ productivity gain from OFDI. An integrative 
perspective based on the RBV and IT the author proposes below will enhance our 
understanding of OFDI’s productivity effect on EMEs. First, underlying assumptions and 
boundary conditions of the RBV and IT are different, and hence they serve only a partial 
account of EMEs’ international expansion and the incorporation of them contributes to the 
advances of EMEs’ internationalization theory (Meyer et al., 2009). For instance, the RBV 
addresses neither why managers may make decisions that are not economically optimal, nor 
how firms balance competitive and institutional pressures. Differences in OFDI’s 
productivity effect on EMEs not resulting from variations in resources are particularly 
intriguing, partly because they cannot be explained by the RBV reasoning. Second, resource-
based constructs and institutional forces are interdependent. They interact with and influence 
each other. For example, EMEs formulate specific institution-based resources based on 
home country institutions. Their internationalization strategies and outcomes are influenced 
by how the institutional context affects access to valuable resources, which will then affect 
EMEs’ ability and willingness to invest abroad. It is valuable to combine the RBV and IT, 
particularly in an emerging economy context, where firms’ strategies and performance are 
influenced by the hybrid state of “neither hierarchy nor market ”(Powell, 1990).  
 
EMEs’ ownership status, absorptive capacity, OFDI entry mode and entry destinations have 
been selected by the author as the representatives of the institutionl factors, resource-based 
facors and OFDI strategies that could moderate EMEs’ productivity gain from OFDI. These 
four variables are chosen because they can significantly influence outcomes of EME 
investment activities based on the framework. Firstly, the author chooses state ownership as 
one moderating variable because this status represents EMEs’ affiliation with government, 
and is the most important institutional factor influencing EMEs (Buckley et al., 2008; Cui 
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and Jiang, 2012; Deng, 2009; Wang et al., 2012) due to state provision of institution-based 
resources to these firms (Hoskisson, Wright, Filatotchev, and Peng, 2013; Peng, 2003). 
Secondly, in line with Cohen and Levinthal (1990), Dai and Yu (2013), and Griffith, 
Redding, and Van Reenen (2004) who suggest that a firm’s valuable resources derive from 
intangible knowledge, the next moderating variable the author selects is absorptive capacity, 
measured by R&D to capture an EME’s key valuable resources. This variable moderates the 
OFDI-productivity linkage as it can assist EMEs in recognizing, exploiting acquired global 
assets and making further innovations. Finally, entry mode and investment destination as two 
very important internationalization strategies are determined by EMEs’ resources and 
institutional background (Buckley et al., 2007; Cui and Jiang, 2009; Ramasamy et al., 2012), 
and can significantly moderate outcomes of EMEs’ OFDI. The theoretical framework and 
hypotheses is represented by Figure 4, and this framework is one part of the model that the 
author proposed in chapter 2 (Figure 3). As the author has clarified before, the model in 
chapter 2 (Figure 3) will be tested step-by-step in chapter 3, 4 and 5. This framework will be 
the first step which focuses on the respective impact of resouce-based factors, institutional 
factors and OFDI strategies on EMEs’ productivity gain from OFDI.  
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Figure 4: Theoretical framework and hypotheses 
 
 
3.2.1 State ownership and OFDI’s productivity effect on EMEs  
Institutional factors have important influences on EMEs’ OFDI performance, and arguably, 
among various institutional dimensions, home country governments may be of paramount 
importance as a driving force of EMEs’ internationalization (Li, He, Lan, and Yiu, 2012; 
Zhou and Delios, 2012). In contrast with private EMEs, EMEs with state ownership (SO-
EME) are, by definition, assets of home-country governments, which make them a part of 
their home-country institutions, and thus contain specific institution-based resources in 
international competition (Cui and Jiang, 2012). From the perspective of home country 
institutions, SO-EMEs enjoy monopolistic resources, like political support, capital from 
state-owned banks, extra business chances provided by national corporations, human capital 
(Amighini et al., 2013), access to  networks and privileged access to information about 
particular host countries that help reduce the liability of foreignness (Cui and Jiang, 2009; 
Luo et al., 2010), but they are also subjective to restrictive government approval, and the 
higher level the SO-EMEs’ affiliation with governments, the higher level of home country 
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institutional pressures they confront with (Liu, 2005). On the other hand, because of SO-
EMEs’ affiliation to home country governments, they are always recognized as political 
actors in host countries, especially in developed countries, which pushes them into a 
negative position when internationalizing to acquire assets (He and Lyles, 2008). SO-EME 
managers, who are also government officials, play a crucial role in moderating the 
productivity effect EMEs could finally gain from OFDI (Brockman, Rui, and Zou, 2013). 
 
Following the RBV, an EME’s international competitive capability is positively correlated 
with the firm’s holding of specific resources. SO-EMEs, which are endowed with strong 
institution-based resources, should be more capable of achieving better performance, and 
gaining more productivity premium from the global market. However, with unparalleled 
resources, SO-EMEs’ bad international performance surprises scholars and challenges the 
traditional RBV (Buckley et al., 2007; Buckley et al., 2008; Ramasamy et al., 2012). The 
possible negative impacts of state ownership on EMEs’ gain from internationalization cannot 
be ignored (Morck, Yeung, and Zhao, 2008; Witt and Lewin, 2007). As a result, employment 
of IT to complement the RBV for explaining the moderating effect of state ownership on 
EMEs’ OFDI outcomes is justified.  
 
Institutional theory argues that firms are under institutional pressure to adhere to the formal 
and informal rules in their institutional fields, and become isomorphic ( DiMaggio and 
owell, 1983; Scott, 1995b). Firms vary in their responses to the institutional pressures, 
according to firms’ different levels of resource dependence on the institution that exerts the 
pressure (Oliver, 1991). With high resource dependence, a firm is more likely to conform to 
the institutional pressures to avoid negative consequences (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1978). Thus 
according to IT, state ownership strengthens the home-country institutional pressures on 
EMEs’ internationalization strategies and outcomes. In contrast with private EMEs, SO-
EMEs are politically affiliated with home -country governments, and are highly dependent on 
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the home-country institutions for critical resource inputs (Liang, Ren, and Sun, 2015). They 
are under more pressures to conform to, rather than resist the political and strategic purposes 
home country governments specify for OFDI. While pursuing their business objectives, SO -
EMEs are always required to serve the political mandates of the state and align their interests 
with the home institutions rather than challenge these interests (Scott, 2002; Zhang, Zhou, 
and  Ebbers, 2011). Under this condition, when internationalizing, SO-EMEs are confronted 
with strong home country institutional pressures, and thus turn out to be a political actor 
seeking for political goals, but not profit-maximizing agencies, which is the assumption of 
the RBV (Buckley et al., 2007). It is well-known that SO-EMEs from China have a distinct 
feature as they tend to invest in countries with high political risk to seek natural resources, 
serving as a politcal actor for the nation’s sustainable development (Buckley et al., 2007; 
Ramasamy et al., 2012). At the same time, OFDI from SO-EMEs often encounter highly 
burdensome and bureaucratic administrative OFDI approval procedures as governments at 
various levels, seek to affect the direction, amount and scope of outward capital flows 
(Buckley et al., 2007). 
 
Apart from that, because of SO-EMEs’ affiliation with home institutions, when they invest 
overseas, they might be perceived by host-country institutions not simply as business 
entities, but also as political actors (Globerman and Shapiro, 2009; He and Lyles, 2008). 
Such a perception can pose challenges and more stressful institutional pressures to SO-
EMEs’ institutional processes in host countries (Luo and Rui, 2009; Peng et al., 2008). There 
can be concerns about the political rationale of SO-EMEs in attempted foreign acquisitions, 
such as CNOOC’s failed acquisition of Unocal (Wan and Wong, 2009). From the host-
country aspect, the state-driven objectives of EE SO-EMEs are often perceived as non-
beneficial, or even harmful, to the host country (Globerman and Shapiro, 2009). 
Consequently, the institutional barrier for SO-EMEs to assume ownership and control in 
their investment in the host country will be high, which decreases the likelihood of a 
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productivity gain (Cui and Jiang, 2012).  
 
Furthermore, different from private EME managers who formulate internationalization 
strategy to pursue global assets and markets, many SO-EME managers are often directly 
appointed by the state after serving as government officials (Brockman et al., 2013; Fan, 
Wong, and Zhang, 2007) and their companies go global following the guidance and capital 
control by the home state (Cui and Jiang, 2012). Correspondingly, SO-EME managers are 
incentivized not just by the prospect of increasing economic performance but also by 
satisfying the state’s political and social objectives in making OFDI strategies (Cuervo-
Cazurra and Dau, 2009). When making strategic decisions, managers of SO-EMEs may seek 
the possibility of further government support, which may be available in unexpected adverse 
circumstances. Such managerial cognition influences decision-makers’ risk perception, and 
leads managers to underestimate risks in OFDI (Buckley et al. , 2007). Risk perception has 
implications for EMEs’ OFDI ownership decisions and would significantly influence EMEs’ 
gain from OFDI, as with perceived government backing combined with below-market costs 
of capital, SO-EMEs are able to bear short-term loss and misleading OFDI strategies 
(Ahmed, Mohamad, Tan, and Johnson, 2002). 
 
Thus the author concludes that as a representative of EMEs’ affiliation relationship with the 
government, although EMEs’ state ownership offers EMEs’ institution-based resources, it 
also produces higher institutional pressures on them in both home and host countries, which 
negatively affects EMEs’ productivity gain from OFDI (Brouthers, 2002; Brouthers and 
Hennart, 2007): 
 
Hypothesis 1: State ownership moderates the effect of OFDI on an EME’s productivity as 
such positive gains will be smaller for EMEs with state ownership than those without. 
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3.2.2 Absorptive capacity and OFDI’s productivity effect on EMEs  
The RBV suggests that firms develop dynamic capabilities based on existing resources. 
These resources are considered as a prerequisite, just as previous learning facilitates the 
learning and application of new, related knowledge (Barney, 2001; Deng, 2007; Teece, 
2014). It is evident that EMEs invest overseas because they wish to acquire knowledge and 
learn new skills and capabilities in order to enhance their competitive advantages and 
productivity. But as (Kokko and Kravtsova, 2008) emphasize, technology diffusion and 
productivity premium are not automatic. Higher productivity gains should be expected for 
EMEs with higher R&D and absorptive capability, which helps them to recognize the value 
of new information, and assimilate and apply it to commercial ends (Cohen and Levinthal, 
1990), or build the “ability to make effective use of technological knowledge in efforts to 
assimilate, use, adapt and change existing technologies” (Kim, 1997). Sawada (2010) 
indicates that the productivity effect of technology spillovers depends on MNEs’ absorptive 
capacity. Therefore, EMEs with strong absorptive capability are more likely to capitalize on 
their assets, access or build up new resources, and enhance their productivity (Zahra and 
George, 2002).  
 
In addition to home country institutional pressures they have adapted to, MNEs need 
particular firm resources and capabilities to deal with host country institutional hazards 
(Cantwell et al. , 2010). Emerging from an under-developed home county institutional 
environment, EMEs are argued to have specific ownership advantages when operating in 
similar full-of-voids developing country institutional environments (Cantwell et al., 2010). 
However, it is mostly in developed countries where productivity spillovers happen 
(Audretsch and Feldman, 2004; Ramasamy et al., 2012). In these countries, firms compete 
based on knowledge -intensive resources and are stimulated by the coercive, normative, and 
mimetic isomorphic pressures to innovate for survival. Thus it could be expected that EMEs 
with stronger resources and absorptive capabilities are more likely to succeed in developed 
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institutional environments, exploit their well-developed institutional infrastructures and gain 
more positive productivity effect. Based on the above arguments, the author hypothesizes 
that: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Absorptive capacity moderates the effect of OFDI on an EME’s productivity 
as such positive gains will be greater, if an EME’s pre-OFDI absorptive capacity is stronger. 
 
3.2.3 Entry mode and OFDI’s productivity effect on EMEs  
The RBV indicates that entry strategy plays an important role when EMEs enter foreign 
markets with the intention of augmenting resources or capabilities (Ekeledo and Sivakumar, 
2004; Stopford and Wells, 1972). Entry mode strategy differences affect subsidiaries’ 
managerial pattern, corporate culture, and technique-learning channels, thus influencing 
subsidiaries’ performance (Brouthers, 2002; Kim and Gray, 2008; Li, 1995) and EMEs’ 
productivity gain from OFDI (Branstetter, 2006; Nocke and Yeaple, 2007). 
 
Firms enter foreign markets using alternative strategies. Greenfield investment, in line with 
the RBV, acts as a channel of appropriating the potential externalities from the technology 
clusters and centers of innovation and excellence in host developed countries, i.e. the 
technological externalities associated with such location (Pradhan and Singh, 2008). 
Greenfield presence provides the proximity to innovative competitors, foreign R&D 
infrastructure, knowledge centers and research results. In addition, EMEs will gain access to 
information on changes in global consumer preferences, safety standards, packaging style, 
etc. Under the growing international competitive pressures, the EMEs in turn are expected to 
internalize this inflow of foreign information to improve their competitive capabilities 
(Deng, 2007). Furthermore, greenfield investment provides access to local knowledge if 
experienced local professionals work for EMEs. Local employees enable EMEs to develop 
networks of contacts with local intermediaries and consultants. This creates teams of 
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professionals from parent and local management, facilitating organizational learning and 
resource augmentation. Therefore, outward greenfield presence may help EMEs to learn 
from technological developments and strategies of competitors in foreign countries and 
move to a dynamic path of innovation (Deng, 2007). Huawei Technologies provides a good 
example of how foreign investment in R&D centers can help it be close to sources of 
knowledge and learning via greenfield investment in India, Germany, Japan, and the U.S.  
  
While greenfield investment strategy involves the creation of a new organization, M&A 
takes place through the takeover (in part or whole) of an existing organization (Brouthers 
and Hennart, 2007). The RBV suggests that strategic M&A provides EMEs with a quicker 
way of acquiring innovative capabilities than undertaking long term in-house R&D efforts 
without any assured success (Deng, 2007; Pradhan and Singh, 2008). For EMEs with 
perquisite intermediate competencies, M&A allows them to achieve a higher bundle of 
resources or capabilities by integrating the target’s firm-specific valuable resources like 
product development capabilities, process know-how, managerial expertise, marketing skills, 
relationships and networks. This transfer of knowledge from the target to the acquirer is 
direct and can be expected to create technological synergies that the parent company does 
not enjoy on its own. However, as firms are restricted in their structural and experiential 
capabilities to operate in foreign markets and their entry mode decisions are necessarily 
constrained by the resource capabilities and outcomes of past history (Aulakh and Kotabe, 
1997), M&A cannot offer EMEs an immediate productivity growth if they are not capable 
enough to absorb and exploit resources from the targets.  
 
To complement the RBV, IT provides an explanation of the role of entry mode in moderating 
OFDI’s productivity effects on EMEs. It holds that a firm’s entry mode choice and its impact 
is influenced by both nation- and firm-level institutional pressures (Dunning and Lundan, 
2008a; North, 1990; Scott, 1995b). On one hand, EMEs have to adapt to host country 
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institutional pressures to gain legitimacy (Chan and Makino, 2007; Yiu and Makino, 2002). 
On the other hand, plenty of time is needed by EMEs to deal with the organization-level 
institutional and cultural conflicts brought about by M&A. This dilemma is common among 
EMEs in developed countries as they try to control and integrate firms in higher-level 
institutional and environmental environments. During the pre-acquisition phase, an EME’s 
overpayment in bidding might be the biggest problem (Chen, Hope, Li, and  Wang, 2011). 
However, during the post-acquisition phase, integration is a leading challenge for EMEs. 
From an institutional factor market standpoint, managerial talents are an important factor 
behind the growth of firms and economies. Lack of internationally managerial talents gives 
EMEs little confidence to efficiently integrate acquired targets and generating value 
(Birkinshaw, Bresman, and Nobel, 2010). EMEs cannot act quickly to impose their systems 
and rules on acquired target companies.  
 
Thus overall, even though greenfield investment and M&A both offer channels for EMEs’ 
technology sourcing (Chung and Alcácer, 2002; Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001; Wesson, 
2000), compared to greenfield investment, M&A may bring in more challenges as it is costly 
in capital, time and efforts to achieve the corporate culture integration, and deal with the 
historical burdens for merged affiliates 2  (Buckley and Casson, 1998; Görg, 2000). The 
author hypothesizes that OFDI’s productivity effect via M&A may be lagged: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Entry mode moderates the effect of OFDI on EMEs’ productivity as such 
gains will be lagged if M&A is chosen as the entry mode, although both M&A and greenfield 
investment generate positive productivity gains for EMEs. 
 
 
                                                 
2 Note that the standard errors of the estimators for M&A are much larger than those for Greenfield Investment, 
which demonstrates large performance difference for investors via M & A. 
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3.2.4 Investment destination and OFDI’s productivity effect on EMEs  
The RBV suggests that the inability of EMEs to build all needed knowledge and 
competences domestically forces them to acquire these resources overseas (Frost, 2001). For 
example, they might establish foreign R&D facilities to overcome locational disadvantages 
of the home base by tapping into locational advantages abroad (Frost, 2001). But resources, 
especially technology are often location-bounded, context-dependent and cumulative 
(Barney, 2001; Buckley et al., 2008; Taylor, 2002) , in line with countries’ specific location-
advantages in the “OLI” paradigm (Buckley and Casson, 1976). Geographical proximity is 
crucial as different lines of innovative activities influence each other and knowledge 
spillovers are always geographically bounded (Jaffe, 1986; Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and 
Henderson, 1992). Given the tacit and uncofdified nature of knowledge, it is very difficult 
for spillovers to be transmitted over geographical space. By contrast, knowledge is better 
diffused through frequent, direct, and face-to-face contact (Dosi, 1988). Innovation is 
expected to concentrate geographically in areas that provide a high level of local density of 
specialized resources, or agglomeration economies, which enhance and facilitate the 
innovation process. 
 
While less developed countries, as latecomers, are cheap labor and natural resource abundant 
(Dunning, 1988), developed countries are rich in technology, as R&D has always been 
considered a domain of firms in technologically advanced and economically developed 
countries. Thus compared with OFDI in less developed countries which provides EMEs with 
economies of scale, OFDI in developed countries are expected to offer EMEs more 
productivity premium, via accessing inter-firm technological spillovers, specialized labor 
and intermediate inputs (Head, Ries, and Swenson, 1995). 
 
This proposition is also supported by institutional theory which highlights that home 
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institutions shape the types of resources that firms develop (Peng et al., 2008). In particular, 
the institutional environment moderates the selection mechanisms through which 
competition selects firms (Aldrich, 1999). Thus, firms' resource endowments are an outcome 
of processes of resource accumulation and learning, which is path-dependent process 
conditioned by the institutional context in which firms operate (Tan and Meyer, 2010). In 
developed economies, institutional frameworks foster and stimulate market-based 
competition and firms’ strategic innovation. Firms' primary challenge is to develop 
competitive resources and capabilities to outperform competitors in the market place (Peng, 
2003). In contrast, less developed countries often lack sufficient market-supporting political, 
legal, and economic institutions (Hoskisson et al. , 2013), and this works as a location-
disadvantage that restrict the formulation of local firms’ capabilities (Khanna and  Palepu, 
2000; Khanna and Rivkin, 2001). This reasoning suggests that more capabilities and 
productivity premium gains could be expected from OFDI in developed countries, rather 
than less developed countries: 
 
Hypothesis 4: Investment destination moderates the effect of OFDI on an EME’s 
productivity as such positive gains will be greater if EMEs invest in developed countries 
than in less developed countries. 
 
3.3 Data 
The author tests the OFDI-led productivity change hypothesis relying on three disaggregated 
datasets. One is derived from the Annual Manufacturing Enterprises Survey conducted by 
China’s National Bureau of Statistics. This dataset covers all state-owned enterprises (SO-
EMEs) and non-SO-EMEs whose annual sales exceed RMB 5 million3. The data used in this 
paper ranges from 2002 to 20084, covering more than 180,000 firms in 2002 and more than 
                                                 
3 In fact, the aggregated data on the industrial sector in the annual China’s Statistical Yearbook and China’s  
Industry Economy Statistical Yearbook are compiled from this data set. 
4 When estimating the probability to invest abroad in one year, we would use firms’ production data in the 
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410,000 firms in 2008. This dataset includes three major accounting statements - the balance 
sheet, cash flow statement and income statement, incorporating more than 100 useful 
variables5.  
 
However, noisy observations still exist in this dataset because of non-standardized financial 
statements or report errors from some firms. Thus cleaning the original data before doing 
further analysis is necessary. The author cleans the sample and removes the outliers by using 
the following filtering criteria. First, following (Feenstra, Li, and Yu, 2014), observations 
with missing primary financial variables (such as total asset, gross industrial output value 
and net fixed assets) are omitted. Second, firms with fewer than 8 workers are excluded from 
the sample because they are under a different legal regime (Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, and 
Zhang, 2012; Yu, 2015). Furthermore, observations satisfying the following criteria are 
excluded according to the basic rules of the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles: (a) 
Liquid assets are greater than total assets; (b) Fixed assets are greater than total assets; (c) 
Net fixed assets are greater than total assets; (d) An invalid founded time exists (i.e., the 
opening month is earlier than January or later than December.); (e) the firm’s identification 
number is missing.  
 
The second dataset used in the chapter comes from China’s Ministry of Commerce. It covers 
rich information of EMEs that have conducted non-financial OFDI, including parent firm 
names, registration addresses, investment destinations, foreign subsidiary names, approval 
                                                                                                                                          
previous year, namely when the previous year is 2001, we would also utilize firms’ production data in 2001. Thus 
more exactly speaking, the production data utilized in this paper ranges from 2001 to 2008. 
5  Because the intermediary input variable is missing in 2008, we impute this variable using a conventional 
method. According to China’s Statistical Yearbook, value added = total output - intermediary input + value added 
tax payable, We can impute the missing data by the equation, intermediary input = total output - valued added + 
value added tax payable. Here we assume a firm’s valued -added rate in 2008 equals to that in 2007. Depending 
on the value-added rate in 2007 and the total output in 2008, we can obtain firms’ value added in 2008, and then 
firms’ intermediary inputs in 2008 can be straightforwardly derived. Imputing the intermediary input data in 2008 
helps extend the sample. If we only utilize the sample 2002-2007, our findings do not change significantly. 
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dates6 and business scopes. All the EMEs engaging in non-financial OFDI from 2002 are 
covered in the dataset7. This enables us to investigate the OFDI-led productivity change at 
the country level. 
 
Other firm investment information such as entry mode and investment amount is included in 
the third dataset, which was compiled based on local government reports, China’s Ministry 
of Commerce website, and parent firm or subsidiary official websites. The collection rules of 
this dataset are as follows. First, the author collects such information for firms which are in 
both the first and second datasets8. Second, the information on investment amounts for firms 
is collected from official firm websites. If the investment amount information is unavailable 
in this way, the Ministry of Commerce and its local office websites are consulted. Press 
release is also used as a source of the investment amount information. Third, if a subsidiary 
is reported as being created, established or founded, then its entry mode is recorded as 
greenfield investment. If a subsidiary is announced to be established via merge or 
acquisition, its entry mode is noted as M&A. 
 
Based on whether a firm invested abroad during the sample period, the author divides the 
whole sample into two subsamples, i.e., one with firms having OFDI and the other with 
firms having no OFDI. Table 2 provides a statistical summary of firms’ OFDI status during 
the sample period. It is revealed that firms with OFDI have more employees, more capital, 
more intermediate inputs and higher productivity on average. They also have higher 
possibility of having export and R&D, compared with firms without OFDI. 
                                                 
6 Considering that the date on which an investment was approved differs from that on which the subsidiary was 
established, we spared no effort to search the internet (the information from the parent firm’s website is labeled 
top priority) to confirm the exact date of subsidiary establishment. If the establishment date is unavailable, the 
year in which the investment was approved is used to approximate the year in which the subsidiary was 
established. 
7 In 2002, the former Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation of China and China’ National Bureau 
of Statistics jointly developed China’s first Outward Foreign Direct Investment Statistical System.  
8 We can merge the first and second dataset based on parent firm’s name and the operation year. 
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Table 2: Summary statistics by OFDI status during the sample Period 
 Firms with OFDI  Firms without OFDI 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
 Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Log(number of 
employees) 
5.92 1.44  4.67 1.11 
Log(capital stock) 11.58 1.93  9.74 1.43 
Log(intermediate inputs) 11.34 1.74  9.73 1.37 
Log(TFP) 2.09 0.51  1.90 0.56 
Export dummy 0.71 0.45  0.25 0.43 
R&D dummy 0.32 0.47  0.11 0.31 
Note: As the R&D variable in 2004 is missing, I imputed the missing values with the 
average values in 2003 and 2005. As the R&D data in 2008 is not utilized in the following 
analysis, then it’s not included here. That is, all the variables summarized here are ranging 
from 2002 to 2008 except for the R&D dummy. TFP presented in this table is calculated 
using an augmented Olley-Pakes approach which will be described in detail in the following 
section. 
 
 
3.4 Methodology 
3.4.1 Measures 
Following previous literature, the author deploys TFP to capture EMEs’ productivity change 
(Damijan, Polanec, and Prasnikar, 2007), but the author avoids the simple Solow residual 
approach as it is not reliable enough and would cause biased productivity estimation results 
(Olley and Pakes, 1992). Instead, following Dai & Yu (2013), De Loecker (2007), De 
Loecker et al. (2012),  Markuse (2004), and Yu (2015), the author has augmented the 
traditional Olley and Pakes (1992) approach by introducing OFDI and export dummies when 
the production function is estimated, because EMEs with or without OFDI and export may 
confront with different production environments and resource allocation processes. 
 
Compared with the traditional s imple OLS method, the augmented Olley-Pakes approach in 
TFP measurement has many advantages. First, this method utilizes the function of real 
current-period capital stock and investment 9  as the proxy variable for current-period 
                                                 
9 We adopt the perpetual inventory method as the law of motion for real capital and real investment. The nominal 
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productivity 10 , which effectively controls for the unobservable productivity shock in the 
production function estimation, and reduces the simultaneity bias. Second, firms’ survival 
probability is considered in the estimation of the production function, and thus the selection 
bias that only productive enterprises could survive in the markets can be effectively 
corrected. Third, the author takes into account the role of exporting and OFDI status when 
estimating the production function, which helps alleviate the production function estimation 
bias arising from omitting influential variables in the production function (De Loecker, 
2011; De Loecker et al., 2012). The detailed measure of firm TFP will be illustrated in the 
appendix. 
 
An EME’s OFDI status is measured based on whether the firm has conducted OFDI. But as 
suggested by the literature, when measuring EMEs’ OFDI status, the author includes firm 
features into the estimation model to alleviate the concern of endogeneity bias in that 
productive firms often self-select into investing abroad. Firm-level variables that have been 
considered to correct the unobserved endogeneity and heterogeneity when measuring EMEs’ 
selection of OFDI include EMEs’ pre-OFDI level of firm productivity (Helpman et al., 
2004), inputs (capital, labor and intermediate inputs), firm-level strategies (pre-OFDI export 
and R&D decision), firm ownership (foreign-invested firm or state-owned enterprise), firm 
age (Wang et al., 2012), and dummy variables for year and industries 11. Bascle (2008) and 
Hamilton and Nickerson (2003) argue that, inputs and firm-level strategies need to be 
considered to ensure that the difference score in productivity is attributed to the impact of 
OFDI only. Head and Ries (2004) suggest that firms can adopt OFDI and export as 
substitutive or complementary strategy to engage in foreign markets. The author therefore 
treats pre-OFDI export decision as one firm strategy that may influence the firm’s OFDI 
                                                                                                                                          
and real capital stock constructed following Brandt et al. (2012). We depend on the firm’s own information in the 
dataset to construct firm’s real depreciation ratio. 
10 Here is an implicit assumption, namely, firms which are more productive now would have higher expected 
return rates, and hence those firms would invest more in that period. Under a few assumptions of production 
technology, Pakes(1996)  has verified this implicit assumption. 
11 In fact, to alleviate the influence of business cycle and control the industry heterogeneity, we estimate the 
propensity score on a year-by-year and industry-by-industry basis. 
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decision. The R&D decision is another firm strategy that may affect the firm’s OFDI 
decision, as Lu, Liu, and Wang (2011) illustrate that firms in industries with higher levels of 
R&D intensity have higher probability to conduct strategic asset-seeking OFDI. In line with 
previous literature, firm-level inputs (i.e., capital, labor and intermediate inputs) have also 
been considered in the estimation model as they are important variables for firms’ 
productivity change (Bascle (2008). 
 
To estimate the impacts of state ownership on the EME’s productivity gain from OFDI, the 
author distinguishes between EMEs with state ownership and those without for further 
comparison (Amighini et al., 2013; Cui and Jiang, 2012). Following Cohen and Levinthal 
(1989), the author measures an EME’s absorptive capability by its R&D. It is suggested that 
R&D that not only generates innovations, but also develops an ability to identify, assimilate, 
and exploit knowledge from the environment (Zahra and Hayton, 2008). The investment 
destination dummy (developed country / less developed country) is composed by whether 
they are non-OECD countries (coded “0”) or OECD countries (coded “1”), while the entry 
mode dummy includes greenfield investment (coded “0”) and merge and acquisition (coded 
“1”) (Buckley et al., 2008; Pradhan and Singh, 2008). 
 
3.4.2 Preliminary Analysis  
In order to test whether firms that have conducted OFDI have higher productivity, the author 
sets the regression model as follows: 
   (1) 
 where  and represent firm ’s TFP, and OFDI status (coded “1”when  the 
firm conducted OFDI in year , and “0” otherwise) in year  respectively.  refers to a 
series of control variables, for instance, logarithms of capital, labour, intermediate input, and 
also ownership (SOE or foreign-invested firm), export or not (coded “1” when firm  
0 1ln + Xit it it i t itTFP OFDI         
ln itTFP itOFDI i
t t
itX
i
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exported in year , and “0” otherwise) as well as R&D dummy (coded “1” when firm  has 
R&D input in year , and “0” otherwise). To control for the learning-by-exporting effect 
(Delgado, Farinas, and Ruano, 2002; Lileeva and Trefler, 2007), a dummy variable (export 
or not) is included in the regression models. The empirical specification can be easily 
derived from the traditional log-linear Cobb-Douglas production function as suggested by 
the literature (Braconier, Ekholm, and Knarvik, 2001). Furthermore, ,  and represent 
the firm’s individual fixed effects, year fixed effects and the idiosyncratic error term 
respectively.  
 
Table 3 reports the regression results of Eq.(1). According to Table 3, after controlling for 
capital input, labour input, ownership, export status, firms engaging in OFDI are verified to 
have higher productivity, compared to those that have not conducted OFDI. But this result 
shows only partial correlation between a firm’s OFDI status and productivity. (Helpman et 
al., 2004) demonstrate that the self-selection effect exists when it comes to the OFDI status, 
i.e., more productive firms would have a high possibility to conduct OFDI. Hence the 
productivity impact of OFDI would be overestimated if firm’s self -selection effect is not 
controlled for. 
 
Table 3：Productivity difference between firms engaging in OFDI and not 
Independent variable：
 
(1) (2) 
OFDI 
0.016** 0.010* 
(0.008) (0.006) 
Log(number of employees) 
-0.028*** -0.043*** 
(0.000) (0.001) 
Log(capital stock) 
0.060*** 0.030*** 
(0.000) (0.001) 
Log(intermediate inputs) 
0.028*** 0.058*** 
(0.000) (0.001) 
Foreign-invested firm 
0.006*** 0.006* 
(0.001) (0.003) 
State-owned firm 
-0.054*** -0.008*** 
(0.002) (0.003) 
t i
t
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Exporting firm 
0.014*** 0.018*** 
(0.001) (0.001) 
R&D dummy 
0.020*** 0.011*** 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Year-specific fixed effect Yes Yes 
Industry-specific fixed effect Yes Yes 
Firm-specific fixed effect  No Yes 
R-squared 0.126 0.131 
Observations 1,521,763 1,521,763 
Note: An augmented Olley-Pakes approach has been used here, and the figures in the 
parentheses are the robust standard errors. Because R&D variable is missing in 2008, I 
exclude 2008 observations in the estimation. *, **, *** indicate the significance levels at 
10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
3.4.3 Econometric Model 
Disentangling correlations and causality in the OFDI-productivity growth nexus faces 
numerous challenges. As high productive firms are more likely to invest abroad, productivity 
growth may be endogenous and self-selected, and simple least squares estimation is invalid. 
Inspired by the literature (Bascle, 2008; Hamilton and Nickerson, 2003), the author uses 
propensity score matching to assess the causal effect of OFDI on parent firm productivity 
change. The matching technique creates the missing counter facts of firms that have foreign 
subsidiaries. It does so by pairing up a firm that conducts OFDI with a domestic plant (or 
several plants) with similar observable characteristics operating in the same sector and year, 
where similarities are determined on the basis of those plant features that have explanatory 
power in the OFDI decisions. Following De Loecker (2007) and Hayakawa, Matsuura, 
Motohashi, and Obashi (2013), propensity score matching is employed combining with a 
difference-in-difference approach. The OFDL-led productivity effect is hence inferred from 
the average divergence in the productivity paths between each firm having OFDI and its 
matched control plants, starting from the pre-OFDI year. This strategy allows us to control 
for observable and time -invariant unobservable differences between OFDI firms and their 
control plants (Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd, 1997).  
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The basic idea of propensity score matching is to take OFDI as a “treatment”, and then the 
productivity effect of OFDI can be captured by the average treatment effect on the treated 
(ATT). The author rescales the year that a firm just starts to invest abroad as period 0, and 
employs  to represent the number of years after a firm starts to invest abroad. Variable 
“ ” represents that firm  starts to invest abroad. Then the productivity effect of 
starting to invest abroad could be expressed as:  
   (2) 
The productivity is denoted by if a firm starts to invest abroad, and by if it does not. 
Equation (4) shows the average treated effect on the treated group (firms that start to invest 
abroad). The key point of getting the ATT is to find out the counter facts of the treated group, 
i.e., the control group. To achieve this purpose, propensity-score matching approach is 
utilized to construct the control group, following previous studies (De Loecker, 2007; Girma, 
Greenaway, and Kneller, 2004; Imbens, 2004; Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). Based on the 
information prior to the year when the firm started to invest abroad, the author has 
constructed the following model to estimate the propensity score: 
   (3) 
where  represents the cumulative density function of a normal distribution. refers to 
firm ’s characteristics as the control variables which could predict whether this firm would 
invest abroad in the next period. Firm pre -OFDI productivity, inputs (capital, labor and 
intermediate inputs), firm-level strategies (pre-OFDI export and R&D decision), firm 
ownership (foreign-invested firm or state-owned enterprise), firm age 12 , and dummy 
variables for year and industries serve this purpose, as discussed  in Section 3.4.1. 
                                                 
12 Although there is an argument that the newness of the subsidiary could explain the improvement in firm 
productivity, the analysis still holds. Frist of all, it’s true that subsidiaries st arted in different years probably take 
different technologies, but the estimation results still can show the positive productivity spillover effect through 
the backward linkage if parent firms benefit from engaging in OFDI. Furthermore, the analysis is to compare the 
productivity changes of parent firms with their counterfactuals (firms that operate in the same year and industry 
with the treatment group, but not engage in OFDI) rather than directly comparing firms with OFDI in different 
years. Moreover, the sample ranging from 2002-2007 (mainly between year 2004-2007), technologies used in a 
given manufacturing industry may be relatively similar during such a short time. What’s more important, the 
results still hold if we restrict the estimation sample to year 2004-2007. 
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According to Becker and Ichino (2002) and De Loecker (2007), the following algorithms are 
employed to find out the control groups. Firstly, the observations are split into k equally 
spaced intervals depending on the propensity score13. Secondly, within each interval, the 
author tests whether the average propensity score of the experimental group (treated group) 
differs significantly from that of the control group. If the test fails in one interval, the 
interval would be split in half and tested again until the average propensity scores of treated 
and control groups do not differ significantly in each interval. Thirdly, the author tests 
whether the means of the covariates do not differ significantly between treated and control 
groups within each interval, and this is to check whether the balancing condition is satisfied. 
If the balance condition is rejected, the author will alter the functional form of the propensity 
score by adding higher-order covariates and interaction terms and redo the above steps. 
Fourthly, the nearest-neighbor matching method is employed to find out the counterfactual 
observations after the balancing condition is satisfied14.  
 
After obtaining the control group, the author has pooled all the years and industries together 
and calculated the average TFP difference between the treated and control groups.  
denotes a set of firms that are matched to firm , and  refers to the number of firms in 
. The weight of firm that is matched to firm  is denoted as .  and  are 
the productivity of the treated firm and the firm in the control group respectively. Then the 
average treatment effect for year  on the treated can be written as follows: 
   (4) 
The year-by-year productivity growth effect can be expressed as follows: 
                                                 
13 The initial value of is set to 2. 
14 After sorting the sample by the propensity score, we search the counterfactual observations for the treated 
group by searching upward and downward. In fact, we find two firms for each treated one. Some other matching 
methods are also utilized, such as finding out one or four counterfactual observations for each treated firm, but 
the main results do not change significantly.  
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  (5) 
It is obvious that the productivity effect estimated from Eq.(5) is actually the average 
difference of productivity growth between the treated group firms and the matched control 
group firms15. 
 
Based on the above propensity-score matching method, Table 4 provides the matching 
results by year. Overall, the matching quality improves as the number of the treated group 
increases, which eliminates the influence of extreme values and outliers. 
 
 
Table 4: Summary of the matching quality 
Year 
Number of New 
Firms Starting to 
Invest Abroad 
Valid Number of 
New Firms Starting 
to Invest Abroad 
Number of 
Firms Matched 
Proportion of 
Firms Matched 
2002 22 17 6 0.35 
2003 28 19 12 0.63 
2004 72 51 16 0.31 
2005 280 263 120 0.46 
2006 334 304 252 0.83 
2007 399 362 303 0.84 
2008 381 367 315 0.86 
Total 1, 516 1, 383 1, 024 0.74 
Note: The valid number of new firms starting to invest abroad restricts the sample to firms 
with observations in pre-OFDI year and the primary variables used for matching are not 
missing. 
 
 
Table 5 compares the average TFP, capital, labor, intermediate input, and firm size between 
the treated and control groups. Before matching, compared with firms which have no OFDI, 
firms having OFDI are more productive and own more employees and capital on average. 
This confirms the self-selection effect for investing abroad. After matching, the difference is 
not statistically significant. As a result, the self-selection effect is substantially eliminated, 
                                                 
15 We adopt firms that never invest abroad in the sample period as the control group. There is an alternative way 
to choose the control group, i.e., treating firms that just do not invest abroad in the given year as the control 
group. However, the latter approach inevitably neglects the lagged effect of investing abroad in the previous 
years. Therefore the estimation results are based on the former approach. 
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based on the propensity-score matching method. 
 
 
Table 5: Comparison of characteristics between the treated and control groups 
 Before matching  After matching 
Variable Observation 
Mean: 
treated 
group 
Mean: 
control 
group 
t-statistic  Observation 
Mean: 
treated 
group 
Mean: 
control 
group 
t-
statistic 
Log(TFP) 1,383 2.09 1.90 13.73***  1,024 2.10 2.10 0.18 
Log(number of 
employees) 
1,383 5.92 4.67 28.15***  1,024 5.91 5.93 -0.95 
Log(capital 
stock) 
1,383 11.58 9.74 32.17***  1,024 11.51 11.54 -0.89 
Log(Intermediate 
inputs) 
1,383 11.34 9.73 30.26***  1,024 11.34 11.32 0.47 
Exporting firm 1,383 0.71 0.25 34.55***  1,024 0.71 0.69 1.43 
R&D dummy 1,383 0.32 0.11 27.43***  1,024 0.33 0.31 1.60 
Note: The control group before matching is constructed using the average values of all the 
firms without OFDI. Statistics after matching is based on sample in the pre-OFDI Year. The 
number of observations refers to that of the treatment group. The results reported here after 
matching are based on 1:2 matching approach, that is, there are two counterfactual firms for 
each treated firm. The results are similar if I employ the 1:1 or 1:4 matching approach.  
 
 
Next the author combines the propensity score matching and DID approaches to produce a 
more precise estimation of the productivity effect of OFDI (Blundell and Dias, 2009). The 
author compares an EME’s productivity with its pre-OFDI level (s=−1), where  denotes 
the productivity growth difference in period  compared to the pre-OFDI level， for the 
treated and control groups. 
   (6) 
  Considering the advantage of controlling for the pre-OFDI level of productivity after 
propensity-score matching, the author relies on the DID measure to produce main estimation 
results. 
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3.5 Estimation Results 
3.5.1 Results at the Overall Manufacturing Level  
Table 6 demonstrates the estimation results at the overall manufacturing level. Panel (1) 
describes the impact of OFDI on the parent firm’s level-value of productivity change over 
time, while panel (2) indicates the year-to-year productivity premium the new investor 
gathered over time. The results show that the productivity premium for EMEs that started to 
engage in OFDI increased gradually. Based on the DID approach, EMEs’ average 
productivity gains from the first to the third year after starting OFDI grew from 4.9% to 
14.5%, which is similar to the pure level effect. However, panel (3) shows that firms’ year-
to-year productivity growth after OFDI is not significant for all the years.16. 
 
Table 6：Productivity Effect of OFDI—at the Overall Manufacturing Level17 
 0 1 2 3 
(1) Results: TFP level 0.015 0.051*** 0.080*** 0.147*** 
Standard error (0.011) (0.015) (0.023) (0.039) 
(2) Results: TFP growth: DID measure 0.014 0.049*** 0.079*** 0.145*** 
Standard error (0.011) (0.018) (0.025) (0.042) 
(3) Results: TFP: year-to-year growth  0.014 0.030* 0.027 0.053* 
Standard error (0.011) (0.017) (0.021) (0.029) 
Number of treated units 1024 657 346 114 
Note: This table reports the estimation results of OFDI’s impacts on parent firms’ 
productivity change. An augmented Olley-Pakes approach has been used here, and standard 
errors are reported in the parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance level at 10%, 5% and 
1%, respectively. 
 
 
3.5.2 State ownership and OFDI’s productivity effect on EMEs 
To test the first hypothesis that how state ownership moderates OFDI’s productivity effect 
                                                 
16 This finding is similar to the conclusion about the productivity effect of exporting by De Loecker (2007). 
17 In this table, the number of treated units is less than that of the treated ones after matching. There are several 
reasons for this situation. First, production information prior to the year when firms started to invest abroad is 
needed for matching, and firms with missing pre-OFDI information are omitted. Second, firms that cannot be 
matched are dropped because of the violation of the balance condition hypothesis. Third, when calculating TFP 
with the augmented Olley -Pakes approach, firms with missing covariates are deleted. These are also the cases for 
later estimations. 
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on EMEs, the author splits the sample into four groups based on state ownership 18  and 
EMEs’ OFDI status and test whether there is a difference in productivity effects between 
private EMEs and SO-EMEs. The author treats SO-EMEs (private EMEs) with no OFDI in 
the sample period as the control group for SO-EMES (private EMEs) that conduct OFDI in 
that year, and the matching approach adopted in this chapter is on a year-by-year and 
industry-by-industry basis. The estimation results are listed in Table 6 below. 
 
Table 7 and Figure 5 show that OFDI indeed significantly contributes to the productivity 
growth for private EMES. Their productivity benefits increase from 1.8% in the first year to 
15.2% in the third year after conducting OFDI. While for SO-EMEs, the productivity growth 
effect is not significant. Therefore hypothesis 1 is supported according to this estimation 
result.  
 
Table 7: Instantaneous and long-run productivity effect of OFDI by state ownership19 
 0 1 2 3 
(A) Results for SO-EMEs 
(1) Results: TFP: DID measure -0.015 0.025 0.036 0.11 
Standard error (0.026) (0.041) (0.147) (0.131) 
(2) Results: TFP: year-to-year growth -0.015 0.046 -0.014 0.073 
Standard error (0.026) (0.063) (0.94) (0.109) 
Number of treated units 54 37 29 11 
(B) Results for private EMES 
(1) Results: TFP: DID measure 0.018* 0.053*** 0.086*** 0.152*** 
Standard error (0.010) (0.018) (0.024) (0.041) 
(2) Results: TFP: year-to-year growth 0.018* 0.026* 0.031 0.058** 
Standard error (0.010) (0.014) (0.020) (0.029) 
Number of treated units 916 598 302 97 
Note: This table reports the productivity effect of starting to invest abroad grouped by 
ownership of parent firms. An augmented Olley-Pakes approach has been used here, and 
standard errors are reported in the parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance level at 10%, 
5% and 1%, respectively. 
                                                 
18  By the official definition reported in China Statistical Yearbook (2008), SO -EMEs include firms such as  
domestic SO -EMEs (code: 110), state-owned joint venture firms (141), and state-owned and collective joint  
venture firms (143), but exclude state-owned limited corporations (151), based on the registration type. 
19 According to Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment 2008, the share of number of 
SOEs is about 16.1% in 2008. Considering most of the financial investors are SOEs, limitin g the sample to the 
manufacturing firms further decreases the share of SOEs. 
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             Figure 5: Effect of state ownership on OFDI’s productivity effect on EMEs 
 
 
3.5.3 Absorptive capacity and OFDI’s productivity effect on EMEs 
To test whether a firm’s absorptive capability matters, the authors splits the sample into four 
groups according to whether firms have conducted OFDI and whether they have had pre-
OFDI R&D20 . The matching approach is conducted on a year-by-year and industry-by-
industry basis. The author treats firms with (without) positive R&D expenditure before year 
 as the control group for firms that starting OFDI in year  and with (without) positive 
R&D before year  respectively21. Table 8 illustrates the corresponding estimation results, 
and Figure 6 shows the comparative role of absorptive capability in moderating OFDI’s 
productivity effect.  
 
 
                                                 
20 To be accurate, for those that have never invested abroad, we split them based on whether they had R&D prior 
to that year within each industry for each year. 
21 An alternative method to test the role of absorptive capability in moderating the productivity effect of OFDI is 
to directly split the matched results from Section 5.1 into two groups by firms’ pre-OFDI R&D status. But it may 
overestimate the productivity effect for firms that had pre-OFDI R&D, compared to the approach. 
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Table 8: Instantaneous and long-run productivity effect of OFDI by pre-OFDI R&D status22 
 0 1 2 3 
(A) Results for firms with pre-OFDI R&D 
(1) Results: TFP: DID measure 0.035** 0.066*** 0.122*** 0.169*** 
Standard error (0.014) (0.022) (0.030) (0.050) 
(2) Results: TFP: year-to-year growth 0.035** 0.028 0.048* 0.049 
Standard error (0.014) (0.019) (0.027) (0.036) 
Number of treated units 447 283 146 51 
(B) Results for firms without pre-OFDI R&D 
(1) Results: TFP: DID measure 0.007 0.045* 0.072* 0.079 
Standard error (0.012) (0.026) (0.037) (0.061) 
(2) Results: TFP: year-to-year growth 0.007 0.031 0.029 0.011 
Standard error (0.012) (0.019) (0.030) (0.039) 
Number of treated units 521 321 174 55 
Note: This table reports the productivity effect of starting to invest abroad grouped by pre-
OFDI status. An augmented Olley-Pakes approach has been used here, and standard errors 
are reported in the parentheses. *, **, *** indicate the significance levels at 10%, 5% and 
1%, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
                     Figure 6: Effect of absorptive capacity on OFDI’s productivity effect on EMEs 
                                                 
22  Because of the advantage of controlling for the pre-OFDI effect more precisely, we only report the DID 
estimates here, which is similar to the TFP level effect (the same below). The summation of the number of the 
two group treated units is less than that the total number of the treated units in Table 5. There is an important 
factor that can explain this situation. When we conduct the matching estimation to the four groups on a year-to-
year and industry-to-industry basis, some treated units could not be matched to the counterfactual firms because 
of the violation of the balancing condition. Therefore those firms which could not be matched were omitted when 
the estimation was performed. This was also the case for the majority of the following subsamples. Table 7  
shows that the proportion of firms with positive pre-OFDI R&D expenditure was close to 50%, which was  
remarkably higher than the share of the overall manufacturing firms with R&D expenditure. The annual average 
share of firms with positive R&D expenditure is about 11% in the period 2002-2008. 
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It can be summarized from Table 7 and Figure 3 that on average OFDI promotes the parent 
firm’s productivity growth no matter whether it has pre-OFDI R&D or not. However, the 
productivity effect differentiates significantly according to firms’ absorptive capability. 
Based on the estimation results of the TFP, for EMEs that have positive pre-OFDI R&D 
expenditure, the productivity premiums are highly significant, and OFDI engagement brings 
in 2.1% higher productivity growth in the first year, than firms without OFDI. Till the third 
year after (s=3) starting OFDI, the productivity premium for EMEs with strong absorptive 
capacity turns to be larger and reached 16.9%. However, for firms without pre-OFDI R&D, 
the productivity growth benefits brought by OFDI are only significant in some beginning 
years (the first and second year after OFDI, i.e., only significant when s=1 and 2), and their 
productivity growth rate is noticeably lower than EMEs with positive pre-OFDI R&D 
expenditure. Thus hypothesis 2 is supported.  
 
3.5.4 Entry mode and OFDI’s productivity effect on EMEs 
To identify how entry mode strategy moderates OFDI-led productivity growth, the author 
tackles the potential endogeneity issue of different entry modes (Shaver, 1998) based on the 
combination of propensity score matching and difference-in-difference method illustrated in 
Section 4 to examine the impacts of different modes on productivity for each group. The 
estimation results are illustrated below in Table 9 and Figure 7. 
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Table 9: Instantaneous and long-run productivity effect of OFDI by entry mode23 
 0 1 2 3 
(A) Results for firms starting to invest abroad via Greenfield Investment 
(1) Results: TFP: DID measure 0.015 0.051** 0.085*** 0.148*** 
Standard error (0.011) (0.020) (0.025) (0.042) 
(2) Results: TFP: year-to-year growth 0.015 0.033* 0.028 0.054* 
Standard error (0.011) (0.017) (0.021) (0.028) 
Number of treated units 623 431 235 92 
(B) Results for firms starting to invest abroad via M&A 
(1) Results: TFP: DID measure 0.010 0.036 0.064* 0.113* 
Standard error (0.013) (0.022) (0.034) (0.058) 
(2) Results: TFP: year-to-year growth 0.010 0.020 0.040 0.048 
Standard error (0.013) (0.018) (0.031) (0.039) 
Number of treated units 106 62 30 11 
Note: This table reports the productivity effect of starting to invest abroad grouped by two 
kinds of entry mode strategy. An augmented Olley-Pakes approach has been used here, and 
standard errors are reported in the parentheses. *, **, *** indicate signif icance level at 10%, 
5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
 
                       
                     Figure 7: Effect of entry mode strategy on OFDI’s productivity effect on EMEs 
 
It can be summarized from Table 8 and Figure 4 that the positive OFDI-led productivity 
growth effect occurs via both of these two entry modes, but during different periods. Via 
greenfield investment, the productivity effect appears from the first year after OFDI (s=1), 
and this effect increases with time. Through M&A, OFDI’ impact on productivity is not 
                                                 
23 We drop observations that parent firms had two kinds of entry mode strategy in the starting year to avoid any 
confusion. In addition, firms whose initial entry mode cannot be identified are omitted. 
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significant until the second year after OFDI starts (s=2, only weakly significant)24. Based on 
the above estimation results, hypothesis 3 is supported.  
 
3.5.5 Investment Destination and OFDI’s productivity effect on EMEs 
The author tests the hypothesis 4 via comparing the performance of EMEs having OFDI in 
developed countries only 25 and in less developed countries only 26. The results in Table 10 
and Figure 8 support the hypothesis by demonstrating that OFDI’s productivity effect 
significantly exists whether EMEs invest in developed or less developed countries, but this 
OFDI-led productivity gain is clearly higher if investing in developed countries. Hence, 
hypothesis 4 is supported. 
 
Table 10: Instantaneous and long-run productivity effect of OFDI by investment destination 
 0 1 2 3 
(A) Results for firms starting to invest only in developed countries 
(1) Results: TFP: DID measure 0.022* 0.068*** 0.106*** 0.178*** 
Standard error (0.012) (0.018) (0.025) (0.041) 
(2) Results: TFP: year-to-year growth 0.022* 0.039* 0.033 0.055* 
Standard error (0.012) (0.021) (0.022) (0.032) 
Number of treated units 394 201 102 25 
(B) Results for firms starting to invest only in less developed countries 
(1) Results: TFP: DID measure 0.008 0.037* 0.068** 0.135** 
Standard error (0.010) (0.021) (0.028) (0.059) 
(2) Results: TFP: year-to-year growth 0.008 0.024 0.026 0.052* 
Standard error (0.010) (0.016) (0.019) (0.028) 
Number of treated units 509 332 201 85 
Note: This table reports the productivity effect of starting to invest abroad grouped by 
investment destination. An augmented Olley-Pakes approach has been used here, and 
standard errors are reported in the parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance level at 10%, 
5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
                                                 
24One thing needs to be emphasized. Because it is common for big companies instead of small ones to engage in 
M&A. Information for big companies is always more publicly available, as a result, missing entry mode status  is 
more possible for greenfield investment. Therefore, we can replace missing entry mode status by greenfield 
investment to check whether the results for entry mode have a big difference. Fortunately, the results for entry 
mode are still robust. 
25 Developed countries used in this paper are restricted to those that had joined OECD before 2009, because of 
the sample period. For more information about the list of OECD members, please refer to 
http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/list-oecd-member-countries.htm 
26 In order to get rid of the mixed effect generated by firms that invest both in developed countries and in less  
developed countries during the starting year, we drop all the observations of those firms in this section. 
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             Figure 8: Effect of investment destination on OFDI’s productivity effect on EMEs 
 
 
 
 
3.6 Robustness Check and Further Analysis  
 
3.6.1 An Alternative Measure of Total Factor Productivity 
 In order to check whether the above estimation results are robust to different productivity 
estimation methods, the author has re-estimated firms’ productivity effect using the 
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) approach (LP method). This method employs an EME’s 
intermediate inputs as a proxy for unobservable productivity, to control for the correlation 
between firms’ inputs decisions and invisible productivity, thus solving the simultaneity bias 
when estimating the production function. After the firm-level productivity estimation, the 
author tests the OFDI-led productivity effect using the same method in Section 5, and the 
results (see Table 11) are similar to those in Section 3.5. 
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Table 11: OFDI’s productivity effect-productivity calculated by LP method 
  0 1 2 3 
Results at 
Manufacturing 
level 
(1) Results: TFP: DID measure 0.021 0.064** 0.128** 0.176** 
Standard error (0.019) (0.031) (0.052) (0.087) 
Number of treated units 1380 967 587 288 
Results by 
different 
resources and 
institutions of 
parents’ firms 
(2-a) Results for firms with pre-OFDI R&D 
Results: TFP: DID measure 0.038* 0.103** 0.176** 0.263** 
Standard error (0.021) (0.043) (0.073) (0.104) 
Number of treated units 501 325 182 71 
(2-b) Results for firms without pre-OFDI R&D 
Results: TFP: DID measure 0.012 0.047* 0.089* 0.128 
Standard error (0.017) (0.028) (0.042) (0.086) 
Number of treated units 824 602 366 187 
(3-a) Results for SO-EMEs 
Results: TFP: DID measure 0.014 0.085 0.12 0.155 
Standard error (0.022) (0.054) (0.084) (0.098) 
Number of treated units 55 46 34 22 
(3-b) Results for private EMES 
Results: TFP: DID measure 0.022 0.063** 0.131** 0.189** 
Standard error (0.018) (0.029) (0.051) (0.086) 
Number of treated units 1273 881 528 253 
Results by 
different 
investment 
strategy 
(4-a) Results for firms via Greenfield Investment 
Results: TFP: DID measure 0.021 0.065** 0.129*** 0.183** 
Standard error (0.018) (0.029) (0.049) (0.087) 
Number of treated units 672 475 268 124 
(4-b) Results for firms via M&A 
Results: TFP: DID measure 0.02 0.064 0.121* 0.163* 
Standard error (0.019) (0.041) (0.065) (0.092) 
Number of treated units 134 105 62 33 
(5-a) Results for firms starting to invest only in developed countries 
Results: TFP: DID measure 0.026 0.086** 0.139** 0.201** 
Standard error (0.020) (0.034) (0.054) (0.088) 
Number of treated units 491 358 214 103 
(5-b) Results for firms starting to invest only in less developed countries 
Results: TFP: DID measure 0.019 0.046 0.118** 0.159* 
Standard error (0.018) (0.029) (0.050) (0.086) 
Number of treated units 678 469 265 158 
Note: This table reports the estimation results of OFDI’s impacts on parent firms’ 
productivity change. A Levinsohn and Petrin approach has been used here to estimate firm-
level productivity, and standard errors are reported in the parentheses. *, **, *** indicate 
significance level at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
3.6.2 Investment Destination Measured by Patent Application Per Capita 
To test whether the estimation results of Section 5.5 are robust to different criteria of the host 
country division, the author has divided the sample into two groups based on host counties’ 
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technology levels measured by patent applications per capita. the author has averaged each 
host country’s patent applications per capita during the period 2002-2008, and then 
compared them with the overall average, to evaluate whether a country is high-tech or low-
tech (a country with above-total-average patent application per capita is labeled as a high-
tech country and otherwise a low-tech country). The estimation results are shown in Table 12 
and they are again similar to those in Section 5.5. 
 
 
Table 12: Estimation results by innovation level 
 0 1 2 3 
(A) Results for firms starting to invest only in high-tech countries 
(1) Results: TFP: DID measure 0.021* 0.059*** 0.102*** 0.174*** 
Standard error (0.011) (0.019) (0.024) (0.041) 
(2) Results: TFP: year-to-year 
growth 
0.021* 0.036** 0.040* 0.066* 
Standard error (0.011) (0.018) (0.024) (0.034) 
Number of treated units 339 227 123 45 
(B) Results for firms starting to invest only in low-tech countries 
(1) Results: TFP: DID measure 0.010 0.043** 0.066** 0.124*** 
Standard error (0.011) (0.017) (0.027) (0.043) 
(2) Results: TFP: year-to-year 
growth 
0.010 0.028* 0.021 0.044 
Standard error (0.011) (0.016) (0.020) (0.027) 
Number of treated units 634 405 211 65 
Note: This table reports the productivity effect of starting to invest abroad grouped by 
investment destination. The two kinds of host countries, high-tech countries and low-tech 
countries are defined by the level of the host countries’ patent application per capita under 
the Patent Application Treaty. An augmented Olley-Pakes approach has been used here, and 
standard errors are reported in the parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance level at 10%, 
5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
3.6.3 One-Step System GMM Approach to Estimate the OFDI’s Productivity Effect  
Given the flexibility of one-step system-GMM, according to Blundell and Bond (1998) and 
Yu (2015), the author has examined OFDI-led productivity growth directly without the pre-
estimation of EMEs’ productivity27. Thus the coefficients of inputs and OFDI in production 
function are estimated simultaneously, as an extra robustness check.  
                                                 
27 In fact, this is to treat OFDI as a component of TFP, and explicitly test whether starting to invest abroad can 
promote parent firms’ productivity keeping other production factors unchanged.  
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The results in Table 13 show that at the overall manufacturing level, OFDI indeed promotes 
EMEs’ productivity growth. But the productivity effect is moderated by firm heterogeneity 
and investment strategy. EMEs that have pre-OFDI R&D and non-SOE ownership gain 
more OFDI-led productivity growth. At the same time, investing in developed countries 
helps EMEs gain higher productivity premium.  In all the estimation specifications, SO-
EMEs are less efficient. 
 
Table 13: Additional one-step system-GMM estimation 
Regressand: 
log(output) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Overall 
Effect 
With pre-
OFDI 
R&D 
Without 
pre-OFDI 
R&D 
Investment 
in developed 
countries  
Investment 
 in less 
developed 
countries 
Lagged  
0.037*** 0.047*** 0.025 0.033*** 0.028* 
(0.010) (0.014) (0.027) (0.010) (0.015) 
Log(lagged output) 
0.162*** 0.177*** 0.195*** 0.160*** 0.194*** 
(0.007) (0.015) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) 
Log(capital stock) 
0.024*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.024*** 0.021*** 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Log(intermediate 
inputs) 
0.739*** 0.753*** 0.692*** 0.739*** 0.704*** 
(0.005) (0.011) (0.009) (0.005) (0.007) 
Log(number of 
employees) 
0.080*** 0.104*** 0.083*** 0.080*** 0.089*** 
(0.002) (0.006) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) 
Log(lagged capital 
stock) 
-
0.010*** 
-
0.019*** 
-0.005*** -0.010*** -0.007*** 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Log(lagged 
intermediate inputs) 
0.018*** -0.015 -0.003 0.020*** -0.006 
(0.004) (0.011) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) 
Log(lagged number 
of employees ) 
-
0.042*** 
-
0.044*** 
-0.031*** -0.042*** -0.032*** 
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
SOE indicator 
-
0.101*** 
-
0.064*** 
-0.118*** -0.101*** -0.092*** 
(0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.007) 
Exporter indicator 
0.010*** 0.011*** 0.033*** 0.010*** 0.029*** 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) 
Observations 796335 169137 627198 796279 796293 
Note: Figures in the parentheses are robust standard errors. Column (1) reports the 
estimation results at the whole manufacturing level. Columns (2) and (3) respectively use 
start
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samples that have R&D and have no R&D before OFDI, while Columns (4) and (5) report 
the estimation results that drop all the observations of firms that invest in developed 
countries, and less developed countries respectively. The year fixed effect and industry fixed 
effect have been controlled for in each regression. Only the lagged level value and difference 
value up to 2 periods of endogenous or predetermined variables, such as labor, intermediary 
input and capital stock are used as the GMM-type instruments in case of overfitting issue 
(Roodman, 2009). *, **, *** denote significance level at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.  
 
 
 
3.7 Discussion and Conclusion 
 Given the mixed empirical results on the OFDI-EMEs’ productivity growth nexus, the 
author has established a novel theoretical framework by combining the RBV and IT, and 
assessed the moderating effect of firm heterogeneity, in terms of state ownership, absorptive 
capacity, entry mode and destination. This is the very first attempt to address such 
moderating effects. The author feels that this study has the following theoretical, policy and 
managerial implications. 
 
Unlike previous studies that treat OFDI-EMEs’ productivity growth as a direct linkage 
(Herzer, 2011), the contribution of this chapter firstly lies in identifying and documenting the 
moderating effect of firm heterogeneity on OFDI’s productivity. The author’s overarching 
argument is that although EMEs turn to be generally more productive after they conduct 
OFDI, this productivity effect varies depending on EME heterogeneity: 1) An EME without 
state ownership gains more positive productivity effect via OFDI than that with state 
ownership; 2) The stronger the EME’s absorptive capacity, the more positive productivity 
premium it can get from OFDI; 3) In contrast with greenfield investment, the positive 
productivity effect an EME acquires via M&A is lagged; 4) An EME investing in developed 
countries only gains more from OFDI-led productivity enhancement. The new theoretical 
model developed in this chapter extends existing literature as it does not just look at the 
direct impact of OFDI on firm productivity, but examines how the OFDI-productivity 
relationship is altered when firm heterogeneity is introduced. This provides original 
contribution to the ongoing debate about OFDI’s productivity effect. 
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Secondly, the author has focused on an emerging economy context and added to an under-
researched area by complementing the RBV with IT, to predict EMEs’ productivity gain 
from OFDI ( Hoskisson et al., 2013; Peng et al., 2008). The author has discussed how 
EMEs’ resource- and institution-based heterogeneity jointly affects OFDI’s productivity 
effect. The author finds evidence that private EMEs can gain positive productivity effect via 
OFDI while SO-EMEs cannot. This result challenges the RBV which indicates that SO-
EMEs with more institution-based resources should perform better in global markets (Wang 
et al., 2012), and support the author’s argument that IT is needed to explain EMEs’ 
productivity gains from OFDI. With affiliation to governments, SO -EMEs are confronted 
with more stressful home country institutional pressures as their high resource-dependence 
on home country governments pushes them in serving for national politic goals. At the same 
time, being recognized as political actors, host country institutions exert huge pressures on 
SO-EMEs, preventing them from performing resource-augmenting activities effectively (Cui 
and Jiang, 2012). 
 
The author enriches the existing literature related to absorptive capability by recognizing its 
positive moderating effect on the OFDI-EMEs’ productivity linkage, based on both the RBV 
and IT. The author confirms the role absorptive capability plays in shaping EMEs’ 
recognition, assimilation and application to commercial ends of external valuable knowledge 
and information (Barney, 2001; Deng, 2007). Apart from that, this chapter suggests that 
EMEs’ absorptive capability also works as resource-based capabilities, assisting EMEs in 
dealing with host country institutional pressures and surviving in asset-intensive developed 
institutions. Similarly, the moderating effect of OFDI destination has also been identified. In 
line with both the RBV and IT, the author demonstrates that developed countries with 
agglomerated high-tech and well-developed institutional infrastructure (Hoskisson et al., 
2013), offer EMEs with more possibilities for productivity enhancement.  
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Last but not the least, the finding of the moderating effect of entry mode on OFDI’s 
productivity effect calls for the incorporation of the RBV and IT again. It is proved that 
OFDI’s productivity effect on EMEs via M&A will be lagged. It is contradictory with the 
previous literature based on the RBV which suggests that M&A is more efficient in asset-
augmenting (Chung and Alcácer, 2002). OFDI’s productivity effect brought about by M&A 
could be lagged for both country-level and firm-level conflicts of institutional construct. 
Compared to greenfield investment, M&A may bring more challenges for EMEs as it needs 
time and efforts in corporate culture integration, and has to deal with the historical burdens 
for merged affiliates28 (Buckley and Casson, 1998; Görg, 2000). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
28 Note that the standard errors of the estimators for M&A are much larger than those for Greenfield Investment, 
which demonstrates large performance difference for investors via M&A. 
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Chapter 4: Joint Role of Resource-based and Institutional Factors in 
Determining MNE Subsidiary’s Bribing Strategy in Host Countries: An 
Empirical Test 
 
4.1 Introduction 
As a strategic reaction in corrupt business environment, the role of bribery has long been 
discussed (Birhanu, Gambardella and Valentini, 2015; Spencer and Gomez, 2011; Svensson, 
2003; Martin, Gullen, Johnson and Parboteeah, 2007). The existing literature has so far 
identified the following main determinants of bribery:  national culture (Martin et al, 2007), 
institutional features (Spencer and Gomez, 2011; Sanyal, 2005; Jeong and Weiner, 2012), 
and top management characteristics (Collins, Uhlenbruck, and Rodriguez, 2009). Apart from 
that, a firm’s ‘refusal power’, formulated based on firm resources, has also been regarded as 
a determinant of firms’ bribery, as it explains a large part of the variation in bribe payments 
across graft-reporting firms (Svensson, 2003).  
 
In an international business context, as government corruption is pervasive internationally 
and has been institutionalized into host country environments, it is inevitable that MNE 
subsidiaries will have to encounter bribery requests in host countries.  It is especially in 
corrupt host countries that are highly corrupt and thus corruption has been institutionalized 
to be illegal legitimacy in those contexts (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016). But in a corrupt 
environment, MNEs are actually expected by government officials to pay different levels of 
bribery, according to MNEs’ heterogeneity including MNEs’ country-of-origin and their firm 
capabilities (Spencer and Gomez, 2011). MNE subsidiaries confront different levels of 
corruption pressures in a host country, and identifying and documenting who bribes and who 
should bribe and what factors determine MNE subsidiaries’ bribing strategy is essential as it 
provides MNE subsidiaries with clues to make right strategic decisions to survive (Galang, 
2012). Recent literature has recognized the role of institutional factors in MNE subsidiaries’ 
106 
 
bribing strategy in host countries, e.g., the home country’s participation of the OECD 
Convention for Combating Bribery, and the host country corruption environment (Spencer 
and Gomez, 2011). However, as argued in chapter 2, the institutional pressure MNE 
subsidiaries confront in a host country can be moderated by MNEs’ holding of resources, 
and MNEs’ strategy in a host country can be affected by both institutional and resource-
based factors (Peng, etc., 2008). Therefore, it is essential to analyze the determinants of a 
firm’s choice of bribery with a sound analytical framework beyond institutions. But so far 
there is still a lack of a comprehensive approach including both institutional and resource -
based factors to explain MNEs’ bribing strategy (Lee and Weng, 2013).  
 
This chapter aims to fill in the above research gaps by combing the RBV and IT to generate 
an interactive model, illustrating how resource-based and institutional factors jointly 
determine an MNE subsidiary’s strategic choice of bribery. This is also a test of the 
proposition 5c in model proposed in chapter 2 (Figure 3), i.e. institutional and resource-
based factors jointly determine MNEs’ OFDI strategy. The author argues that the 
heterogeneity of MNE subsidiaries’ resources and perceived corrupt pressures work jointly, 
leading to differing bribery strategies in response to host country corruption. The author 
chooses MNE subsidiary managers’ experiences and MNE subsidiaries’ holding of 
internationally recognized quality certification (IQC) as the representative measures of MNE 
subsidiaries’ intangible and tangible specific resources (Peng and Luo, 2000; Clougherty and 
Grajek, 2008), and chooses MNE subsidiaries’ perceived pressure of host country corruption 
as the measure of host country institutional factors that might influence firms’ bribing 
strategy (Spencer and Gomez, 2011). MNE subsidiaries’ embeddedness in the home country 
anti-corruption practice will be employed by the author as a measure of MNE subsidiaries’ 
specific institution-based resources accumulated in the home country institutions (Cuervo-
Cazurra, and Genc, 2008). This theoretical framework then is tested using firm-level data 
from the World Bank enterprise surveys from 2006 to 2012, with a total of 2210 MNE 
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subsidiaries being included in the final sample. Both Tobit model and Heckman two-step 
approach are employed to carefully tackle MNE subsidiaries’ potential self-selection to 
bribe. Based on the preliminary results from the Tobit regression, the author finds that MNE 
subsidiaries’ perceived host country pressures and MNE subsidiary managers’ experiences 
generate a positive effect on MNE subsidiaries’ bribery choice, whereas MNE subsidiaries’ 
holding of IQC and embedded home country anti-corruption practice produce a negative 
effect on MNE subsidiaries’ willingness to pay bribes. A further analysis via the Heckman 
two-step approach suggests that managers’ role in MNE Ss’ bribing choice is insignificant, 
indicating that this part of the theoretical framework proposed in this chapter is not 
supported. A detailed analysis of the estimation results will be provided in the final 
discussion and conclusion part.  
 
This chapter firstly contributes by combining resource-based and institutional factors in one 
framework and examining how they jointly affect MNE subsidiaries’ bribing decisions. This 
framework is proposed and tested as the second part of the model developed in chapter 2 
(Figure 3). Secondly, the author uses firm-, rather than country-level data, which provides an 
insight into the micro mechanism by which firm-level heterogeneity in resources and 
confronted institutional pressures influence MNE subsidiaries’ choice of bribery (Birhaun, et 
al. 2015). Aidt (2009) and Campos, Dimova, and Saleh (2010), among others, argue that one 
reason why the country-level analyses yield inconclusive results is the endogeneity of 
corruption with respect to institutions and the lack of satisfactory instrumental variables at 
the aggregate. The use of firm-level data and appropriate instrument variables has tackled 
this problem. Thirdly, considerable research of government corruption suffers from the 
predominance of developed country studies, where the manner is relatively transparent and 
predictable, while few studies are conducted using the context of African countries (Pearce, 
Manz, and Sims Jr, 2008). The current study uses data from sub-Saharan African countries. 
These countries are highly corrupt, but have remained highly under researched in the 
management literature. As such, the current study sheds light on a geographic area that has 
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remained an unknown terrain to many management scholars. Finally, MNE subsidiaries 
might self-select to bribe or not bribe, depending on their holding of resources and perceived 
institutional pressures, and this self -selection bias might affect the rigor of the estimation 
results. As it is increasingly essential to tackle firms’ self-selection issue in social science 
research (Clougherty, Duso and Muck, 2015), after basic estimation via the Tobit regression, 
the current study conducts further analysis via the Heckman two-step approach to check the 
robustness or the results.  
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In the following section the author proposes 
a theoretical framework and corresponding hypotheses. A discussion of data follows. Next, 
the author discusses the preliminary results of the empirical analysis. In the fourth section, 
the author conducts further analysis via the Heckman two-step approach and then reports the 
results. The final section contains the author’s discussion and conclusion.  
 
4.2 Hypotheses: Resource-based and Institutional Factors as Determinants of MNE 
Subsidiary Bribery Decision 
The role of institutional factors on MNE subsidiaries’ strategy making has been referred to 
before (Spencer and Gomez, 2011; Jeong and Weiner, 2012). As government corruption can 
be institutionalized as a fundamental component of an environment (Colins and Bruck, 
2004), following IT, MNE subsidiaries face local isomorphic pressures to react to local 
bribery requests so that they can gain legitimacy to survive (Dimaggio and Powell, 1983). 
Collins and Uhlenbruck’s (2004) study finds that even though the stated opinion regarding 
government corruption is negative in India, as corruption has been perceived as an 
institution and has been accepted as the ‘it’s the way things are done’, firms are likely to 
comply with institutional demands associated with corruption. Additionally, as government 
corruption are perceived to be more take for granted in a corrupt context, firms will be 
confronted with pressures to comply with this illegal legitimacy and government officials 
may also impose more coercive pressures on MNE subsidiaries to engage in bribery. 
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Furthermore, MNE subsidiaries also suffer from mimetic pressures to participate in bribery 
if high performing domestic firms engage in government corruption. Thus, we conclude that 
in corrupt contexts where government corruption has been institutionalized to be an illegal 
legitimacy, MNEs are confronted with pressures to comply with bribery requests, and the 
higher the perceived pressures of corruption, the higher possibility MNE subsidiaries will 
pay bribes. Thus, 
Hypothesis 1: The level of an MNE subsidiary’s perceived pressure of host country 
corruption relates positively with its willingness to engage in bribery in the host country.   
However, existing studies tend to rely on IT when analyzing the determinants of MNE 
subsidiary bribery （Martin, etc., 2007）, while resource-based factors have long been 
ignored. Firms’ resources constitute and determine firms’ strategy (Barney, 1991). When 
confronting bribery requests in host countries, firms’ specific resources affect their ‘refusal 
power’ for bribery requests. Some resources such as MNE subsidiaries’ product quality and 
technology help MNE subsidiaries avoid paying bribes with limited impacts on their 
business operations and performance. Other resources like firms’ home -country institutional 
embeddedness, as a kind of institution-based resources, and managers’ social ties with 
government officials could also significantly influence MNE subsidiaries’ responses to 
bribery requests (Martin, Cullen, Johnson, and Parboteeah, 2007; Peng and Luo, 2000). 
Mainstream international business theories suggest that MNEs develop resources and 
competitiveness from country-of-origin (Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 2008; Porter, 1980; 
Cantwell, Lundun and Dunning, 2010). As firms develop abilities to operate in a particular 
institutional environment over time via a learning-by-doing manner (Eriksson, Johanson, 
Majkgard, and Sharma, 1997; Johanson and Vahlne, 1977), MNE subsidiaries’ home country 
institutional background generates assumptions and attitudes that influence the way in which 
MNE subsidiaries govern their relationships with external environments when 
internationalizing. MNE subsidiaries thus are offered specific institution-based resources 
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from their home country embeddedness when operating in host countries. On one hand, 
following the predictions of IT, MNE subsidiaries from less corrupt home countries are 
accustomed to the regulatory, normative and coercive norms in paying no bribes, and thus 
are less willing to bribe. On the other hand, MNE subsidiaries’ home-of-origin works as an 
institution-based resources, affecting MNE subsidiaries’ reactions to the corrupt 
environment. MNE subsidiaries from developed institutions with high anti-corruption 
practices tend to have strong ownership advantages in areas such as branding and advertising 
(Lall, 1993) and technology (Bartlett and Ghosal, 2000), and they have more refusal power 
to reject bribery requests. Thus,  
Hypothesis 2: The level of an MNE subsidiary’s home-country anti-corruption practices 
relates negatively with the MNE subsidiary’s willingness to engage in bribery in the host 
country.  
According to the RBV，firms’ tangible assets play a role in their bribery decisions in host 
countries. It is obvious that product quality is the most crucial firm resource for firm 
performance (Peng and Luo, 2000). As a signal of high quality, internationally recognized 
quality certification (IQC) constitutes MNE subsidiaries’ essential firm-based capabilities, 
endowing MNE subsidiaries with strong ‘refusal power’ to negotiate with corrupt 
government officials. It not only provides a sign of high quality that helps reduce waste and 
increase productivity, but also can support creating more efficient or effective operations and 
improve employee’s motivation, awareness, and morale (World Bank, 2014). Additionally, 
IQC (e.g., ISO 9000, 9002 and 14000) (World Bank, 2014), defined as an internationally 
recognized standard for quality and operation management, has been argued to work as an 
informal institution to alter the costs involved with FDI activity, via their quality-signaling, 
common-language, and conflict-settling properties (Clougherty and Grajek, 2008). It also 
works as an anti-corruption tool (Fan and Gaius, 2014), controlling and guiding the 
operations and management of MNE subsidiaries that under its system (Clougherty and 
Grajek, 2008). Thus, the author proposes the following: 
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Hypothesis 3: An MNE subsidiary’s holding of IQC will relate negatively with its willingness 
to engage in bribery.   
Additionally, managers represent a unique organizational resource (Daily, Certo, and Dalton, 
1999), and their social ties, contacts, and networks are believed to affect firms strategic 
choices and performance (Peng and Luo, 2000). In corrupt environment, managers’ intra-
industry experience would be more essential, as a representative of nonmarket resource. 
Firstly, experienced managers have knowledge of the use of lobbyists. They know when, 
how and whom (both within the industry and within various governmental agencies) to bribe 
to get things done, thus are more confident to gain extra benefits from engaging in 
corruption. Secondly, managers with more intra-industry experience are said to have more 
social capital and political ties that could help political coalition building (Fainsod, 1940). 
Collins and Uhlenbruck (2004) thus assumes that having these types of connections will 
decrease the likelihood that the MNE subsidiaries will need to engage in corrupt transactions 
in order to gain access to government approvals, etc. However, their estimation results 
rejected this hypothesis by showing that actually, managers’ intra-industry experience is 
playing facilitating role in firms’ participation into corruption payments. Experienced 
managers in corrupt contexts are more likely to accept the ‘it’s the way things are done’ 
mentality regarding corruption. This is due to their embeddedness in those corrupt 
institutional environments which condones the perpetuation of government corruption 
(Collins and Uhlenbruck, 2004). Thirdly, because of the tight connections between 
experienced managers with local governments, local corrupt government officials will 
actually expect more bribery from MNE subsidiaries with experienced managers, especially 
managers that have bribed them before（Peng and Luo, 2000). Thus, 
Hypothesis 4: The MNE subsidiary top manager’s experiences will relate positively with 
his/her willingness to engage in bribery.  
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The analytical framework is illustrates as following (Figure 9) 
 
Figure 9: theoretical framework and hypotheses 
 
4.3 Data  
The study has been conducted using firm-level data mainly from the World Bank Enterprise 
Surveys. The World Bank periodically collects firm-level data from key manufacturing and 
service sectors around the world. Standardized survey instruments and a uniform sampling 
methodology are employed to yield a world comparable dataset by the World Bank. Private 
contractors, rather than the local government agency, are hired to conduct the survey on 
behalf of the World Bank in order to ensure the accuracy of answers to the sensitive bribery-
related questions. Business managers and top owners are the main respondents, while 
company accountants and human resource managers are also invited to answer the questions 
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in the sales and labor sectors in the survey29. 
Specifically, the dataset used in this chapter only covers firms with foreign ownership and 
operating in 40 host countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, to examine the influence of both 
resource-based and institutional factors on MNE subsidiaries’ bribery decisions and their 
impacts on the bribery-performance nexus in a certain corrupt context 30. The author restricts 
the sample to Sub-Saharan African countries firstly because that according to Transparency 
International’s (2012) Corruption Perception Index, this area has a regional average 
corruption score of 3.3 of a maximum possible score of ten (with 1 being highly corrupt).  
This makes the region to be the most corrupt area worldwide with the average corruption 
rank for Sub-Saharan Africa countries being 112 out of 176 captured in the survey. The 
selection of this region as the research context thus fits this study’s research purposes well.  
Secondly, as firms in this area are less studied in the MNE literature and this area is an 
increasingly important investment destination for MNEs, research that focusing on this 
context sheds lights on uncovering the black box of MNEs’ survival paths in this under 
researched area. Furthermore, economic conditions and social backgrounds are very similar 
for countries in this region, and region-specific time -varying unobservable factors are 
eliminated when the author restricts the sample to this region31.The overall year span ranges 
from 2006 to 2012. 
After deleting unusable observations, the author has a final sample of 2210 MNE 
                                                 
29 The data is publicly available on the World Bank Web site http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/, 
and the data collection methodology is also accessible from this website. 
30 The World Bank conducts enterprise surveys in 43 out of the 48 Sub -Sahara African countries 
(Comoros, Equatorial Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles and Somalia are excluded), 
including Angola, Botswana, Kenya, Mali, etc. Firms surveyed in Sudan, South Sudan and Zimbabwe 
can’t be figured out the foreign ownership, therefore those firms are also not included in the sample. 
31 In addition to firms in Sub-Sahara Africa, home country name can also be figured out for firms 
in Eastern Europe and Central Asia in the 2005 World Bank Enterprise Survey dataset. Actually the 
results are very similar if we add those observations to the sample. 
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subsidiaries with 19 having two-period observations32. MNE subsidiaries come from four 
main sectors: manufacturing, service, construction, and transportation33. Treating 2006 as 
the benchmark year, variables such as host country GDP are deflated by the corresponding 
host country CPI/GDP deflators and converted to US dollars based on the exchange rate in 
2006. Host country GDP, CPI/GDP deflators and exchange rates with the US dollars are 
taken from the World Development Indicators database34. 
 
4.4 Preliminary Analysis: Estimating the resource-based and Institutional factors 
determinants of MNE subsidiary’s bribery 
To estimate how the institutional and resource-based factors affect MNE subsidiaries’ 
bribery decisions, the author sets the empirical model as follows:  
        (7) 
 
 refers to the amount of bribery paid by firm  of industry  in year ;  
refers to an MNE subsidiary’s three main resources, namely, home -country anti-corruption  
practice35 (Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 2008), its holding of IQC (Clougherty and Grajek, 
2008) and its top manager’s experience (Hitt, Biermant, Shimizu, and Kochhar, 2001; Peng 
and Luo, 2000). As the law-and-order index from the International Country Risk Guide 
measures a home country’s law enforcement and social order, it shapes a MNES’s bribery 
behavior. Therefore it is chosen as a proxy for the home country’s anti-corruption practices. 
                                                 
32 In fact, if we drop firms with two-period observations in the pooled regression, the estimation results are 
almost the same because of the small proportion of those kinds of firms. 
33 The industry code systems in the 2006 survey and following surveys are not all the same, we 
reconcile the industry code by recoding the 2006 sector based on coding system after 2006 according 
to the sector description.  
34 For more information about the WDI database, please refer to http://data.worldbank.org/data-
catalog/world-development-indicators. 
35 It’s also a kind of home-embedded resource for a MNE subsidiary. 
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As inspired by Clougherty and Grajek (2008), the author also employs internationally 
recognized standard for quality and operation management as firm-specific resources. The 
author emphasizes the manager’s experience as it is a valuable and inimitable firm resource 
accumulated over time, which can work as a substitute for institution in underdeveloped 
areas (Wang et al., 2012).  refers to MNE subsidiary’s self-perceived pressure for 
host-country corruption, which has been widely recognized as an institutional factor 
affecting a MNE subsidiary’s bribery strategy (Spencer and Gomez, 2011).   
 
 represents the control variables which may affect an MNE subsidiary’s bribery decision. 
The MNE subsidiary’s size (Baucus and Near, 1991; Martin et al., 2007), age (Lee and 
Weng, 2013), technology (Bharadwaj, 2000; Koellinger, 2008), export intensity (Svensson, 
2002) and its confronted financing obstacle and informal competition (Martin et al., 2007) 
are controlled for as they affect firm performance and influence the firm’s choice of bribery. 
Furthermore, following Lee, Oh and Eden (2010), the author extends control variables to 
host-country GDP and GDP growth rate to rule out the effect of overall macroeconomic 
growth. ,  and  are industry, year fixed effect and error term, respectively. As bribery 
takes only non-negative values, the author uses the Tobit model to estimate Eq. (1) 
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2005).  
Table 14 presents the variable definitions and Table 15 shows the summary statistics and 
correlations of the main variables used in this paper. Inspired by Aiken and West (1991) and 
Dawson and Richter (2006), the variable of government corruption is centered when 
incorporated to the regression to make it easier to interpret interactions 36 . 
                                                 
36 The other two categorical variables of financing obstacle and informal competition are also 
centered to coincide with the government corruption variable on scale. Actually, if we standardize the 
variables, the results are still robust. 
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Table 14: Definition of variables 
Variables Definition of variables 
1. Performance Sales per employee (USD) 
2. Technology license 
A dummy variable that takes 1 if a firm at present uses technology licensed from a foreign-owned company, 
excluding office software 
3. Firm size Logarithm of the number of employees of the firm 
4. Log(firm age) Logarithm of the firm’s age created by subtracting the year of establishment from the survey year 
5. Export intensity The ratio of the firm’s export to its sales 
6. Financing obstacle Level of ‘availability and cost to financing’ as an obstacle 
7. Informal competition Level of ‘practices of competitors in the informal sector’ as an obstacle  
8. log (Host country GDP) Logarithm of the host country’s gross domestic production 
9. Host country GDP growth Host country’s GDP growth rate 
10. Firm bribery Percentage of sales paid by a foreign invested firm to government officials “to get things done” 
11. Government corruption 
Corruption pressure that foreign invested firms perceive in the host country, also named perceived host country 
corruption pressure. 
12. IQC Internationally-recognized quality certification (such as ISO 9000, 9002 or 14000, etc.). 
13.Manager's experience Logarithm of years of experiences foreign invested firms' top manager have in this sector 
 
Note: Treating 2006 as the benchmark year, variables such as sales, host country GDP are deflated by the host country CPI/GDP deflator and converted to US 
dollars based on the exchange rate in 2006. The host country GDP, CPI/GDP deflator and exchange rate with the US dollars are taken from the World 
Development Indicators database. 
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Table 15: Summary statistics and correlations 
Variable Obs Mean 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1.Performance 1946 9.87 1             
2.Technology license 2229 0.07 0.04 1            
3.Firm size 2212 2.98 0.12 0.18 1           
4.log(Firm age) 2206 2.41 0.12 0.07 0.32 1          
5.Export intensity 2223 5.53 -0.01 0.08 0.29 0.10 1         
6.Financing obstacle 2206 2.78 -0.12 0.02 -0.11 0.00 -0.02 1        
7.Informal competition 2195 2.80 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 0.08 0.00 0.28 1       
8.log(Host country GDP) 2229 23.19 0.09 0.03 0.14 0.17 0.00 -0.06 0.01 1      
9.Host country GDP growth 2174 1.86 -0.07 0.06 0.10 -0.01 -0.02 -0.07 -0.12 -0.08 1     
10.Firm bribery 2045 1.91 -0.05 0.03 -0.03 -0.05 0.00 0.08 0.05 -0.03 0.06 1    
11.Government corruption 2134 2.73 -0.05 -0.07 0.07 0.12 0.04 0.26 0.29 0.09 -0.04 0.10 1   
12.IQC 2162 0.18 0.12 0.23 0.26 0.10 0.16 -0.07 -0.02 0.01 0.03 0.00 -0.01 1  
13.Manager's experience 2166 2.41 0.07 0.03 0.17 0.50 0.10 0.03 0.13 0.11 -0.09 0.00 0.10 0.06 1 
 
Note: Firm size is measured by logarithm of the number of firm employees. Government corruption is measured by firm self-perceived host country 
government corruption. 
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4.5 Estimation Results  
Table 16 reports the estimation results of Eq. (1). As shown in the Table, perceived host 
country corruption pressures generate positive effect on firms’ bribery choice. P value of 
variable “perceived host country corruption pressure” is highly significant, indicating that 
hypothesis 1 is supported. Hypothesis 2 is also verified. MNE subsidiaries with a higher 
home country anti-corruption index, ceteris paribus, are less likely to engage in bribery. This 
indicates that MNE subsidiaries’ home country anti-corruption practices play a significant 
role in shaping an MNE subsidiary’s overseas behavior. Meanwhile, the role of MNE 
subsidiary’s holding of IQC on its bribery is significant, indicating that MNE subsidiaries’ 
resources do affect their bribery decisions. An MNE subsidiary with IQC, which is treated as 
a kind of firm-specific informal anti-corruption resource (Clougherty and Grajek, 2008), 
bribes less when other variables are controlled for. This lends support to hypothesis 3. For 
hypothesis 4, although the coefficient of the manager’s experience is positive, it is not very 
significant. This shows the complexity of the role of the manager’s experience.     
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Table 16: Tobit model estimation for the determinants of MNE subsidiaries’ bribery decision 
Dependent variable: Firm bribery (1) (2) 
Home country law and order 
 -1.601*** 
 (-35.94) 
Internationally-recognized quality 
certificate 
 -0.460*** 
 (-3.51) 
Manager’s experience 
 0.011* 
 (1.68) 
Perceived host country corruption pressure 
0.711*** 0.772*** 
(29.58) (33.83) 
Firm size 
-0.101** -0.042 
(-2.36) (-0.95) 
Technology licensed from a foreign-owned 
company 
0.828*** 1.305*** 
(6.04) (8.88) 
Financing obstacle 
0.418*** 0.530*** 
(18.17) (25.16) 
Informal competition 
0.411*** 0.449*** 
(20.90) (22.33) 
Export intensity 
2.858*** 2.428*** 
(16.70) (13.92) 
Log(firm age) 
0.007 0.003 
(1.54) (0.70) 
Log(Host country GDP) 
-1.438*** -0.143*** 
(-66.62) (-19.21) 
Host country GDP growth rate 
-0.295*** -0.384*** 
(-9.05) (-11.40) 
Year-fixed effect Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed effect Yes Yes 
Pseudo R-squared 0.030 0.032 
Observations 1962 1903 
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses; ***, ** and * indicate significant at 1%, 5% and 
10% significance level, respectively. 
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4.6 Further Analysis: Correcting MNE Subsidiaries’ Self-selection to Bribe  
It is increasingly important to tackle the self-selection issue in social science research. In 
order to get better performance, MNE subsidiaries self-select to bribe or not bribe, 
depending on their own resources. Thus, inspired by Heckman (1979), Hamilton and 
Nickerson (2003) and Clougherty, Duso and Muck (2015), the author employs the Heckman 
two-step approach (type-2 Tobit model) to tackle the potential self -selection effect of 
bribery. A binary selection model (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005) is utilized to estimate the 
probability for MNE subsidiaries to engage in bribery. Here the author supposes whether an 
MNE subsidiary would engage in bribery can be determined by a latent variable . The 
MNE subsidiary engages in bribery if and only if . Therefore, as the first step of type-
2 Tobit model, bribery participation can be expressed by:  
   (7) 
For the second step, the extent of bribery is modelled as a linear function of associated 
variables. 
Specifically, the author employs the Probit model to estimate the following selection 
equation: 
   (8) 
 
where ,  and have the same meaning as those in Eq.(7);  is a 
cumulative density function of a normal distribution. After estimating the Probit model of 
Eq. (8), the author can obtain the inverse mills ratio based on the estimation results, and 
incorporate it into the second step. It should be noted that the Heckman two-step estimation 
requires one excluded variable that affects an MNE subsidiary’s bribery decision, but does 
not appear in the second stage (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). The author chooses MNE 
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subsidiary age to serve this purpose. Previous studies have found that MNE subsidiary age is 
associated with its bribery decision (Lee and Weng, 2013); at the same time, the correlation 
of MNE subsidiary age and the extent of bribery is very weak (0.06), which indicates that 
MNE subsidiary age can be excluded in the second stage estimation. To control for year and 
industry unspecified factors, the author includes year dummy  and industry dummy  in 
both steps. Then the author can figure out the fitted extent of bribery based on the second 
stage estimates. 
 
The Heckman two-step approach based on Eq. (9) is employed to tackle the possible self -
selection bias and the estimation results are shown in Table 17. From Column (1), MNE 
subsidiaries with a high home country anti-corruption index and IQC are less likely to 
engage in bribery. By contrast, MNE subsidiaries facing high host -country-corruption 
pressures, severe financing obstacle, more fierce informal competition and with high export 
extensity have a higher possibility to bribe. The author then includes the computed inverse 
mills ratio derived from the first-step estimates in the second-step Heckman estimation, and 
the results are shown in Column (2). Thereafter, the author can obtain the firm-level fitted 
extent of bribery, which is used in the rest of estimation for correcting self-selection bias. 
The estimation results based on this fitted extent of bribery show that only MNE 
subsidiaries’ perceived host country institutional pressures and MNE subsidiaries’ holding of 
IQC could generate effect on their bribery decisions in the host county institutional 
environment. The further analysis, which has corrected bribery’s self-selection bias, 
confirms that only hypotheses 1 and 3 in this chapter are finally supported.  
 
 
 
t j
122 
 
Table 17: Heckman two-step estimates of bivariate selection model 
Heckman two-step: 
Dependent variable 
(1) (2) 
Bribery dummy Extent of bribery 
Home country law and order 
-0.418*** -0.082 
(-4.80) (-0.17) 
Internationally-recognized quality 
certification 
-0.184** -0.390** 
(-1.97) (-2.07) 
Manager’s experience 
-0.000 0.007 
(-0.03) (1.02) 
Perceived host country corruption pressure 
0.155*** 0.256*** 
(6.06) (2.93) 
Firm size 
0.025 0.014 
(0.81) (0.20) 
Technology licensed from a foreign-owned 
company 
-0.189 0.490 
(-1.20) (1.33) 
Financing obstacle 
0.065** 0.092 
(2.56) (1.56) 
Informal competition 
0.064*** 0.083 
(2.63) (1.50) 
Export intensity 
0.525** 0.471 
(2.37) (0.95) 
Log(Host country GDP) 
-0.097** -0.679*** 
(-2.49) (-7.16) 
Host country GDP growth rate 
-0.121*** -0.025 
(-6.52) (-0.34) 
Log(firm age) 
0.005*  
(1.66)  
Inverse mills ratio 
 2.087** 
 (2.36) 
Year-fixed effect Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed effect Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.182 0.250 
Observations 1779 848 
Note: Robust t- and z-statistics in parentheses in Step 1 and Step 2 respectively; ***, ** and 
* indicate significant at 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. R-squared 
reported in the first column is the Pseudo one. 
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4.7 Discussion and Conclusion 
Different from the previous literature that estimates the influence of resource-based and 
institutional factors on firms’ bribery in an isolated way, the author deploys both Tobit model 
regression and Heckman two-step approach to investigate the determinants of MNE 
subsidiaries’ bribing strategy, considering the roles of both institution and resources 
simultaneously. The study differs from the existing literature as it has tackled firms’ self-
selection to bribe, and pointed to the importance of looking beyond IT for understanding 
MNE subsidiaries’ choice of bribery via emphasizing the role of firm resources (Wang, 
2012). 
Utilizing the firm-level data from the World Bank enterprise surveys from 2006 to 2012, this 
chapter has identified and documented how MNE subsidiaries’ resources (e.g., holding of 
IQC and managers’ experiences) and institutional factors, including different levels of 
government corruption in home and host countries, jointly affect an MNE subsidiary’s 
bribing choice in a corrupt host country environment. The overarching argument of this 
chapter is that MNE subsidiaries’ bribery decisions in host countries are not only determined 
by host country institutions, but also by embedded home country institutions and MNE 
subsidiaries’ resources. The findings are theoretically meaningful as it assists us in 
explaining the heterogeneity of MNE subsidiaries’ choice of bribery in a comprehensive 
way, with careful consideration of both institutional and resource-based factors (Spencer and 
Gomez. 2011; Birhanu et al., 2015; Martin, et al., 2007; Svensson, 2003; Jeong and Weiner, 
2012).  
Based on the regression results, the author has identified the influential role of host country 
institutional factors on MNE subsidiaries’ choice of bribery, and this is consistent with 
Spencer and Gomez (2011) and Martin et al., (2007). The author finds that perceived 
pressures of government corruption in a host country stimulate MNE subsidiaries’ 
conduction of bribery. This result is in line with IT’s prediction, which argues that MNEs are 
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confronted with institutional pressures and MNE subsidiaries need to comply with local 
isomorphic pressures to gain legitimacy (Dimaggio and Powell, 1983). But the estimation 
results of home country’s role in MNE subsidiaries’ bribing decision based on the Tobit 
model regression are different from those based on the Heckman two-step regression. The 
Tobit model estimation results show that home country anti-corruption works significantly to 
prevent MNE subsidiaries from paying bribery. However, after correcting MNE subsidiaries’ 
self-selection to bribe, the estimation results based on the Heckman two-step model suggests 
that MNE subsidiaries’ home county anti-corruption has a negative influence on their 
bribing, although it is insignificant. This result is different from Spencer and Gomez’s 
(2011), suggesting a need of careful reconsideration of the moderating effect of MNEs’ 
home country institution on their internationalization activities.  
Additionally, the author has examined the effect of MNE subsidiaries’ holding of IQC and 
MNE subsidiary managers’ experiences on MNE subsidiaries’ choice of bribery and fond 
that IQC acts as firms’ specific resources and informal institutions to assist MNE 
subsidiaries in refusing bribery requests. The results support the author’s theoretical 
argument that MNE subsidiaries’ holding of resources generates significant impact on their 
internationalization strategy. However, manager’s role in MNE subsidiaries’ bribing strategy 
seems to be different based on different estimation results. Such inconsistent results may not 
be surprising as there has been much debate on the role of managers’ experiences in their 
companies’ bribing strategy. For instance, Collins and Uhlenbruck (2004) argue that firms 
with experienced managers contain higher levels of social capital, know with whom to deal 
to ‘get things done’ and therefore are less likely to engage in corrupt transactions. Other 
scholars suggest that managers with more experiences and local ties tend to pay more bribes 
because they need to engage in corruption to keep these strong ties, and local corrupt 
government officials expect more bribery from MNE subsidiary managers who have bribed 
them before（Peng and Luo, 2000). Hence, estimation results in this chapter, combined with 
the previous conclusions, ask for more detailed and comprehensive research on the role of 
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managers’ experiences in MNEs’ bribing strategy. A future research direction can draw on 
this and go in depth by distinguishing managers’ characteristics, e.g., gender, home -of-
origin, age, and family ties with government officials.    
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Chapter 5: Integration of Resource-based and Institutional Factors to Moderate 
the Effectiveness of MNE Subsidiaries’ Bribing Strategy in Host Countries: An 
empirical test 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Government corruption is generally thought to have negative consequences on economic 
development (Knack and Keefer, 1995; Mauro, 1995; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). However, 
beginning with Leff (1964) and Huntington (2006), some scholars suggest that corruption 
might raise business performance through corrupt practices such as bribery, as it enables 
some individuals or organizations to avoid bureaucratic delay, and gain preferential 
treatment (Lee and Weng, 2013; Méon and Weill, 2010).  
Coupled with continued globalization, the international pervasiveness of government 
corruption in recent decades increases the likelihood that international enterprises will 
encounter government rent-seeking, and stimulates scholars to declare the importance of 
capabilities to deal with corruption for MNE subsidiaries’ success (Galang, 2012; Kwok and 
Solomon Tadesse, 2006; Oliver and Holzinger, 2008; Uhlenbruck et al., 2006). In such a 
corrupt business environment, bribing becomes a MNE subsidiary’s informal strategic 
choice, and it is meaningful and emergent for MNE subsidiary managers to know what 
explains the heterogeneous effectiveness of bribery on MNE subsidiary performance, and 
why government corruption could be exploited by some MNE subsidiaries to realize great 
success, while detrimental for others.  
The existing literature has so far identified some determinants of bribery (Martin et al, 2007; 
Spencer and Gomez, 2011; Sanyal, 2005; Jeong and Weiner, 2012; Collins, Uhlenbruck, and 
Rodriguez, 2009; Svensson, 2003). However, there is still a lack of a comprehensive analysis 
relevant theories (Lee and Weng, 2013), and so far little is known of how bribery affects a 
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firm, especially an MNE subsidiary’s performance (Birhanu et al, 2015; Spencer and 
Gomez, 2011).  This chapter aims to fill in the above research gaps by combing the RBV and 
IT to generate an interactive model, illustrating how resource-based and institutional factors 
interactively moderate the effect of bribery on MNE subsidiary performance in a typical 
corrupt context. The theoretical framework is tested using firm-level data from the World 
Bank surveys from 2006 to 2012, with a total of 2210 MNE subsidiaries being included in 
the final sample. The author argues that the heterogeneity of MNE subsidiaries’ resources 
and perceived corrupt pressures leads to differing bribery strategies in response to host 
country corruption, and these two variables then interactively moderate the impact of bribery 
on MNE subsidiary performance. 
Chapters 3 and 4 have tested the first and second part of the model proposed in chapter 2 
(Figure 3). Following them, this chapter 5 will test the third part of the model (Figure 3), and 
will focus on testing the proposition 5d in chapter 2, i.e. integrative role of resource-based 
and institutional factors in moderating the effectiveness of MNEs’ strategy on performance.  
The author contributes to the literature about the role of bribery in international business in 
the following ways. First, in contrast to the rich and fruitful findings about the antecedents 
and influential factors of bribery (Martin et al, 2007; Collins et al, 2009), little is known 
about the role of bribery in firm performance. Given that bribery is an important ‘strategic 
choice’ for firms in a corrupt context (Spencer and Gomez; 2011), it is crucial to investigate 
its effectiveness in line with a comprehensive model.  
Second, the existing literature tends to investigate the bribery–firm performance relationship 
in an isolated way, i.e. assessing bribery’s impact from the perspective of IT (Spencer and 
Gomez, 2011; Jeong and Weiner, 2012), controlling for other important variables such as 
firm resources. However, the author argues that resource-based and institutional factors co-
exist and interact with each other, producing a joint effect on firm performance. Failure to 
capture this interactive relationship will lead to a biased or at least incomplete assessment of 
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the impact of bribery.  
Third, similar with what we have discussed in chapter 4, this chapter will also deploy data 
from sub-Saharan countries  as these highly corrupt countries provide us a perfect context to 
investigate the determining and influencing mechanisms of corruption and bribery.  This 
work contributes a lot as these countries are highly corrupt bur remain under researched in 
international business literature (Pearce et al., 2008).  
The rest of this chapter will be organized as follows. In the following section the author 
proposes a theoretical framework and corresponding hypotheses. A discussion of data and 
methodology follows. Next, the author presents and discusses the results of the empirical 
analysis. In the fourth section, the author conducts robustness checks. The author then 
concludes by discussing and outlining the contributions of this study to existing knowledge, 
and drawing useful practical recommendations. 
5.2 Hypotheses: Interactive Role of Resource-based and Institutional Factors in 
Moderating the Effectiveness of MNE Subsidiaries’ Bribing Strategy  
Theoretically, the role of the institutional environment and firm resources in firms’ strategy 
decisions and performance has been widely recognized (Peng, etc., 2009; Gupta, Smith, and 
Shalley, 2006; Brouthers and Hennart, 2007), so have their separate roles in moderating the 
strategy-performance nexus (Newber, 2007; North, 1990; Scott, 1995). However, Brouthers, 
Brouthers, and Werner (2008) propose a resource-based institutionally adjusted model which 
stresses that adding the moderating influence of the national institutional environment to a 
resource-based perspective could better explain the effectiveness of strategies on firm 
performance. In line with this, the author incorporates the interaction terms between the 
institutional and resource-based factors and identify their interactive role in moderating the 
bribery strategy - performance relationship. The author asserts that the heterogeneity of the 
bribery-performance relationship is a function of the interaction between MNE subsidiary 
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resources and their perceived pressures of corruption.   
Bribery, as a responding strategy in a corrupt institutional environment, is firstly a direct 
financial cost (Luiz and Stewart, 2013) and indirect reputation cost (Spencer and Gomez, 
2011).  It is damaging because of higher transaction costs due to the secrecy and uncertainty 
that necessarily accompany bribery and the fact that benefits gained from bribes are not 
enforceable in courts ((Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). For MNE subsidiaries that cannot 
transfer this kind of cost to benefits and achieve extra profits, bribery brings negative effects 
on their survival (Fisman and Svensson, 2007). But IT suggests that MNE subsidiaries are 
forced to bribe under corrupt institutional pressures, and active bribery is used as a defensive 
method to avoid sanctions or other punishments (Wu, 2005). Svensson (2003) argues that the 
effectiveness of bribery on performance actually depends on firm resources (Fisman and 
Svensson, 2007; Gaviria, 2002; Martin et al., 2007; Svensson, 2003; Wang and You, 2012). 
Different from previous literature, this chapter not only emphasizes the moderating role of 
MNE subsidiary resources on the effectiveness of bribery, but also moves forward to find 
out whether the influence of resources on the bribery-performance nexus is further 
moderated by the level of MNE subsidiaries’ perceived corrupt pressures.  
 
5.2.1 Perceived host country corruption, home country anti-corruption practice and 
effectiveness of bribery.  
Argued by Cuervo-Cazurra (2006), firms can transfer disadvantages derived from poor home 
country institutions to advantages, i.e., MNE subsidiaries from highly corrupt home 
countries are offered stronger capabilities for dealing with or exploiting corruption and 
bribery in a similar institutional environment. As MNE subsidiaries from home countries 
with low anti-corruption practices internationalize, their managers can easily maneuver in 
host countries with poor governance, because of their understanding of norms (e.g. 
government corruption) for conducting business and corresponding strategy there (Cuervo-
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Cazurra, 2006). In contrast, managers of MNE subsidiaries from countries with high anti-
corruption practices face challenges of altering their deep-seated assumptions about the 
institutional background and confront troubles in dealing with bribery requests (Prahalad and 
Hammond, 2002). They will even be punished for bribing host country government officials 
because laws in their home countries forbid them from such a practice (Cuervo-Cazurra and 
Genc, 2008).    
However, as MNE subsidiaries from countries with high anti-corruption practices are less 
capable of exploiting bribery, they are actually requested less by host country corrupt 
government officials, and are more tangible resources-intensive to keep good performance 
even if they refuse bribery. Government officials nowadays increasingly face uncertainty 
when demanding bribes (Gyimah-Boadi, 2004; Widjajabrata and Zacchea, 2004). As a 
result, local officials will adjust tactics and pressures to MNE subsidiaries according to their 
assessment of targeted MNE subsidiaries’ potential reactions, as practically some MNE 
subsidiaries acquiesce to bribery demand quietly while others are likely to seek protections 
via reporting illegal bribery demands and appalling to other agents (Rodriguez, Uhlenbruck, 
and Eden, 2005; Uhlenbruck et al., 2006). Many times, government officials adopt heuristics 
such as stereotypes to forecast an MNE subsidiary’s likely behaviour and evidence shows 
that they impose different levels of pressure on subsidiaries based on the MNEs’ home 
country institutional environments (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999).  Thus officials will be less 
aggressive when pressuring MNE subsidiaries from countries that have institutionalized 
anticorruption norms, while more aggressive when targeting MNE subsidiaries from 
relatively corrupt home countries. The cost of refusing bribery requests will be more serious 
for MNE subsidiaries from more corrupt home countries.  
Thus, when operating in highly corrupt host countries, MNE subsidiaries from countries 
with low anti-corruption practices are confronted with more institutional pressures, but 
possess home country institution-based resources to take advantage of bribery for better 
performance, while MNE subsidiaries from less corrupt countries are more likely to succeed 
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via refusing bribery. Apart from that, as firm level heterogeneity in MNE subsidiaries’ 
perceived corrupt pressures influences the moderating effect of home-of-origin on the 
bribery-performance nexus, the author estimates home-of-origin’s real moderating role via 
controlling for an MNE subsidiary’s level of perceived institutional pressures, and asserts 
that,  
Hypothesis 1: An MNE subsidiary’s perceived pressures of corruption in the host country 
integrate with its home country anti-corruption practices to negatively moderate the 
effectiveness of bribery on performance. 
 
5.2.2 Perceived host country corruption, MNE subsidiaries’ holding of IQC and 
effectiveness of bribery.  
MNE subsidiaries’ holding of resources acts as ‘refusal power’ to moderate their perceived 
pressures in corrupt environments (Svensson, 2003). Product quality is a fundamental and 
traditional strategy for good sales performance (Peng and Luo, 2000)，and IQC has been 
argued to be one type of firm-specific resource, as it not only provides a sign of high quality 
that helps reduce waste and increase productivity, but also supports creating more effective 
or efficient operations and improving employees’ motivation, awareness, and morale (World 
Bank, 2014). MNE subsidiaries with IQC can claim that they have a documented quality 
certification that is enforced and followed, ensuring that their products are made to exact 
specifications (GBUERIN and Rice, 1996). Via its efficient signaling approach, IQC is 
reported to act as the common-language mechanism facilitating communications between 
firms (Terlaak and King, 2006), and stimulating firm innovation performance (Terziovski 
and Guerrero, 2014). This firm-based capability/resource provides MNE subsidiaries with 
strong power to refuse the bribery requests from government officials, as these firms do not 
expect to earn money from exploiting bribery, but their core resources and high quality 
products.  
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IQC’s role as informal and decentralized institutions has also been recognized (Clougherty 
and Grajek, 2008; Terlaak, 2007). The internationally recognized-quality certification 
system, as an informal institution, retains promise as an anti-corruption tool (Fan and Gaius, 
2014). As bribery activities are punished by the internationally recognized-quality 
certification system and the economic cost and reputational risk of bribery are high, firms 
that hold IQC in this status are less likely to pay bribes. Apart from that, highly corrupt 
government officials expect relatively less or no bribes from MNE subsidiaries with 
certification and high-tech. Thus the cost for MNE subsidiaries with IQC to refuse bribery 
may be relatively small. Based on the above arguments, as the level of MNE subsidiaries’ 
perceived corruption also affects the effectiveness of IQC, the author generates the following 
hypothesis, 
Hypothesis 2: An MNE subsidiary’s perceived pressures of corruption in the host country 
integrate with its holding of IQCs to negatively moderate the effectiveness of bribery on 
performance. 
 
5.2.3 Perceived host country corruption, managers’ experiences and effectiveness of 
bribery.    
Managers represent a unique organizational resource (Daily et al., 1999), which is essential 
in an environment full of institutional voids. Experienced managers have stronger political 
ties which help political coalition building, and have knowledge of the employment of 
lobbyists (Fainsod, 1940). Dahan (2005) describes non-market capabilities as being mainly 
technical-economic expertise in lobbying governments, but this particular non-market 
capability of a firm actually depends on its managers’ experiences and networks with 
government officials. On one hand, it is inevitably costly for experienced managers to keep 
strong ties with governments and organizations to make bribery more effective, and the risk 
and results for them to stop bribery are huge and detrimental (Rowley, et al., 2000). On the 
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other hand, managers’ experiences and ties posititvely yield the consequensces of bribery as 
they provide knowledge and political networks, and give MNE subsidiaries signals about 
when, how and whom to bribe. Thus extra profit gains from experienced managers’ bribing 
activities are expected. The positive association of managers’ experiences with the 
effectiveness of bribery will even be enlarged in an environment where institutions are 
undeveloped, and where managers’ interpersonal relationships work to substitute for formal 
institutions (Peng and Luo, 2000). Under certain conditions of perceived corruption 
pressures, the effectiveness of bribery on MNE subsidiary performance can be substantially 
moderated by managers’ experiences:  
Hypothesis 3: An MNE subsidiary’s perceived pressures of corruption in the host country 
integrate with its manager’s experiences to positively moderate the effectiveness of bribery 
on performance. 
In line with the above hypothesis, the author’s theoretical framework (Figure 10) is 
demonstrated as follows: 
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Figure 10: theoretical framework and hypotheses 
5.3 Data and Methodology  
5.3.1 Data  
The current work was conducted using the firm-level data from the World Bank Enterprise 
Surveys, which has been illustrated in detail in Chapter 4. The data collection methods, 
variable definitions, and summary statistics and correlations could be found in sections 4.3 
and 4.4 (Table 14 and Table 15). 
 
5.3.2 Econometric Model: Estimating the interactive role of resource-based and institutional 
moderators on bribery-performance nexus 
In chapter 4, the author has analyzed in detail the utilization of the Heckman two-step 
approach (type-2 Tobit model) to tackle the potential effect of MNE subsidiaries’ self-
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selection to bribe. Based on Eq. (8) and Eq. (9), the author has corrected MNE subsidiaries’ 
self -selection to bribe and figured out the fitted extent of bribery based on the two-step 
estimation. 
Then, to estimate the moderating effect of MNE subsidiary resources on the bribery -
performance nexus with the host country corruption status under control, the author sets the 
regression model as follows, based on the fitted extent of bribery: 
 
  (9) 
where  means MNE subsidiary ’s (in industry ) performance in year , and is 
measured by the logarithm of sales per employee.  refers to the fitted extent of bribery 
paid by MNE subsidiary of industry  in year ; represents the MNE subsidiary’s 
self-perceived corruption status;  refers to the MNE subsidiary’s three main 
resources as in Eq. (1), namely, the home country anti-corruption practice, the MNE 
subsidiary’s holding of IQC and the MNE subsidiary manager’s experience.   
 indicates other control variables which may affect firm performance, such as the MNE 
subsidiary’s bribery decision (Zhou and Peng, 2012). Following previous studies (e.g., 
Thornhill, 2006; Jiménez-Jiménez and Sanz-Valle, 2011), the author controls for firm-
specific characteristics, including the MNE subsidiary’s size, age and technology. Financia l 
constraint is included as another control variable as it is an obstacle to firm performance 
(Smolarski and Kut, 2011; Gorodnichenko and Schnitzer et al., 2013). The author also 
controls for informal competition (Henderson and Mitchell, 1997) and export intensity 
(Katsikeas, Leonidou and Morgan, 2000; Zou and Cavusgil, 2002 et al.). Furthermore, 
following previous research (e.g., Elango and Sethi, 2007; Qian et al., 2010) the host -
country GDP and GDP growth rates are included to control for the macroeconomic 
1 2 3 4(1 )( )ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt j t ijtY Corrup CorrupBext Bext Resource X                  
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variations.  and  refer to industry, year fixed effect, respectively. 
MNE subsidiary performance can be financially measured by various indicators, such as 
sales per employee, value added per employee, net profit per employee (Girma, Görg, and 
Strobl, 2004), employment and investment (Birhanu, Gambardella and Valentini, 2015), 
return on assets, and return on equity (Peng and Luo, 2000). Given the heterogeneous and 
sometimes unobserved incentives and profit hiding behaviour, an indicator like sales revenue 
would produce more reliable estimation results. As larger firms may be more visible to 
government corruption (Fisman and Svensson, 2007), the author takes into account the size 
effect by using the number of employees to normalize the firm’s sales income. Thus the 
dependent variable, firm performance, is measured by the fiscal year’s sales per employee, 
following Wang and You (2012). To control for the host country corruption status and its 
interaction with the MNE subsidiary’s bribery decision, the MNE subsidiary’s perceived 
government corruption is incorporated in the estimation equation. Perceived pressures of 
home country government corruption is captured by the World Bank enterprise survey 
question, which asked managers to report their perceptions concerning the extent to which 
corruption pressures posed an obstacle to their firms’ operation building on previous studies 
(Spencer and Gomez, 2011). This question was worded in a manner that it was less sensitive 
to interviewees. They were not asked to disclose whether or not they had been involved in 
corrupt activities, but the extent to which they perceived the host country’s institutionalized 
corruption as an obstacle to their business operation and performance. As these questions did 
not indicate that the MNE subsidiaries do or do not engage in bribery, managers should be 
less concerned about indirectly revealing sensitive information. 
The author employs OLS regression as the benchmark to estimate Eq. (9) and conduct 
instrumental variable (IV) estimation to tackle the potential endogeneity issue of fitted 
extent of bribery. Although the author tried to mitigate the “self-select to bribe” bias, 
endogeneity issue coming from potential measurement error or bribery, reverse causality 
because of pursuing desired performance, and potential missing variables may still bias the 
j t
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estimates. Following Birhanu, Gambardella and Valentini (2015), the industry -country-year 
average fitted extent of bribery is utilized to instrument the fitted extent of bribery for each 
firm. 
 
5.4 The Benchmark Results about the Interactive Role of Resource-based and 
Institutional Moderators in the Bribery-performance Nexus 
In this sub-section, the author tests the hypothesis that MNE subsidiary resources moderate 
the bribery-performance nexus controlling for corruption pressures MNE subsidiaries face. 
After correcting MNE subsidiaries’ self-selection bias to bribe, the author estimates the 
regression model set by Eq. (9) using the fitted extent of bribery. Table 18 presents the 
benchmark results based on OLS regression.    
The author first specifies Column (1) of Table 18 that includes only control variables. The 
author then adds the independent and moderating variables to form Column (2) to Column 
(5). The results in Column (1) show that firm size and technology licensed from a foreign-
owned company both positively contribute to an MNE subsidiary’s performance. Although 
the logarithm of host country GDP negatively contributes to the MNE subsidiary’s 
performance, the effect is not consistently significant when considering the endogeneity 
issue in Table 19. From Column (2), bribery is shown to have a statistically negative effect 
on MNE subsidiary performance when the other explanatory variables are controlled for. It 
is obvious that bribery is direct financial costs and it wastes employees’ time that could have 
been spent on productive activities such as production and sales. As a result, bribery 
generates a direct negative impact on MNE subsidiary performance. However, in countries 
where corruption is prevalent, bribery can actually produce positive effects on MNE 
subsidiary performance, and this is verified by the interaction term of bribery and an MNE 
subsidiary’s perceived corruption pressure in Column (2). Moreover, IQC also implies better 
performance. The host country corruption pressure variable itself is positively associated 
with MNE subsidiary performance. Possible reasons could be that corruption assists MNE 
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subsidiaries in overcoming bureaucratic constraints (Huntington, 1968) and that there is 
inefficient public service especially when operating in counties with weak institutions 
(Acemoglu and Verdier, 2000; De Vaal and Ebben, 2011). 
Columns (3) - (5) show how an MNE subsidiary’s resources affect the bribery-performance 
nexus after controlling for the MNE subsidiary’s perceived pressures of corruption. 
Following (Aiken and West, 1991), the author enters all the two-way interactions along with 
three-way interactions to identify the true three-way interactive effects. The three-way 
interactions in Columns (3) and (4) indicate that bribery’s positive effect would be cut down 
if the MNE subsidiary has a higher home country anti-corruption index or an IQC. This 
confirms hypotheses 2 and 3. In other words, ceteris paribus, for MNE subsidiaries with IQC 
and from well-developed institutions, the less bribery, the better performance. But in 
Column (5), the three-way interaction term is not significant, indicating that hypothesis 4 is 
not supported. This may be due to the complexity of the role of the MNE subsidiary 
manager’s experience, and a further investigation is needed.  
Table 18: OLS regression results for the integration of resource-based factors and 
institutional factors’ effects on the bribery- performance nexus 
Dependent variable: 
Log (sales per 
employee) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Effects of 
control 
variables 
Host 
country 
institution 
effects 
Home 
country 
anti-
corruption 
effects 
IQC 
effects 
Managers’ 
experience 
effects 
Firm size 
0.199*** 0.200*** 0.220*** 0.186*** 0.215*** 
(3.76) (3.25) (3.56) (2.99) (3.49) 
Technology licensed 
from a foreign-owned 
company 
0.536** 0.679** 0.728*** 0.701*** 0.725*** 
(2.19) (2.47) (2.76) (2.62) (2.72) 
Financing obstacle 
-0.074** -0.042 -0.044 -0.043 -0.041 
(-2.00) (-1.02) (-1.05) (-1.04) (-0.95) 
Informal competition 
-0.055 -0.037 -0.034 -0.066 -0.037 
(-1.45) (-0.90) (-0.81) (-1.62) (-0.89) 
Export intensity 
-0.455 -0.908** -1.371*** -1.198*** -1.234*** 
(-1.59) (-2.23) (-3.37) (-3.07) (-2.95) 
Log(Firm age) 
0.001 -0.006 -0.003 -0.006 -0.004 
(0.13) (-1.04) (-0.62) (-1.09) (-0.80) 
Log(Host country GDP) - -0.218*** -0.156** -0.228*** -0.165** 
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0.342*** 
(-5.60) (-2.78) (-2.11) (-2.98) (-2.21) 
Host country GDP 
growth rate 
-0.007 -0.041 -0.275 -0.438* -0.376 
(-0.30) (-1.10) (-1.07) (-1.76) (-1.49) 
Fitted extent of bribery 
(FB) 
 -0.642*** -1.040*** -0.805*** -1.081*** 
 (-3.16) (-5.85) (-4.71) (-4.35) 
Perceived host country 
corruption pressure 
(Host country  GC) 
 0.046 0.783*** 0.158*** 0.183** 
 (0.93) (4.70) (3.10) (2.45) 
Host country GC × FB 
 0.113*** 0.514*** 0.142*** 0.233*** 
 (2.66) (4.36) (3.18) (2.97) 
Internationally-
recognized quality 
certificate (IQC) 
 0.428*** 0.620*** 1.039*** 0.545*** 
 (2.60) (3.73) (2.85) (3.24) 
Manager’s experience 
 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.026** 
 (0.58) (0.68) (0.30) (2.08) 
Home country anti-
corruption index (HAP) 
  0.623*** 0.202* 0.162 
  (4.10) (1.86) (1.46) 
HAP× FB 
  -0.008   
  (-0.71)   
Host country GC × 
HAP 
  -0.195***   
  (-4.39)   
Host country GC × FB 
× HAP 
  -0.071***   
  (-2.63)   
FB × IQC 
   -0.006  
   (-0.19)  
Host country GC × IQC 
   -0.090  
   (-0.61)  
Host country GC × FB 
× IQC 
   -0.214**  
   (-2.01)  
FB ×log (Manager’s 
experience) 
    0.017 
    (1.51) 
Host country GC × 
Manager’s experience 
    -0.006 
    (-1.65) 
Host country GC × FB 
× Manager’s experience 
    -0.003 
    (-0.84) 
Year-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.23 0.25 0.20 0.23 0.18 
Observations 1885 1674 1652 1652 1652 
Note: Robust t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significant at 
1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. The parallel analysis of the variance 
inflation factor (VIF) statistics after OLS regression indicate that VIFs are well below the 
recommended threshold of 10, suggesting multicollinearity is not a serious issue for this 
model (Neter, Wasserman, and Kutner, 1985).  
 
140 
 
5.5 IV Regression to Assess the Interactive Role of Resource-based and Institutional 
Moderators in the Bribery-performance Nexus 
To tackle the potential endogeneity issue of firm bribery, the author adopts an instrumental 
variable (IV) approach to re-estimate Eq. (9) and the results are reported in Table 18. 
Following Birhanu, Gambardella and Valentini (2015), the author uses the country-industry-
year average fitted extent of bribery and its interactions with other related variables (i.e., 
host country perceived government pressure, home country anti-corruption index, holding of 
IQC and manager’s experience) as the excluded instrumental variables. The results are 
shown in Table 19. 
It is confirmed that the estimation results in Table 19 are still robust even after tackling the 
potential endogeneity issue. Firm size and technology license from a foreign-owned 
company still statistically and positively contribute to firm performance. The direct impact 
of bribery on firm performance is negative, while it may have some positive influence on 
firm performance when facing relatively high corruption pressures. The impacts of host 
country GDP and its growth rate on firm performance are not robust, indicating that country-
level macroeconomic development can’t directly determine firms’ specific performance.  
The results in Columns (2) to (4) in Table 19 generated by the IV approach are qualitatively 
the same as those in Table 5. The three-way interaction terms in Columns (2) and (3) are 
significant, while is insignificant in column (4). Overall, hypotheses 2 and 3 are again 
supported based on the IV regression results 37 . The four Kleibergen-Paap rank LM  
statistics reject the under identification null hypotheses and the Kleibergen-Paap rank Wald F 
statistics indicate that instrumental variables used here are not weak. 
 
 
                                                 
37 Except for Hypothesis 4. 
2

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Table 19: IV regression results for the integration of resource-based factors and institutional 
factors’ effects on the bribery- performance nexus 
Dependent variable: 
Log(sales per employee) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Host 
country 
institution 
effects 
Home 
country 
institution 
effects 
International 
certificate 
effects 
Manager’s 
experience 
effects 
Firm size 
0.188*** 0.193*** 0.206*** 0.206*** 
(3.10) (3.07) (3.34) (3.35) 
Technology licensed from a foreign-
owned company 
0.843*** 0.873*** 0.766*** 0.790*** 
(2.98) (3.21) (2.88) (2.96) 
Financing obstacle 
-0.028 -0.032 -0.028 -0.034 
(-0.69) (-0.74) (-0.67) (-0.80) 
Informal competition 
-0.030 -0.037 -0.041 -0.036 
(-0.75) (-0.86) (-0.98) (-0.86) 
Export intensity 
-1.006** -1.496*** -1.325*** -1.295*** 
(-2.47) (-3.65) (-3.30) (-3.10) 
Log(firm age) 
-0.010* -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 
(-1.71) (-1.03) (-1.30) (-1.15) 
Log(Host country GDP) 
-0.144* -0.069 -0.128* -0.123 
(-1.74) (-0.90) (-1.70) (-1.63) 
Host country GDP growth rate 
-0.012 0.044 -0.283 -0.268 
(-0.33) (0.16) (-1.13) (-1.05) 
Fitted extent of bribery (FB) 
-1.007*** -1.351*** -1.055*** -1.288*** 
(-3.96) (-5.01) (-5.69) (-4.65) 
Perceived host country corruption 
pressure (Host country GC) 
0.100* 0.945*** 0.163*** 0.212*** 
(1.91) (5.40) (3.16) (2.80) 
Host country GC × FB 
0.152*** 0.740*** 0.216*** 0.278*** 
(3.38) (4.95) (4.25) (3.21) 
Internationally-recognized quality 
certificate (IQC) 
0.409** 0.622*** 1.047*** 0.535*** 
(2.50) (3.73) (2.91) (3.20) 
Manager’s experience 
0.007 0.007 0.007 0.026** 
(1.04) (0.99) (1.02) (2.11) 
Home country anti-corruption 
(HAP) 
 0.703*** 0.187* 0.186* 
 (4.48) (1.71) (1.68) 
HAP× FB 
 -0.076   
 (-1.55)   
Host country GC × HAP 
 -0.218***   
 (-4.76)   
Host country GC × FB × HAP 
 -0.104***   
 (-2.80)   
FB × IQC 
  -0.003  
  (-0.09)  
Host country GC × IQC 
  -0.065  
  (-0.44)  
Host country GC × FB × IQC   -0.227**  
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  (-2.17)  
FB ×Manager’s experience 
   0.017 
   (1.42) 
Host country GC × Manager’s 
experience 
   -0.006 
   (-1.57) 
Host country GC × FB × Manager’s 
experience 
   -0.004 
   (-1.01) 
Kleibergen-Paap rank LM  
statistic 
252.5 523.2 241.1 257.0 
Kleibergen-Paap rank Wald F 
statistic 
1744.4 1435.0 1003.2 1074.8 
Year-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.24 0.18 0.19 0.18 
Observations 1674 1652 1652 1652 
Note: Robust t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significant at 
1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively.  
 
In line with Hitt, Bierman, Shimizu and Kochhar (2001) and Martin, Cullen, Johnson and 
Parboteeah (2007), the author draws conventional graphs for marginal effects to interpret the 
findings, and such moderation effects of home country anti-corruption and IQC are shown in 
Figures 11 and 12 respectively. As shown, the highest level of MNE subsidiary performance 
with a high fitted extent of bribery is achieved when the host country government corruption 
pressure an MNE subsidiary faces is high but the home country anti-corruption index is low 
(or the MNE subsidiary does not have an IQC). By contrast, the highest level of MNE 
subsidiary performance with a low fitted extent of bribery is achieved when the host country 
government corruption pressure an MNE subsidiary faces is low but the home country anti-
corruption index is high (or the MNE subsidiary owns IQCs). 
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Figure 11: Interaction of perceived host country corruption, home country anti-corruption 
and bribery  
Note: GC refers to host country government corruption; HAP refers to home country anti-
corruption practice index. Low level is minus one standard deviation from the mean, and 
high level is plus one standard deviation from the mean. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Interaction of perceived host country corruption, MNE subsidiaries holding of 
IQC and bribery  
Note: GC means host country government corruption, IQC refers to MNE subsidiaries’ 
holding of internationally-recognized quality certification. Low level is minus one standard 
deviation from the mean, and high level is plus one standard deviation from the mean.  
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5.6 Robustness Checks 
For the moderating effect, the author has conducted the following robustness checks. Firstly, 
the author replaces the measure of the home country anti-corruption index with the home 
country’s transparency index (as an anti-corruption measure) taken from the Transparency 
International38. The anti-corruption index of the home country plays a role in shaping an 
MNE subsidiary’s corruption behavior, which is very close to the impact of corruption in the 
home country. The results show that home-country embeddedness can still negatively affect 
the bribery-performance nexus after controlling for the host country corruption pressures 
MNE subsidiaries face. The results are reported in Column (1) of Table 20. 
Secondly, only the manufacturing firms are kept to check the moderating role of an MNE 
subsidiary’s IQC. As quality certificates, ISO 9000, 9002 and 14000 etc., are standards that 
ensure firms’ materials, products, process and services are fit for their purposes 39 , and 
services firms are less likely to get an IQC. This is also confirmed by the data, i.e., 
manufacturing firms have 28% higher probability to own a quality certificate than services 
firms. Therefore, to alleviate the potential attenuation bias, the author keeps only the 
manufacturing firms to re-estimate the moderating effect of quality certificate. The results in 
Column (2) of Table 20 show that IQC can play a role in anti-corruption, and an MNE 
subsidiary with a quality certificate would have worse performance caused by bribery after 
controlling for the perceived pressure of corruption. This also confirms the robustness of the 
results.  
 
 
 
                                                 
38  Please refer to this website for more detail: https://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview. 
39 A similar description can be found on the website of the International Standard Organization: 
http://www.iso.org/iso/home/standards.htm. 
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Table 20: Robustness check-IV Estimates 
Dependent variable: 
Firm performance 
Changing home-
embedded institution 
measure 
 
Keeping only the 
manufacturing 
industry 
Firm size 
0.181*** 0.165** 
(2.87) (2.45) 
Technology licensed from a 
foreign-owned company 
0.761*** 0.831*** 
(2.79) (2.89) 
Financing obstacle 
-0.032 -0.055 
(-0.74) (-1.04) 
Informal competition 
-0.061 -0.145*** 
(-1.43) (-2.80) 
Export intensity 
-1.484*** -1.026** 
(-3.56) (-2.38) 
Log(firm age) 
-0.003 -0.010* 
(-0.62) (-1.80) 
Log(Host country GDP) 
-0.184** -0.144 
(-2.30) (-1.39) 
Host country GDP growth rate 
-0.076 -0.460 
(-0.29) (-1.24) 
Fitted extent of bribery (FB) 
-0.840*** -1.151*** 
(-3.41) (-4.07) 
Perceived host country 
corruption pressure (Host 
country GC) 
0.580*** 0.215*** 
(3.17) (3.21) 
Internationally-recognized 
quality certificate (IQC) 
0.581*** 1.251** 
(3.46) (2.53) 
Home country GC × FB 
0.643*** 0.271*** 
(4.15) (4.18) 
Manager’s experience 
0.003 0.006 
(0.48) (0.85) 
Home country anti-corruption 
(HAP) 
 0.226 
 (1.36) 
Home country corruption 
perceptions index (CPI) 
0.350**  
(2.05)  
Home country CPI × FB 
-0.105**  
(-2.24)  
Host country GC × Home 
country CPI 
-0.140***  
(-2.63)  
Host country GC × FB × Home 
country CPI 
-0.115***  
(-2.63)  
FB × IQC 
 -0.010 
 (-0.21) 
Host country GC × IQC 
 -0.233 
 (-1.53) 
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Host country GC × FB × IQC 
 -0.118* 
 (-1.82) 
Kleibergen-Paap rank LM 2  
statistic 
530.8 147.3 
Kleibergen-Paap rank Wald F 
statistic 
1399.0 445.8 
Year-fixed effect Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed effect Yes Yes 
Pseudo R-squared 0.16 0.29 
Observations 1649 825 
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Column (1) reports the 
estimation results based on replacing the home country law -and-order index by  the Transparency 
International’s country-level corruption index. Column (2) reports the results, which depend on the 
sample that keep only the manufacturing sector as robustness checks for certificate effects . 
 
5.7 Discussion and Conclusion  
Through the integration of IT and the RBV, the author contributes to the theoretical literature 
by developing an analytical framework based on the interactive role of   institutions and firm 
resources, to explain the heterogeneous role of MNE subsidiaries’ bribing strategy on their 
performance (Peng et al, 2009; Oliver, 1997; Brouthers, Brouthers, and Werner, 2008). 
Following this framework, the author identifies and documents the impacts of MNE 
subsidiaries’ bribery in corrupt environments. The overarching argument is that MNE 
subsidiaries’ perceived institutional pressures and specific resources interact with each other, 
jointly moderating the effectiveness of bribery on performance. 
The findings are theoretically meaningful as it assists us in explaining the heterogeneity of 
the impact of bribery on MNE subsidiary performance in a comprehensive way, with careful 
consideration of both resource-based and institutional  factors (Spencer and Gomez. 2011; 
Birhanu et al., 2015; Martin, et al., 2007; Svensson, 2003; Jeong and Weiner, 2012). The 
identification of the interactive mechanisms between bribery, pressures of corruption, 
resources and MNE subsidiary performance also helps managers to understand how their 
firm-specific advantages for addressing corruption in a corrupt environment originate from, 
or are reinforced, and how they can make use of their resources and home and host 
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institutional factors to properly deal with bribery requests and achieve sustainable success.  
First, based on the OLS and IV regressions, the empirical results confirm the author’s 
arguments about the interactive role of institutional and resource-based constructs in 
predicting the impact of bribery on performance. The interaction of bribery, perceived 
corruption, and home country anti-corruption significantly generates negative effect on 
MNE subsidiary performance. This indicates that for MNE subsidiaries from a home country 
with high anti-corruption practices, bribery produces negative effect on performance, 
controlling for the level of perceived corruption. But for MNE subsidiaries from a home 
country with low anti-corruption practice, bribery generates positive effect on performance. 
For MNE subsidiaries from a home country with high anti-corruption practices, bribery 
contributes less to firm performance, controlling for the level of perceived corruption. This 
confirms that MNE subsidiaries from different home countries have different institution -
based resources. On one hand, this is consistent with Cuervo-Cazurra’s  (2006) work that 
MNE subsidiaries from corrupt home instittions are more advantagous in similar institution 
condtions, as they can exploit bribery better and gain extra profits (Sencer and Gomez, 
2011). On the other hand, MNE subsidiaries from home countries with developed 
institutions are in a better position than those from home countries with poor institutions to 
refuse bribery and achieve good firm performance due to their possession of strong internal 
resources. This is an ethical and sustainable way to be successful.  
Second, IQC’s role as a firm resource and anti-cprruption instituion is confirmed 
(Clougherty and Grajek, 2008; Terlaak, 2007; World Bank, 2014). Controlling for the 
perceived pressurs of corruption, MNE subsidiaries’ holding of IQC leads to a negative 
bribery-perfromance nexus. This shows that for MNE subsidiaries that hold strong 
resources, a better way to achieve sustainable and good performance is to pay no bribes. 
This is in line with (Luiz and Stewart, 2013) who suggest that MNE subsidiaries do not need 
to get caught in a vicious cycle whereby they perpetuate corruption in conditions of 
underdeveloped institutions but instead can contribute towards a virtuous cycle through 
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developing resources and ongoing refusal for bribery.  
But the top manager’s role in interacting with institutional conditions and moderating the 
impact of bribery is not all significant. One reason for this insignificant result may be that 
the data about managers’ experiences do not distinguish managers’ characteristics such as 
country-of-origin. Insufficient information about managers may result in the insignificant 
estimation result. For future research, detailed information about top managers should be 
collected and analyzed, such as their country of origin, degree of ties with governments, and 
family relations with government officials (Collins and Uhlenbruck, 2004), as these 
variables are much stronger predictors of whether a firm engages in and exploits corruption, 
to check the role of managers’ experience, as a firm resource, in moderating the bribery -
performance nexus (Collins and Uhlenbruck, 2004).  
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Chapter 6: Conclusions 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter summarizes the main research findings, discusses their theoretical and 
managerial implications, acknowledges the research limitations and provides 
recommendations for future research.  
 
6.2 Summary of Main Research Findings  
Follow Yan and Grey (1994), chapter 2 of the thesis synthesizes past research results on the 
RBV and IT, and identifies their limitations, boundaries, overlaps, and integration 
mechanism in an international business context. Even through the assumptions of the RBV 
and IT are different, or contradictory by traditional views, the author argues that they two 
overlap as they can both be employed in an international business context to explain the 
heterogeneity of MNEs, and they can be integrated as: (a): MNEs select, accumulate and 
formulate firm-specific resources in a certain institutional environment, and in IB, variations 
of MNEs’ embedded institutional environments contribute to the heterogeneity of their 
specific resources; (b): Incorporating both institutions’ indirect enabling role and direct 
supplying role in MNEs’ formulation of resources, institution-based resources assist 
dramatically in explaining MNEs’, especially EMEs’ distinct internationalization 
trajectories; (c): The value and applicability of MNEs’ resources vary upon institutions. 
Institutional factors moderate the effect of resources on MNEs’ internationalization strategy 
and performance; (d): MNEs’ specific resources moderate the effect of institutions on their 
internationalization strategy and performance. Based on the possible integration of the RBV 
and IT, the author further discusses the application of the integration on MNE study, and 
proposes that a): MNEs accumulate institution-based resources from home country 
institutions’ enabling role and supplying role in firm resource development. MNEs’ holding 
of institution-based resources affect their OFDI strategy and performance; (b): Institutional 
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and resource-based factors have their separate effects on MNEs’ OFDI strategy and 
performance, but they then jointly determine MNEs’ OFDI strategy and interactively 
moderate the effectiveness of MNEs’ OFDI strategy on performance. 
 
Chapter 3 aims to examine the impact of EMEs’ state ownership status, absorptive capacity 
and entry strategy on EMEs’ productivity gain from OFDI. The propensity-score matching 
and difference-in-difference (DID) approaches are combined to test the framework. Utilizing 
unique data on Chinese manufacturing firms over the sample period 2002–2008, the author 
finds that 1) An EME without state ownership gains more positive productivity effect via 
OFDI than that with state ownership; 2) The stronger the EME’s absorptive capacity, the 
more positive productivity premium it can get from OFDI; 3) In contrast with greenfield 
investment, the positive productivity effect an EME acquires via M&A is lagged; 4) An 
EME investing in developed countries only gains more from OFDI-led productivity 
enhancement. 
 
Chapters 4 and 5 aim to identify the determinants and impact of MNE subsidiaries’ choice of 
bribing strategy in corrupt environments. The analytical framework is built based on an 
integration of resource-based and institutional constructs, and tested using firm-level data 
from 2210 MNE subsidiaries operating in Africa. Controlling for MNE subsidiaries’ self-
selection to bribe, the findings, based on the Tobit, OLS and IV regression results, indicate 
that the heterogeneity of MNE subsidiary resources and perceived corrupt pressures lead to 
differing bribery strategies in response to host country corruption, and these two variables 
then interactively moderate the impact of bribery on MNE subsidiary performance. The 
author finds that MNE subsidiaries’ perceived level of host country corruption produces a 
positive effect on their choice of bribery. But MNE subsidiaries’ home -country anti-
corruption levels and their holding of internationally recognized quality certification (IQC) 
reduce MNE subsidiaries’ willingness to pay bribes. A more interesting finding is that, after 
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controlling for MNE subsidiaries’ perceived pressures of corruption in host countries, MNE 
subsidiaries’ home-country anti-corruption levels and MNE subsidiaries’ holding of IQC 
negatively moderate bribery’s effectiveness on performance.    
 
 
6.3 Theoretical Contributions and Implications  
Separate applications of the RBV and IT have been criticized by a number of scholars, e.g., 
Kostova and Roth (2008) and Peng (2008; 2009). At the same time, although the integration 
of the RBV and IT has been called for (Hossikisson et al., 2012), and some attempts have 
been made to integrate them, it is still not clear t what their boundaries and overlaps are in 
MNE research, and how we can integrate them (Oliver, 1997; Brouthers, et al. , 2008; Wang, 
et al., 2012; Martin, 2014; Dunning and Lundan, 2008). Rather than merely asking “Whether 
is either the RBV or IT enough to explain MNEs, especially EMEs’ OFDI?”, or “Shall we 
integrate the RBV and IT?”, this thesis firstly contributes to the literature by discerning  
“why” we integrate the RBV and IT, and “how”  we can integrate them. Based on the 
analysis of the integration of the RBV and IT, the author then develops a new model to 
explain MNEs, especially EMEs’ OFDI strategy and performance. The author does not 
disagree with the separate explaining power of the RBV and IT in an international business 
context (Dean and Meyer, 2012; Brouthers et al., 2008; Chen et al. , 2009; Cuervo -Alvero, 
2008; Meyer, 2001; Meyer et al., 2009), but goes further by arguing that resource-based and 
institutional constructs are complementary and interdependent in international business 
research, and a model that recognizes not only the seperate role of resource-based and 
institutional factors, but also their integrative roles could explain/predict MNEs’ OFDI 
activities better. Brouthers, et al. (2008) have emphasized that we should add institutions’  
role into the resource-MNE performance nexus, as resources’ role could be moderated by 
institutional differences across borders. But we further contribute by recognizing that 
institutions’ role in MNE activities could also be moderated by resources. These arguments 
are in line with Svensson (2003), and Marano and Kostova (2016). Besides, via recognizing 
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institutions’ indirect enabling role and direct supplying role in MNEs’ accumulation of 
resources, the author has developed the new concept “institution-based resources”. 
Institutions’ enabling role in firms’ formulation of resources has recently identified by 
Martin (2014) and Cuervo-Alvero (2008), but the author further contributes by discussing 
institutions’ supplying role of resource development for MNEs, specifically for EMEs. As 
EMEs have gone abroad far before they e accumulate enough resources, and invest in a 
distinctive way, recognizing the institution-based resources helps significantly explain 
“why” EMEs’ go global in those ways and “how” they compete in global markets (Buckley, 
et al., 2007). 
 
Given the mixed empirical results of the impact of EMEs’ OFDI on their productivity 
change (De La Potterie and Lichtenberg 2001, Bitzer and Kerekes 2008, Driffield and 
Chiang 2009, Herzer 2011, Masso and Vahter 2008, Hijzen, Inui, and Todo 2007, Barba 
Navaretti and Castellani 2004), chapter 3 takes into consideration the role of EME 
heterogeneity in resource and institutional conditions and entry strategy, and provide insights 
into how resource and institutional conditions affect EMEs’ productivity gain from OFDI. 
After careful control for firms’ self-selection bias and simultaneous bias, chapter 3 firstly 
confirms that generally, there is a positive effect of EMEs’ OFDI on productivity growth. 
This lends support to the learning-by-OFDI argument (Cohen and Leventhal, 1990; 
Cantwell, 1992; Dawar and Frost, 1999; Frost et al., 2002; Zahra and George, 2002). But 
apart from that, the author finds that the OFDI productivity effect varies according to EMEs’ 
holding of resources and their institutional conditions. Private EMEs gain positive 
productivity effect via OFDI while SO-EMEs don’t. As Wang et al., (2012) suggest, SOEs 
can be more resource-abundant because they are closer to government and thus resources. 
But the author then argues that the empirical results indicate that SO- EMEs are unable to 
benefit from learning-by-OFDI, as their heavy resource-dependence on home countries 
pushes them to serve more for national goals, but not economic goals (Cui and Jiang, 2012). 
EMEs’ absorptive capacity helps substantially in EMEs’ productivity upgrade. EMEs’ 
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absorptive capacity works as EMEs’ key tangible resources, shape EMEs’ abilit y of 
recognizing, assimilating, applying and recreating of external valuable knowledge and 
information (Barney, 2001; Deng, 2007). It also helps EMEs to compete in developed 
markets. In line with both the RBV and IT, the results also confirm that EMEs that invest in 
developed countries generate more productivity premium as institutions there include 
agglomerated high-teach resources and well developed infrastructures (Hoskisson et al., 
2013). Furthermore, different from the existing literature which asserts that M&A serves 
better in asset-augmenting (Chung and Alcacer, 2002), estimation results in this chapter 
suggest that OFDI’s productivity effects on EMEs will be lagged because of the firm-level 
and country-level institutional conflicts. Compared with entry by greenfield, M&A asks for 
more to deal with corporate culture and value integration, and produces more historical 
burdens for merged affiliates (Görg, 2000).  
 
Chapters 4 and 5 contribute to theoretical literature by testing the analytical framework 
based on integration of resource-based factors and institutional factors, to explain the 
heterogeneity of MNEs’ OFDI strategy and financial performance (Peng et al., 2009; Oliver, 
1997; Brouthers et al., 2008). The author has examined the determinants and impact of MNE 
subsidiaries’ bribing strategy in corrupt host countries, and the testing results support the 
author’s overarching theoretical arguments by indicating that MNE subsidiaries’ bribing 
strategy is not only determined by institutional factors, e.g., home and host country corrupt 
institutional pressures, but also MNE subsidiaries’ resources, e.g,, holding of IQC. More 
importantly, MNE subsidiaries’ confronted institutional pressures integrate with MNE 
subsidiaries’ resources, moderating the results of MNE subsidiaries’ bribery on their 
performance.  
 
Thus, empirical works in chapters 4 and 5 firstly fill in the research gaps (Peng et al., 2008  
and 2009; Oliver, 1997; Brouthers et al., 2008; Martin, 2014; Wang et al., 2012; Dunning 
and Lundan, 2008) and generate theoretical implications by confirming the propositions in 
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chapter 2 that the RBV and IT jointly determine MNEs’ strategy and moderate its 
effectiveness on performance.  
 
Secondly, this work looks beyond institutional theory (Spencer and Gomez, 2011; Martin et 
al., 2007; Svensson, 2003) in understanding MNE subsidiaries’ choice of bribery, and 
declaring that not only MNE subsidiaries’ confronted home and host country corrupt 
pressures, but also MNE subsidiaries’ holding of IQCs can affect MNE subsidiaries’ bribing 
strategy. As perceived host country pressures of government corruption force MNE 
subsidiaries’ to pay bribes, MNE subsidiaries’ home country anti-corruption practice and 
MNE subsidiaries’ holding of IQCs stimulate them to refuse bribery.  
 
Thirdly, the three-way interactions of MNE subsidiaries’ institutional conditions, resources, 
and strategies on performance generate more valuable theoretical implications. Identifying 
MNE subsidiaries’ home-of-origin as their institution-based resource, the author finds that 
the interaction of MNE subsidiaries’ perceived host country corrupt pressures, MNE 
subsidiaries’ home country anti-corruption practice and MNE subsidiaries’ bribery generate 
negative effect on MNE subsidiaries’ financial performance. This indicates that, controlling 
for the level of MNE subsidiaries’ perceived institutional pressures of corruption in host 
countries, MNE subsidiaries’ bribery produces negative effect on the performance for MNE 
subsidiaries’ from home countries with high anti-corruption, but generates positive effect for 
MNE subsidiaries from countries with less anti-corruption practice. On one hand, these 
empirical results support the theoretical argument by Cuervo-Alovero (2008) who argues for 
MNEs’ comparative advantages in host countries with a similar institutional environment to 
their home countries. But on the other hand, the author highlights that, MNE subsidiaries’ 
home-of-origin, serving as MNE subsidiaries’ embedded resources, helping them to gain 
sustainable profits without engaging in bribery. Similarly, interaction of MNE subsidiaries’ 
perceived host country corrupt pressures, MNE subsidiaries’ holding of IQCs and MNE 
subsidiaries’ bribery also generate a negative effect on MNE subsidiaries’ financial 
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performance. This suggests that controlling for MNE subsidiaries’ perceived corrupt 
pressures, their holding IQCs leads to a negative bribery-performance relationship. This 
result confirms IQCs’ role as MNE subsidiaries’ tangible resources, and a signal for anti-
corruption (Clougherty and Grajek, 2008; Terlaak, 2007; World Bank, 2014). Following this, 
for an MNE subsidiary that holds IQC or other kinds of resources, a better way for them to 
achieve sustainable and good performance in corrupt contexts is to refuse bribery requests 
(Luiz and Stewart, 2013).  
 
Fourthly, as bribing action is unethical but pervasive in Sub-Sahara African countries, 
empirical findings in chapters 4 and 5 about how MNEs react to bribery requests also 
contribute significantly to existing literature on MNEs’ corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
in host countries.  MNEs are now expected to account for all aspects of their performance, 
not just their financial results, but also social performances, i.e., their CSR (Luo, 2006). 
They are suggested to be obligatory to and powerful enough to resist corruption in host 
countries (Luiz and Steward, 2013). But as they operate in diverse institutional environments 
where their relationships with host governments and stake holders are critical and complex , 
it is difficult for them to do that if they do not actively participate in fighting it (Luo, 2006).  
What’s more important, as previous literature has attempted a lot to identify the relation 
between MNEs’ corporate social responsibility and financial performance by asking the 
question that ‘do firms do well by doing good?’, the reported results have ranged from 
showing a negative relation, to showing no relation, to showing a positive relation 
(Rodriguez, Siegel, Hillman and Eden, 2006). Existing literature, eg., Luo (2006) and 
Rodriguez, Siegel, Hillman and Eden (2006) suggest that the integration of the research from 
institutions, corruption and CSR lenses expand our understanding of how and when 
anticorruption MNEs succeed. This work thus confirms their arguments and contributes to 
the literature of MNEs’ CSR by arguing that MNE subsidiaries that operate in high corrupt 
contexts do benefit from strong corporate social responsibility. They achieve sustainable 
financial performance via refusing bribery request. In addition, estimation results in chapters 
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4 and 5 on IQC’s role suggest that IQC works as informal institution and ethical codes to 
force MNEs to carefully consider ethical issues (Luo, 2006). At the same time, with the 
function of IQC, MNE subsidiaries turn out to obtain positive relation between corporate 
social responsibility and financial performance.  
 
6.4 Managerial Implications 
This thesis has significant managerial and policy implications for MNEs and governments. 
In general, it reminds MNEs to look beyond the separate roles of resource-based factors and 
institutional conditions when formulating OFDI strategies. Instead, MNEs need to consider 
resource-based factors and institutional conditions in a more comprehensive way. As 
resource-based factors and institutional conditions are integrative and complementary, a 
strategy that captures both factors can be utilized by MNEs to generate superior and more 
sustainable performance.  
 
Specifically, chapter 3 indicates that productivity premiums EMEs can get from OFDI do 
exist, but they are definitely not automatic, and they differ according to EMEs’ heterogeneity 
in their resources, institutional conditions, and choices of OFDI strategies. OFDI in 
technology-intensive clusters in developed institutions provide EMEs with more possibilities 
to absorb high-tech and upgrade productivity. Thus an EME that invests for asset 
augmenting should consider more to choose developed clusters as destinations. However, a 
prerequisite for real resource augmentation is that EMEs themselves have enough absorptive 
capabilities. EMEs’ pre-OFDI R&D, as intangible resources, helps gain productivity growth 
from OFDI, and at the same time, EMEs’ capabilities in post-M&A management also 
determine whether and when they can benefit after OFDI. With less international 
experiences and tangible resources, EMEs are more vulnerable for foreign liabilities and 
cross cultural differences, and are more difficult to succeed. Therefore the author emphasizes 
that EMEs carefully evaluate their strategic OFDI purposes and their existing pre -OFDI 
resources and capabilities, especially capabilities in post -M&A management, which will 
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highly determine whether their OFDI is going to be profitable, or wasteful.  
 
In contrast with private EMEs, SO-EMEs can access abundant institution-based resources, 
but they actually do not benefit from OFDI in productivity upgrading. As the author has 
argued in chapter 2, EMEs are offered with institution-based recourses and thus invest 
distinctively from traditional MNEs. But the results in chapter 3 indicate that institution -
based resources can act as a double -edged sword. On one hand, institution-based resources 
support EMEs to go abroad to seek for potential markets, strategic assets, or natural 
resources, but on the other hand, they impose many restrictions and pressures on them. The 
higher resource-dependence of EMEs on institutions, the more they are tightly guided, 
political-goals oriented and insensitive to market competition.  This dissatisfying result alerts 
emerging economies a lot. Too much government intervention can be counter-productive. 
Home country support, especially direct financial support could be a driver or a good 
promotion for EMEs’ first step to global investment and competition, but it cannot and 
should not be the enduring guarantee to unlimitedly buy in their loss and keep their 
sustainable success. It might be more wise for emerging market governments to unfasten the 
political shackles for SO-EMEs, and instead, stimulate and help all EMEs to build up 
competitive capabilities and absorptive capability via institutional infrastructure 
development, R&D centers construction, human capital cultivation, market and network 
information supplements, professional consultancy services,  transparent and easier 
financing processes. These not only facilitate domestic innovations, but also enlarge OFDI’s 
productivity effect on EMEs. 
 
Chapters 4 and 5 have also generated significant implications for MNEs. The findings 
provide managers with a crucial understanding of how to deal with bribery requests and 
achieve good performance in a corrupt environment. Perceived government corruption 
interacts with idiosyncratic MNE subsidiary resources to shape the strategic quantity of 
bribery. Government corruption has been argued to help increase efficiency via avoiding red 
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tape, or authorizing specific firm privileges (Kaufmann and Wei, 1999; Wei, 1997). But 
results in this thesis assert that as a strategic choice in response to government corruption, 
the role of bribery on performance is unpredictable and costly. Even through some MNE 
subsidiaries from similar corrupt countries can proactively and systematically take 
advantage of home country institutional embeddedness by carefully formulating bribery 
strategies, their behavior is unethical, and their success is costly and not sustainable.  
At the same time, the author provides evidence that MNE subsidiaries with strong internal 
resources and capabilities have more ‘control right’ and ‘refusal power’, and can achieve 
high performance even by paying no bribe. MNE subsidiaries with strong resources are 
likely to be expected by corrupt local government officials to pay lower bribery than MNE 
subsidiaries without such capabilities. Actually the former type of MNE subsidiaries is more 
welcomed as they bring in high-quality products, capital, high-tech, and experienced talents. 
This result highlights that the fundamental way for MNE subsidiaries to succeed in a corrupt 
environment is to develop strong internal resources and capabilities. This not only confers a 
virtuous cycle for MNE subsidiary performance, but also assists economic development in 
their host countries.  
 
 
6.5 Research Limitations and Future Research Recommendations 
First, firm performance can be financially measured by various indicators, such as sales per 
employee, value added per employee, net profit per employee (Girma, Görg, andamp; 
Strobl, 2004), employment and investment (Dethier, Hirn, andamp; Straub, 2010), return on 
assets, and return on equity (Peng andamp; Luo, 2000). Given the heterogeneous and 
sometimes unobserved incentives and profit hiding behavior, an indicator like sales revenue 
would produce more reliable estimation results. As larger firms may be more visible to 
government corruption (Fisman andamp; Svensson, 2007), the author takes into account the 
size effect by using the number of employees to normalize firms’ sales income. Thus for this 
thesis, the dependent variable – MNE subsidiaries’ performance in chapters 4 and 5  is 
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measured by fiscal year’s sales / permanent fulltime employees + fulltime temporary 
employees, following Wang & You (2012). But more other measures should have been tried 
to ensure the rigorousness and robustness of this thesis’s estimation results. The author adds 
this as a limitation for this study because of the limitation of data access.    
 
Second, in chapters 4 and 5, MNE subsidiary top managers’ experience as a determinant of 
the bribing strategy is not significant, nor is its integration with host country institutional 
corrupt pressures on the bribery-performance relationship. Here the author highlights that 
the insignificance of estimation results might be due to a lack of detailed data about the 
manager’s characteristics, such as nationality, degree of ties with the host country 
government, sectors in which the manager has been worked, relations with host country 
government officials, gender, and education (Collins and Uhlenbruck, 2004). In addition, 
given the limitation of the data set, the author measures top managers’ experience by 
industry-specific  managerial experience rather than international experience. Unrecognition 
of the types of experience might also be the reason for the insignificant estimation results.  
 
Thus more clarifications of MNE subsidiaries’ top manager would help to classify that what 
individual-level features affect MNE subsidiaries’ strategies and the effectiveness of 
strategies. For future research , studies are encouraged to shed light on managers’ influences 
on MNEs’ strategy and performance, as Rugman, Verbeke and Nguyen (2011) emphasize, it 
is MNE subsidiary managers that combine home and host country specific advantages and 
firm specific advantages.  
 
Furthermore, due to the limitations of time and data set, the role of institution-based resource 
on MNEs’ OFDI activities has just been partially tested, based on quantitative methods. 
Future research should consider the complementary nature of qualitative analysis, and 
exploratory works based on in-depth case studies are recommended to develop and test this 
concept in a more comprehensive way. 
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Appendix: The Augmented Olley-Pakes TFP Measures 
In this appendix, I introduce and explain how I use the augmented Olley-Pakes approach 
to estimate firm-level TFP by taking the role of exporting and investing abroad40. 
The first step is to estimate the coefficients of intermediate input and labor input. The 
common Cobb-Douglas production function is adopted here: 
 k l m
it it it it itY A K L M
     (10) 
where, 
itY  is firm i ’s output in year t , itK its capital stock, itL labor input, and itM  is 
intermediary input. Firm i ’s decision to maximize its net future profits is characterized by the 
following Bellman equation:  
 0
1 1 1 1
(k , ,EF ,OFDI ) max{ ,sup ( , ,EF ,OFDI ) (I )
                                        + E[ (k , ,EF ,OFDI ) | ]}
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it it it it it it it it it it it it
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  
 

   
  
  (11) 
where lnKit itk  , it  represents the firm’s productivity, EFit is export status, OFDIit indicates 
firm’s OFDI status41,   represents the liquidation value, ( )it   is profit function, ( )itC   is the 
cost of current investment,   is the discount factor, and 
itJ  means the information firm i  
has in period t . Thus the decision rule for firm i  to exit the market can be written as follows: 
 
1 if (k ,EF ,OFDI )
0
it it it it it
it
otherwise
 


 

  (12) 
where 
it  is an indicator. it equals to 1 if the firm decide to stay in the market, and 0 if it 
decides to exit. I assume that the expected productivity is a function of current productivity 
and capital, then the firm’s investment function can be expressed by Eq.(13) after 
incorporating its exporting and OFDI status.  
 (k , ,EF ,OFDI )it it it it itI I    (13) 
                                                 
40 According to De Loecker (2007), Amiti and Konings(2007) and Yu(2014), exporting firms may have different  
production function as they have access to foreign markets. Similarly, firms engaging in outward foreign direct  
investment may face different input choice, thus have different production function. 
41
 For each fi rm, we let OFDI indicator equal to 1 after i t starts to invest abroad, which implies that production 
process of parent firm will be altered after it conducts OFDI. 
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Then the productivity can be expressed by the inverse function of investment42:  
 1(k , I ,EF ,OFDI )it it it it itI
   (14) 
From now on, I can explicitly control the productivity shock when estimating firms’ 
production function, so as to alleviate the simultaneity bias. The production function can be 
estimated as follows: 
 
0ln ln ln (lnK ,I ,EF ,OFDI )+it m it l it it it it it itY M L g         (15) 
where, 1(lnK ,I ,EF ,OFDI )= ln (k , I ,EF ,OFDI )it it it it k it it it it itg K I
 . Similar to Amiti and Konings 
(2007), De Loecker(2007) and Yu(2014), I utilize a third-order polynomials43 in log-capital, 
log-investment, export dummy and OFDI dummy to approximate ( )g  , i.e., 
 
3 3
0 0
(lnK , I ,EF ,OFDI )= +EF
q
j q
it it it it it it jq it it
j q
g k I

 
（1 +OFDI ）   (16) 
Then I can estimate the coefficient of labor 
l  and intermediary input m . 
The second step is to estimate the coefficient of capital
k . In order to control the sample 
selection bias, a Probit model is employed to estimate the firm’s survival probability. As the 
firm’s survival productivity depends on its productivity and its productivity depends on its 
previous capital stock, investment, export status and OFDI status, a third-order polynomial 
similar to Eq.(16) is utilized to estimate the survival probability. With the predicted 
probabilities itP , I can estimate the coefficient of capital k ： 
 1 1 1 itln lnL lnK ( lnK , )+it m it l it k it it k it itLnY M I g P    

        (17) 
In the last step, firm-level TFP can be calculated from the log-production function with 
the estimated coefficients as follows: 
 ln ln lnK ln lnLopit it k it m it l itTFP Y M        (18) 
 
                                                 
42 Here is an implici t assumption, investment is increasing in productivi ty. Under a  little assumption about the 
production function, Pakes (1994) has verified this assumption. 
43
 Using higher-order polynomials to approximate ( )g  does not change the estimation results (Olley and Pakes, 
1996). 
